



JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
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19971229 069

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-93-004

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3 February 1993

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93UM0358A Moscow *TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
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Cossacks to Serve in Russian 'Hot Spot' Units

93UM0245B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by Guga Lolishvili under the "Georgia" rubric: "Cossacks in Transcaucasus? 'Stanichniki' Visit District Headquarters"]

[Text] A Krasnodar Cossack delegation's recent visit to Georgia passed virtually unnoticed in the atmosphere of the Abkhazia conflict and session of Parliament in progress at the time. The official purpose of the visit by the "Stanichniki" was to hold discussions with the Transcaucasus Military District authorities relative to military service in the Russian troops stationed in the Transcaucasus by young Cossacks. (It is a fact that the manpower level of the Transcaucasus Military District stands at only 60 percent.) In the course of the talks held with Lieutenant General Fedor Reut, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, and with other high command authorities of the district, Armovir Cossack District Ataman Vladimir Ishchenko hinted transparently that it would not be a bad idea if the Cossack initiative were supported by supplying the Krasnodarskiy Kray with a large number of automatic rifles. The district authorities—cool to the suggestion—attempted to change the subject of the dangerous conversion. The sides reached a preliminary accord regarding Cossacks serving in the ZakVO [Transcaucasus Military District]. The district authorities agreed to the Cossacks' proposal that individual units consist only of Cossacks. A final decision will be made after the people from Krasnodar complete a four-day visit in the Transcaucasus, with the purpose being to acquire knowledge about the conditions of serving in Russian Army units that will remain in the area. The latter in Georgia consist of two motorized rifle divisions: the Batumi and the Akhalkalaki Divisions. Specialists are of the opinion that the creation of Cossack units is the only feasible way for the Transcaucasus Military District to make up for the manpower deficit. One can only imagine, however, how the Georgian Parliament will react to the creation of separate Cossack units on the territory of Georgia. And this in light of the fact that many Cossacks are participating in the

Abkhazia conflict as mercenaries fighting against the Georgian Army, thus exacerbating the situation.

Draft Avoidance on Medical Grounds

93UM0352A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Ivan Sergeyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "What Ails the Draftee?"]

[Text] Manning the Russian Army with recruits is becoming increasingly problematical from one draft to the next: there are fewer and fewer young men coming to the induction stations and, as evidenced by our correspondents' data published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 9 December 1992, more and more are being exempted from service for health reasons.

Let us try to examine namely this aspect of the problem—the medical aspect.

As we know, a system of adolescent service existed and operated pretty well in the USSR. Briefly, it was like this: upon receipt of a registration certificate, a 14-year-old lad met the first medical board, had medical records made up, and received the necessary treatment in the event of some pathologies. Thus, up to the age of 18 an adolescent had the opportunity to improve his health and become fit for military service by that time. With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the overall decline in our public health, adolescent service has also begun to "die." Recently, from the speaker's rostrum of a working conference organized by the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation in the city of Rostov-on-Don, where they discussed preparing public health bodies and institutions for working in conditions of the transition to medical insurance of the population, literally the following came from the lips of the top medical chief: preparing a healthy youth is for an army requirement, so let the army do it... This statement might not be considered strange if after serving 1.5-2 years in the army this healthy youth were sent, say, to the moon and did not return to our society.

You will agree that it is naive to demand healthy draftees from a sick society. The sad state of our public health leads to the fact that in 1991 the indicator of fitness for military service, based on the results of medical examination of draftees, decreased by 6.2 percent compared to 1990. And there is no special reason to hope that it will improve this year. During the last two years, the increase in the rate of illness of draft-age youth looks depressing: diseases of the nervous system increased 68 percent; internal organs—47 percent; operative illnesses—41 percent; organs of vision—27 percent; and ailments of the ear and throat. On the whole, beginning in 1991, one out of every five draftees is not drafted for health reasons, while in 1989 only one out of every 10 was not drafted.

Undoubtedly, the latter indicator was influenced to a certain degree by USSR Minister of Defense Order No 436, issued in September 1991, which made serious changes to the Statute on Medical Determination of Fitness in the USSR Armed Forces. According to this order, clinical diagnostic and expert criteria of fitness for military service became stricter. There appeared dozen items which

exempted those from service who just a year ago could have entered the army. The concept of "fit for non-combatant" duty was eliminated; those falling under this late last year and this year were automatically exempted from service. The attitude towards this order today in the army varies. Military medical personnel believe that it will be better for everyone if "healthy" and "practically healthy" young people begin serving in the army. But it is becoming more difficult for workers of the military commissariats to carry out their draft detail. One can also understand the unit commanders, who are forced to assign officers as sentries and boiler room stokers. But given the different assessments of this order, we should not forget that the return of just one draftee under the article "incorrect induction," including for health reasons, over the course of three months costs the state approximately 120,000 rubles.

There is also another nuance here. Having increased the health requirements of recruits, it would not be bad to increase the responsibility of physicians for an incorrect diagnosis that exempts a draftee from service. As was told to me at the Central Medical Board of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, this happens fairly often. Just at the Moscow Induction Center, representatives of the above-named medical board recently brought to light unfounded decisions on unfitness for service: up to 24 percent for operative illnesses; up to 18 percent for diseases of the ear, nose, and throat; up to 10 percent for internal diseases; and up to 6 percent for diseases of organs of vision. Some physicians of draft boards make arbitrary interpretation of the Statute on Medical Determination of Fitness in the Armed Forces when examining draftees, which leads to a significant increase in the number unfit for military service. In addition, in the last 2-3 years, one can trace a steady trend in the work of the boards towards hyper-diagnosis of diseases discovered in draftees. In other words, when making the diagnosis, in most cases the physicians shift the emphasis towards increasing the pathology.

To my suggestion that both "loose interpretation" of the medical fitness determination statute and the tendency towards hyper-diagnosis on the part of physicians may not be altogether unselfish in nature, the chief of the Central Medical Board of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Major-General of Medical Service Valeriy Zolotov, replied:

"This all may be true, but it is quite difficult to prove, especially since the medical boards are made up of people who are insufficiently trained professionally, often elderly, and have a poor knowledge of the statute on medical determination of fitness of draftees."

I found out from a talk with the chief of the Central Medical Board that a new medical examination statute is presently being prepared. It will contain corrections that make more precise and specific the diagnostic and expert criteria of fitness for military service. This is caused, above all, by the fact that after passage of the Law on Military Service Obligation and Military Service there appeared a new legal base, which also imposes new requirements on the health of

servicemen. In addition, the new statute will make it possible to a certain extent to avoid those misunderstandings in diagnosis of diseases and unfounded service deferments mentioned above.

In conclusion, I would like to cite another figure: for Russia in 1991, about 2,000 drug addicts and toxic substance abusers were exempted from service. These are only those who are on the register. And although they account for only 0.8 percent of those appearing at the induction center, we must not forget that we still end up getting in the army people who are inclined to abuse or who abuse drugs, but have not been exposed anywhere.

Here we should think: Do we need a system of adolescent service?

Progress on Contract Service Initiative

93UM0246B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Dec 92 p 1

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Anatoliy Dokuchayev: "The State Must Support Recruitment into the Army and the Navy on Contract"]

[Text] Russian "professionals"... They have appeared. Photo reporters are already turning their lenses to these well-built lads. Advertisements have appeared in the local press that appeal to young men and women to voluntarily enter the ranks of the Russian Army... But the festive, so to speak, hullabaloo and reality—are different things. How do things stand with contract service today?

Quite a bit has been said in the last 2-3 months about the need to introduce contract service. But only today can we firmly say that our state has shifted from words to practical issues. Yes, only right now. The Russian Federation Law "On Defense" that entered into force in October 1992 provides for the Armed Forces mixed manning principle (based on the draft and voluntary service—based on a contract). However, it only declares the principle, without even providing a notion on contract service itself. The Law "On Military Obligation and Military Service" that was adopted by the Supreme Soviet and that should enter into force on 1 January 1993 (that has still not been signed by the Russian Federation President) does that. This legal act establishes the basic regulations for performing military service on contract.

The development of legal acts continues. The Supreme Soviet has tasked its Committee on Defense and Security Issues to submit for a first reading within two months the Statute on the Procedures for Performance of Military Service (the government must prepare it within a month). An entire section in it has been devoted to contract service. However, we will see that document in about 3-4 months and various attachments to it in the form of instructions and methods will also be required... By the way, the United States spent nearly four years on the preparation of the legal base when it began to shift to the army's voluntary manning principle. A specially created state commission was involved with that. In our country, we have an extremely small staff of specialists, in particular less than a dozen

people, at the Ministry of Defense who are working on the extraordinarily difficult and labor-intensive problem.

However, the Ministry of Defense is undertaking energetic steps in this situation. Without waiting until the legal foundation has been completely created, it shifted to practical work on the recruitment of "professionals" in December—the manning level of units and subunits is too low today. The 30 November government decree "On measures for the gradual transition to Russian Federation Armed Forces Manning by Servicemen Serving Voluntarily—on Contract" has served as the point of departure. The government has decided to begin the recruitment of "professionals" and has allocated R6 billion for 1993. Those people who have read the decree (published in the 3 December issue of KRSNAYA ZVEZDA) will say that it does not contain the mechanism for recruitment or performance of contract service. Yes, that is so. But the military department has found a solution here—to use the documents that regulate the service of extended service military personnel and female servicemen. The mechanism has been set into motion. Indeed, with glitches. But we should have anticipated that. The recruitment of "professionals" has been practically assigned to the Ministry of Defense. But what about the organs of executive power of the Russian republics, krais, and oblasts? It is being recommended that they render assistance to the military department. And it would seem that the state must support recruitment into the army and navy and naturally not the efforts of one ministry.

What will be characteristic of the service of Russian "professionals"? Men from 18 to 40 years of age and representatives of the fair sex from 20 to 40 years of age have the right to conclude a first contract. Young men who have reached draft age, soldiers who have served six months, reservists, and also women without children and wives of servicemen, except those who have pre-school age children, are being accepted into the positions of soldiers, sergeants and NCOs.

The contract is concluded between the unit (ship) commander and the individual who is being accepted for duty. In the process, he signs: for 2-3 years—with servicemen who have served no less than six months, for three years with draftees who have a specialty for service in the army, for example, a driver, and also with reservists and women. Subsequently, the contract can be extended for three, five or 10 years. Three types of contracts have been provided for. The first—performance of duty in the cadres of the Armed Forces. The second—performance of duty in the cadres of a specific military unit, institution, or organization. The third—performance of duty in a specific position at a military unit.

A person who does not have a specialty can be sent to obtain one at training centers or subunits based on the commander's decision. Upon completion of training, he returns to the unit to perform his duty.

The positions of junior commanders and specialists who determine the combat capability of units and subunits will be primarily manned by professionals. They are electronics-computer equipment specialists in the Rocket Forces, power

plant and diving specialists in the Navy, parachutists in the Airborne Troops, and also drivers and driver-mechanics of combat vehicles of all branches of the Armed Forces. In 1993, 79 division-sized and smaller units will be manned based upon the mixed manning principle.

It is understandable that we expect conscientious, results-producing service from the "professionals". They must be extremely familiar with vehicles and weaponry, and perform with it like virtuosos during training exercises, and if required, in combat. By the way, their salary level will also depend on their mastery.

Obviously, our readers are interested in how we will provide incentives for the military labor of the professionals.

They will be paid a lump-sum allowance in the amount of one month's salary for their position already upon conclusion of a contract. They will be paid 30% of their prescribed salary during training at the training center. A junior sergeant will receive R750 for his rank, a sergeant—R900, a senior sergeant—R1,050 and, a senior NCO—R1,200. Appropriate sums are stipulated for the military ranks of junior commanders in the Navy. And now about salaries for the post occupied. For rank and file, they will be established from R3,710 to R4,250 and for sergeants and senior NCOs, from R3,980 to R4,820.

Military salaries are not restricted to that. Based upon the results of service during the year that has been completed, monetary awards in the amount of up to two months' salary based on military rank and position will be paid to "professionals" for maintaining high combat readiness and impeccable discipline. They are rendered assistance in the amount of one month's salary during a calendar year. Furthermore, increases to salary have been established for from 2-5 years service—5%, from five to 10 years—10%, from 10 to 15 years—15%, from 15 to 20 years—20% and from 20 to 25 years—25% and so forth (of salary based on position and rank). Increases in the amounts of 15%, 30%, 50% or 100% of the salary based on position have been stipulated for service in remote locations and in locations with severe climactic conditions (depending on the duty performance area). For ranking—up to 10% of the salary for position, depending on the skill. Other additional types of monetary allowances are also being provided for.

And therefore, the total level of the monthly monetary compensation for professionals may total from R3,710 to R13,345 in the Ground Forces, from R4,823 to R15,421 (for flying personnel) in the Air Force, and from R5,194 to R18,535 (for personnel aboard ships) in the Navy.

A number of other benefits have been stipulated for "professionals". For example, they can receive a food ration or monetary compensation in place of it—in October 1992, the cost of rations was R73 per day (up to R2,260 per month). Servicemen are provided with uniforms and equipment. After five years of continuous service, personnel with families who have renewed their contract will be placed on the list and provided housing on a common basis.

The recruitment of "professionals" is already occurring but not especially actively. Time will tell how effective the listed sums and benefits are.

Now about the tactics of the transition to the mixed manning principle. The Ministry of Defense has developed an Armed Forces manning concept under new conditions. It stipulates that 100,000 professionals will be recruited during the first stage—10% from the total rank and file and sergeant corps. During the second stage (1994-1995), up to 30% and during the third stage (up to the year 2000)—up to 50%.

1993 will become a touchstone. It will provide the main thing—the experience of contract manning. Specifically, they plan to study the organization of recruitment work among the population and servicemen, the procedures for the legal wording for entering the service, the experience of teaching professionals and organizing their everyday life and tentatively determine the quantitative and qualitative possibilities for attracting young people into the army. They will clarify the procedures and amounts of material-everyday life and financial support of "professionals" and based on that—the financial and material expenditures.

However, it is already obvious today that a positive result is possible under the condition that the state and its most important institutions will begin to become involved in the recruitment of professionals. For the time being, this is causing headaches only for the "professionals" from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

Decree on Transition to Contract Recruitment

93UM0306B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Dec 92 p 5

[Russian Federation Governmental Decree No 918 of 30 November 1992 on Measures for Phased Transition to Contract Recruitment for Service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces]

[Text]

DECREE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION GOVERNMENT NO 918 OF 30 NOVEMBER 1992 ON MEASURES FOR PHASED TRANSITION TO RECRUITMENT FOR CONTRACT SERVICE IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ARMED FORCES

On the basis of Article 12 of the Russian Federation Law on Defense and of the implementation of measures for phased transition to contract service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Government of the Russian Federation does hereby decree:

1. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense is to initiate action, starting on 1 December 1992, to organize measures for the 1993 implementation of a phased transition to contract service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
2. To undertake, in the initial phase of the transition to recruitment for contract service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, activities designed to encourage citizens to petition for enlistment for contract service, directing these efforts largely to areas suffering a surplus of labor

resources. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is permitted to enlist for contract military service soldiers, sailors, and junior and senior noncommissioned officer personnel who have completed their regular tour of active duty.

3. To instruct the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation to provide in 1993 the sum of 6 billion rubles to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense for the purpose of taking measures related to the initial phase of transition to contract service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

4. That personnel entering contract military service as soldiers, sailors, and junior and senior noncommissioned officers are to be paid at the rates and under the procedure specified in existing legislation applicable to extended service personnel.

Abovementioned personnel are to be paid a one-time bonus in the following amounts:

- a sum of money equal to the base pay and allowances upon signing of the contract;
- a sum of money equal to the base pay and allowances, or twice or three times the latter, upon signing for subsequent extension of the contract, depending upon whether the extension is for 3, 5, or 10 years, respectively.

To conduct periodic review of pay for servicemen in contract service, with the intent of raising their pay to compensate for consumer price escalation and increases in the minimum wage set in the Russian Federation.

5. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense utilize the experience to be gained in implementing the initial phase of transition to contract service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces to develop organizational measures facilitating the implementation of subsequent transition phases, with this to include efforts designed to encourage citizens to enlist for contract service and to provide for the material welfare of servicemen serving a tour of duty under contract;

to be submitted in 1993 to the Russian Federation Government is a report on the work accomplished.

6. That republic executive power agencies at the levels of the Russian Federation, krais, oblasts, autonomous units, and the municipalities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, are to render the necessary assistance to local military management agencies in encouraging citizens of the Russian Federation to enter service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, including service under the contract arrangement.

7. To provide recommendations to the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, Russian State Television and Radio Company Ostankino, television and radio committees of the Russian Federation, and editorial offices of Russian newspapers, for informing the population, on a regular basis, about problems relating to contract service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin

Challenges, Goals of New Training Year Outlined

93UM0316A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Gennadiy Miranovich: "The Army Is Strong Through Proficiency. We Need to Prove That in the New Training Year"]

[Text] The first training year has begun in the Russian Armed Forces. In the background of what is occurring in the world, this, of course, is not an event that merits any special attention whatsoever. So, you could say that this is the time for the military to get to work. But there is something in this "time to get to work" that cannot, it seems to me, leave any person indifferent who is concerned about the fate of the state and its Armed Forces.

This is not simply the beginning of "the next stage of the improvement of the proficiency of the ground and naval forces" to which we were previously witnesses and participants. The ascent is beginning to the qualitatively new army and to qualitatively new levels of combat proficiency. And in this connection, the current training year, no matter what our attitude toward it is, is destined to become a truly unusual event.

Of course, it will be difficult especially for those who have still not managed to settle down at their new deployment location. Last year alone, Russia received nearly 100,000 of its own servicemen from Eastern Europe and from the former Soviet republics. And the withdrawal of troops to its territory will continue. So, the personnel of many division-sized and smaller units will have to develop training plans and programs, so to speak, from the wheels up, while being involved with combat training and with finding their own housing.

The process of creating the Russian Armed Forces and its reduction will continue along with the planned troop redeployments—we all know that they are proposing the withdrawal of 250,000 men to Russian territory by the end of 1995. Furthermore, the difficult economic situation in the country will henceforth require commanders and staffs to be totally involved with supplying food to personnel. Units will have to expand their areas under cultivation and to increase the production of foodstuffs in their private plots...

And yet, despite these and other difficulties, I think that we still have grounds to look ahead with optimism and to hope that planned combat training, for which both soldiers and commanders have so yearned, will finally become the priority in the daily life of the army and navy.

Yes, the Russian Army is young. Only the first stage has been completed in its structural development. But even during the past six months of its existence, quite a bit has been done to support the vital activities of the army and naval organism. The appropriate command and control structures have been created. Development of the Armed Forces structural development concept has been completed, on the basis of which they are already proposing to develop in the near future the concept for the services and combat arms of the Armed Forces. An inventory of weaponry and

military hardware has been conducted. The formation of new Armed Forces formations has begun. The laws "On Defense", "On Military Obligation and Military Service", and a series of the legal acts that regulate the life and activities of ground and naval forces have been adopted. Interim general military regulations have been in force since 1 January. Steps are being taken to increase the social protection of servicemen and their family members. All of this is that base upon which we will have to rely while taking a decisive step on the path to the heights of professionalism.

And we don't have any right to doubt that we are capable of attaining these heights. I will remind you of just one episode. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently wrote about combat firings that were conducted during the course of special tactical training in Moscow Military District. And there was this moment there: in order to increase the professional level of the subunits that are carrying out the tasks, the Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief ordered the manning of tank and weapons crews with 50% officers. And what happened? Each missile and each projectile were placed directly on target. Weapons in skilled hands were frequently operated at the limits of the capabilities that were set forth in them by their designers.

And we could cite quite a few such examples from the everyday life of the young Russian Army.

But will it cost us a lot if what we considered to be a model yesterday does not become an ordinary work standard for us today? This is entirely normal when a commander is capable of skillfully directing his subordinates in daily life and in battle. When a soldier perfectly masters the subunit's organic weaponry and on any terrain, under any climactic conditions, during the day or at night. When a driver-mechanic knows how to skillfully drive a vehicle, maneuver on the field of battle, and negotiate obstacles and barriers. When a subunit NCO has been properly trained to conduct company business and conducts it strictly according to regulations... To ensure all of that—means only to carry out your official duties.

At the same time, the current training year will also have certain specific features that have caused the implementation of the concepts of military structural development and the improvement of the authorized structure of ground and naval forces. Specifically, the transition from the army and division structure to the corps and brigade structure that has already begun will permit the reduction of the number of reduced staff division-sized and smaller units, the organization of duty and training in which, as we know, was a very difficult matter due to the shortage of people. There will also be greater opportunities to establish a full fledged training process and to ensure its combined arms direction in fully manned division-sized and smaller units of which there will be more as a result of authorized staff transformations.

Indeed, even here much will depend on the competence and responsibility of combat training organizers and their ability to rationally utilize the budget appropriations that have been allocated. Commanders and staffs will have to take

that into account. And they will also have to learn to coordinate their plans with the local authorities to avoid any type of misunderstandings.

And in general, it's obvious that the commander will be correct who, while displaying initiative and independence in the organization of duty and combat training, more fully takes into account the realities of the times, local factors and their specific features. For example, experience indicates that, along with the mastery of, so to speak, classical methods of tactics and operational art, today you need to know how to operate in various types of extraordinary situations, during an attack against the unit's position and defended targets, when military garrisons are being blockaded, etc.

Or take, say, this clever question: how to organize tactical training when the unit is barely manned at the 50% level and when you don't have enough subordinates to conduct exercises? And how do you teach a driver-mechanic to negotiate obstacles with a shortage of fuel and POL [Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants]? How to prevent the reduction of the level of professional training of those who are not in authorized positions?... In the search for answers to these and a multitude of other "how" questions, a commander frequently has to count only on those capabilities that he has at the present time. Their either will not be others or they will only be available with time. We need to be prepared for that beforehand.

Incidentally, just like we need to be prepared for the fact that right now you can't organize training based on a single order from Moscow. You'll have to train differently, say, an ordinary motorized rifleman and a soldier from a division of peacekeeping forces, a new recruit and a specialist who has come into the army on contract. In a word, there will already be 100,000 of the latter in the Russian Armed Forces this year. Seventy nine division-sized and smaller units will be manned according to the mixed principle. Meanwhile, the "profs" training program, as the Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate told me, is still only being developed. Therefore, even here—dare, commander, create, create, try?

It turns out to be just like that—dare and create. And how otherwise if it has become your lot to lead the training and education of such an unusual—both according to age, according to level of training, and even according to the sex—of personnel? Actually, quite a bit of inventiveness is needed here.

However, it's a poor commander who counts only on his own efforts. Much will also depend, for example, on how he and his subordinates manage to utilize the far from yet discovered information-education potential of socio-humanitarian training and the new regulations. No inventiveness whatsoever will help if we don't create together the appropriate elements and spiritual atmosphere in the barracks, in the crew's quarters, and in the dormitories for the "profs". An atmosphere that will unite there such varied inhabitants in the high aspiration of loyalty and truth to serve the Fatherland.

INCIDENTALLY. As the Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate reported to the editorial offices, the training year in the Russian Army began in an organized manner on the whole, but... with a large shortage of personnel. The first exercises have been conducted at which the issues of the mobilized readiness of ground and naval forces were worked out.

Initial Reactions to Contract Service System

93UM0353A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Astashkin, under the rubric: "Timely Topic": "Private Ovcharov and Others: How The First Russian 'Professionals' Are Serving"]

[Text] I met Private Nikolay Ovcharov, one of the first Russian 'professionals', in Vladikavkaz. We started to talk. I wanted to understand: what had compelled the young man, two years after he had completed his compulsory service, to once again leave his parents' home in the city of Oboyan in Kursk Oblast. And to come here, in the very intense heat of a "hot spot" in order to continue military service on contract for three years? Everything turned out to be quite practical. After the army, Nikolay got a job as a driver at a road repair-construction administration. He got married. But, alas, family life did not work out. He decided to change his place of residence. But where could he go in our troubled times? One day, a report in the rayon newspaper that the local military commissariat is hiring reserve servicemen for service in the army on contract caught his eye. He came to the military commissariat: so, he said, do you need me? It turned out that they needed him...

I posed this question to Nikolay: does he imagine the difficulties that await him?

"I think," said the "professional", which was unexpected for me because I had prepared myself for a conversation on the problems of establishing service on contract, "that right now it is easier in the army than in civilian life. In any case, there is more order..."

Having become acquainted with the procedures at the unit, I became convinced that Private Ovcharov has basis for saying that. They have lodged him in a separate room in the dormitory where the families of officers live. In December 1992, a soldier's "salary" totaled 4,250 rubles. He is being fed at the officer's mess—and that is plus a rations allowance. Furthermore, a volunteer is paid a bonus in the amount of his salary when he registers for service. And because Private Ovcharov is also directly carrying out a combat mission in a state of emergency area as part of the unified peacekeeping forces, he also receives an additional allowance. As a result, he receives a very decent salary.

Obviously, someone will point out: we're talking about money again but where is the feeling of patriotism and the sense of duty? Of course, I would also very much like to see how men and women, who are motivated by the consciousness of duty and responsibility for the defense of the Fatherland who desire to serve the Fatherland, flock to units and ships. And we will certainly mandatorily turn to these

high concepts in time. But for now... We will not be cunning while many of our "professionals" are now nevertheless more interested in precisely that aspect—monetary-everyday life. And we need to take that into account in our work with them.

In Vladikavkaz, where a German firm recently turned a housing area over for operation, there is the opportunity, say, to resettle volunteers just like, actually, the Russian Federation government decree has provided for. And they will take advantage of that opportunity here while understanding that they are thereby placing that touchstone on which the new Armed Forces manning system will be tested.

During the time that I spent in the state of emergency area, I had the opportunity to visit nearly all of the subunits where the people who have entered the army on contract are serving. I talked with them and with their commanders. The main conclusion: many of them like the new form of military service. At the same time, various types of mix-ups that are arising because, for example, we still don't have provisions on the procedures to carry it out, are interfering with the establishment of that service. People are frequently simply in the dark with regard to the organization of combat training, leisure, and various types of supply and allowances. And not all of them have been as lucky as Private Ovcharov when it has come, say, to setting up everyday life.

We had a lively conversation about that at the unit that Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Nazarenko commands where the officers have organized a sort of "roundtable". And this is the kind of question that arose in the process. Five men in the unit are serving on contract. Two of them—are married. The question arises, where will they settle these people if they return from leave with their wives? Or another question.

"I served two years of compulsory service at a battalion as a driver of heavy cargo vehicles," Private Andrey Klimov said. "I have experience driving under mountain conditions. I decided to serve more on contract. Frankly speaking, I wanted to sit behind the wheel once again. However, I am faced with retraining as an operator."

"Why?"...

The soldier shrugged his shoulders.

"The fact is," explained Unit Chief of Staff Major Anatoliy Shut, "that we can only assign our 'professionals' as drivers only to vehicles with up to a 2.5 tonne cargo capacity, based on the list that we have of primary specialties, but we don't have any such vehicles at the unit..."

"But there is a vacant driver instructor position at the unit," said Klimov, not retreating. "I would certainly be more useful there. And while you are retraining—its time to plan to go home..."

There are high feelings for you. A man wants to work at full strength, not in words, but in deed to strengthen the subunit's combat readiness. I noted that same desire in another volunteer—Junior Sergeant Aleksey Fateyev. He is a section commander and has personnel work experience. However, he will also have to begin his contract service, as

they say, from zero. Fateyev, just like Klimov, has been assigned as an operator because section commander is not on the above mentioned list.

During the course of the conversation, this nuance also surfaced. It turns out that there are quite a few sergeants and soldiers in the unit who, having served out their compulsory service, are not averse to concluding a contract with the commander. But first of all they would like to go home: maybe they will manage to find a good little job there. Well, but if nothing worthwhile turns up in civilian life, they will return to their native battalion and continue service on contract in their previous specialty.

"That's life. In principle, we are also prepared to accept that condition," noted Lt Col Nazarenko. "But according to the established procedure after a soldier or sergeant is released into the reserve, the unit commander already does not have the right to conclude a contract with him. But if he arrives with documents prepared by the local military commissariat, that's another matter. And it's well known that the military commissariats are sending people to serve on contract to that location that is written on the order... In a word, we need precise mechanisms to organize this important matter."

Here, as they say, you can't exaggerate. The sooner the troops receive the statute on the procedures for performing military service, including on contract, which, as we all know, is being developed right now, the greater the chances of establishing it already this year.

Illegal Paramilitary Organizations in Tatarstan

93UM0353B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Volga Military District Press Center Chief Andrey Bondarenko: "The 'Shadow Army' That Allegedly No One Notices: By Whom and How Illegal Paramilitary Formations Are Being Created in Tatarstan"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported on the appearance of so-called "national guard" detachments in Tatarstan that have been created under the All-Tatar Social Center. At the end of 1992, the creation of Tatarstan's own "military council" and plans to form the "army of the people of Tatarstan" were announced by another sociopolitical organization—Milli Mejlis of the Tatar People which claims the role of the republic's highest legal organ.

The question of the creation of its own paramilitary structures was officially raised at the 1st and 2nd Congresses of the Tatar Social Center (TOTs) by Republic People's Deputy Reserve Colonel Fandas Safullin. Subsequently, the idea of creating a military organization began to acquire increasingly greater numbers of supporters among Tatar nationalists-radicals. In 1991, although small in number but structurally organized youth "self-defense groups" had already appeared in the cities of Naberezhnyye Chelny, Almetyevsk, and Bugulma.

At the beginning of January 1993, the largest "national guard" paramilitary formations existed under the Kazan and Naberezhnyye Chelny departments of the Tatar Social

Center (approximately 500 and 700 people, respectively). A special assembly point has been created in Naberezhnyye Chelny under the TOTs city department and office space has been allocated to the "national guard" headquarters where round the clock duty is being performed by internal detail forces. "Guard" members have been organizationally divided into "teams of five" and the issues for their notification and assembly have been worked out. Classes on military topics are being periodically conducted with the "national guardsmen".

Manning of "national guard" detachments is being carried out primarily using volunteers from 19 to 23 years of age regardless of nationality. There are quite a few deserters from the Russian army among the "national guardsmen". There is a special log at the TOTs headquarters office for the registration of servicemen who are AWOL [absent without leave] from their units (nearly 800 deserters had been accounted for at the beginning of the year). A "National Guard of Tatarstan" stamp has been entered on the military service card of those who have agreed to join the ranks of the "defenders of sovereign Tatarstan".

The Milli Mejlis "Military Council" is aggressively seeking to conduct an independent republic military policy and to create their own armed forces in Tatarstan. In the process, Milli Mejlis' military ideology is quite seriously asserted: "Any Mafioso formation is now arming itself, only we are not seriously involved with that".

They are examining, first of all, the theft and seizure of weapons of Russian Army and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] military units that are located on the territory of Tatarstan as ways of supplying weapons to the illegal paramilitary formations. Second, the capabilities to produce them at local enterprises. And, finally, the purchase of combat weapons in nearby foreign states, specifically, in Chechnya.

These paramilitary formations are outside the laws—of both Russian and Tatarstan's laws, but they exist practically legally in the republic. Today the authorities are not undertaking any steps whatsoever despite their active illegal activities. Republic Femida is throwing up its hands: they say, the 17 October 1991 Tatarstan Presidential Edict on Banning the Creation and Activities of Public Paramilitary Formations on the Territory of the Tatar SSR does not extend to the national guard since the procuracy does not have information that the national guard has weapons.

Of course, for now the "national guardsmen" do not have barracks or weapons and people are dispersed in homes. However, I think that it is nevertheless possible to categorize them as a paramilitary formation. Based on a whole series of indicators: the presence of command personnel, relations of subordination toward each other, the presence of regulations, the text of an oath and its adoption by individual members, etc.

Both republic and federal law enforcement organs know about all of this but there has not been any reaction whatsoever from them. As a result, the activity of the paramilitary formations in the republic continues to expand

and has already shifted to neighboring Chuvashiya where guerrilla detachments—the “gray wolves”—have appeared.

So, are these facts enough to become convinced that Tatarstan's “shadow army” is not a fabrication?

INCIDENTALLY. At a time when the Tatarstan leadership has flown to Moscow to conduct negotiations with the Russian President, the All-Tatar Social Center has disseminated a document in Kazan under the title “Voyennaya doktrina Respubliki Tatarstan” [Republic of Tatarstan Military Doctrine]. Its authors are demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Tatarstan, and the elimination of the KGB and military commissariats. They propose transferring the functions of defense from an external threat to the UN Security Council and the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. And to also create “security forces” that consist of the republic national guard, to form republic internal troops, civil defense, construction units, and mobilized service subunits under the local authorities.

There's no doubt that this can disrupt even more relations between Russia and Tatarstan and it can inflict a blow on the Federation Treaty.

CIS: POLICY

Grachev Comments on 21 Jan Defense Ministers' Council Session

93UM0345A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Oleg Falichev and ITAR-TASS Correspondent Andrey Naryshkin: “We Advocate Collective Security”]

[Text] Based upon a request from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Oleg Falichev and ITAR-TASS Correspondent Andrey Naryshkin, Russian Federation Minister of Defense General of the Army Pavel Grachev commented on how the discussion of issues proceeded at the 21 January CIS Countries Defense Ministers' Council session. The conversation occurred on the eve of the meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of State when the final results of the negotiations, including on defense problems, were still not known.

While speaking about the disagreements which were brought to light during the course of the discussion of the issue on the composition of the Strategic Forces by the defense ministers, General of the Army P. Grachev noted that Russia proposes using the term “Strategic Nuclear Forces”, ascribing to that concept not only the missile complexes themselves but also the nuclear warheads that are located on strategic bombers, missile attack warning, antiballistic missile defense, and PVO [Air Defense] systems and certain other command and control systems. Certain independent states, and also the CIS Unified Armed Forces Main Command, do not desire to include all of these components in the Strategic Nuclear Forces.

These contradictions were especially obviously manifested at the Defense Ministers' Council session when the positions of Russia and Ukraine were compared. The Ukrainian

side did not agree with the fact that the Strategic Nuclear Forces that are located on its territory are Russian. The Ukrainian representatives think that these forces are the property of Ukraine but at the same time Ukraine rejects the status of a nuclear state. Here some sort of paradox arises. Its obvious that we will not come to an agreement at the defense ministers' level, noted General of the Army Pavel Grachev. He said that this issue obviously must be resolved at the heads of state level.

The political understanding on the Strategic Forces that was reached at the Moscow Meeting of the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine remains in force, stressed the minister. Ukraine is granting our specialists access to the nuclear systems that are located on its territory for their technical servicing, operational checks, and replacement of assemblies and parts. As President Boris Yeltsin has already stressed, Russia is assuming responsibility for providing Ukraine's nuclear security.

While describing the Republic of Belarus' position, General of the Army Pavel Grachev noted that “everything has already been resolved here”. Belarus has ratified all of the agreements on nuclear weapons and it only remains to make more precise the schedule of their withdrawal from Belarusian territory and their subsequent destruction“.

The Kazakh position is close to the Belarusian position. The Kazakhstan defense minister has proposed to Russia the examination, on a bilateral basis, of the issue on the procedures for the destruction of the nuclear weapons that are deployed on the territory of that state and this issue will be resolved in the next few days.

As for the draft agreement on clarifying the composition of the Strategic Forces, then, according to Minister of Defense Grachev's assessment, it has still not been adequately worked out. Russian, Ukraine and Kazakhstan need to clarify the content of the concept of “Strategic Forces” on a bilateral basis. That could take approximately one month. When the list of division-sized and smaller units that fall under this definition has been compiled, it can be submitted for discussion of the next session of the Heads of State Council, said the Russian minister of defense.

Speaking about the agreement on the utilization of satellite communications for military purposes, General of the Army Grachev noted that this draft does not respond to the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense. “We think that satellite communications systems must be utilized based on bilateral agreements of the CIS states concerned. Military-space forces are Russian forces,” the minister stressed.

Grachev said that the Russian delegation had approved the draft agreement on long-range navigational support but under the condition of shared financing of this program by all CIS states.

The Russian minister of defense also talked about the problem of bringing the military law of the Commonwealth states closer together. We supported the decision on submitting this issue for review by the Interparliamentary Assembly, he said.

Having touched upon the problems of the utilization of the appropriations for the maintenance of the CIS Unified Armed Forces Main Command, Grachev stressed that Russia is prepared to approve the submitted account but at the same time has proposed to the Commander-in-Chief to seek the fulfillment of the agreement that regulates the transfer of contributions for its maintenance by the independent states. Unfortunately, certain members of the Commonwealth, specifically, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine, have not yet transferred the agreed-upon sums to the appropriate account.

While answering the correspondents' questions on the need to preserve the Commonwealth's common defense structures, General of the Army Pavel Grachev noted: "We are not losing optimism and we believe that some sort of commonwealth will be preserved, if only among the six states who have signed the Treaty on Collective Security at Tashkent. Many states that are members of the Commonwealth see very well that they cannot independently build either an army or a system to provide national security. Their aspiration for a rapprochement with Russia is already obvious. If they display an interest in cooperation, Russian is prepared for an equitable dialogue. We have always advocated and will advocate a single collective security system".

Defense Ministry Collegium on 1993 Budget

93UM0308A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 24 Nov 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Army: Budget Remains Unchanged"]

[Text] Russia's 1993 military budget as expressed in relative figures is being planned at the present level. This was stated yesterday by Boris Yeltsin, President and Commander in Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, at a session of the Defense Ministry of Defense Collegium.

Participating in the Collegium's session are Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov; Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy; governmental and ministerial leaders; high officials of the Ministry of Defense; commanders of the service branches, military districts, groups of forces, fleets, armies, and flotillas; and Army corps and squadron commanders.

Boris Yeltsin stressed in a speech that "the Ministry of Defense has exercised in a very short period of time"—six months—"an appreciable amount of enthusiasm in taking up the difficult matter of construction of the Russian Armed Forces," but that the session's participants nonetheless face a sizeable number of important problems. "What I have in mind is having direct and open discussions, not varnishing of the truth. I would like to obtain a clear picture of the true progress being made by military reform," remarked the President.

Decree on Military, Vocational Training of Draft-Eligible Youth

93UM0319A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 93 p 1

[Russian Federation Government Decree signed by V. Chernomyrdin, 30 December 1992: "The Army Needs Professionals—'Goszakaz' for Professional Technical Education: Russian Federation Government Decree 'On Training Military-Technical Specialists at Professional Educational Institutions For Performance of Active Military Service'"]

[Text] Considering the need to man the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other military formations that are not part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, with trained military-technical specialists, the Russian Federation Government resolves:

1. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense will conduct training of conscripts in military-technical specialties at professional educational institutions from among working and temporarily not working young people, students at professional educational institutions who are studying professions that are not related to military-technical specialties (only in non-class time), and also training of students of professional educational institutions who are studying related civilian specialties and who are subject to conscription for active military service.
2. Determination of the number of conscripts and students who are studying related civilian specialties who are subject to training for active military service in military-technical specialties at professional educational institutions is considered to be the prerogative of the Russian Federation Government. The list of specialties and training programs is determined by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and is coordinated with the Russian Federation Ministry of Education.
3. Establish that the Russian Federation Ministry of Education will annually train for active military service 29,000 motor vehicle drivers from youth who are subject to conscription for active military service and also 27,000 conscripts who are studying at professional educational institutions in related civilian specialties at professional educational institutions.
4. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense will supply professional educational institutions with motor vehicles and other vehicles, spare parts for servicing and repairing the vehicles, fleet and garage equipment, POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants], equipment, and material-technical and visual training aids in accordance with the supply tables for payment.
5. The Russian Federation Ministry of Education will organize at its expense the feeding of conscripts at professional educational institutions according to the norms and cost of the daily food ration that has been established for students of professional educational institutions, provide place in dormitories for conscripts from other cities, and provide special clothing (coveralls and mittens).

6. The leaders of enterprises, organizations and institutions will release from work conscripts who have been sent for training and keep the jobs and positions they hold for them during the entire training period, pay 50% of the average monthly wage based upon their job and also pay the cost of round trip transportation to the training site.

7. The Russian Federation Ministry of Education will carry out financing of the training of military-technical specialists at professional educational institutions using appropriations that have been allocated from the Russian Federation republic budget.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin
30 December 1992

Commentary on Military, Vocational Training Decree

93UM0319B Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
10 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Dokuchayev: "Our Commentary"]

[Text] The issues of strengthening the defense capability of the Fatherland and increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces in the majority of countries—is the prerogative and concern of the state and a matter for all the people. The decree that has been published by the government is additional evidence that these principles are also becoming characteristic for the Russian Federation.

We all know that the Achilles' Heel of our army and navy in recent times is the gross undermanning of junior specialists at subunits and units. Because of that, it is impossible to conduct full fledged tactical exercises or firing training in many companies and batteries, battalions and divisions. Moreover, the army is also sensing a low level of general educational and technical training of conscripted youth in general. Today young men are arriving at units who have not held a training assault rifle or machinegun in their hands. But this, as they say, is only half the work because they can rapidly learn to handle weapons in the regiment. Something else is worse: subunits that are saturated with modern weaponry and electronics are being augmented by people without any technical skills whatsoever.

The primary cause of this inauspicious picture is clear—the pre-conscription training system (initial military training) that existed in the country has been thoroughly destroyed in recent times. Of course, not everything was ideal in this sphere in the former single state and far from everything is appropriate for a new democratic state. But another thing is also true—the system that existed operated and trained young people well for service in the army. Young people became acquainted with the fundamentals of the military profession at schools and professional-technical schools. And DOSAAF schools? They annually trained tens of thousands of drivers, radio operators and motorists for the army, air force and navy. Tens of thousands more young people underwent training at courses and at sports-technical clubs. Military departments did their part to improve the training of young people at VUZs. And therefore many conscripts

were sent directly to line units, bypassing training subunits, since they possessed sound military-technical knowledge and skills.

The published decree should give hope to cadre military personnel. Of course it affects only one of the aspects of pre-conscription training. But it will still introduce some sort of direction. It has been precisely, clearly, and specifically stated: professional educational institutions must train specialists for the army. The financing procedures have been defined and specific boundaries have been noted...

We often say: training of young people for service—is the concern of the entire state and all of society. But all of this will be good intentions if the tasks of specific state and social structures are not defined and if we don't indicate those people who are precisely responsible for some portion or other of this important work. This decree—is a step in that direction. But we think that many others must also follow behind it.

The army must not be left face to face with its pain and problems. If we want to have Armed Forces that meet modern demands and that are based on high professionalism, we need to have a coherent, painstakingly considered, and fine-tuned in all of its elements system for training future soldiers.

Law on Servicemen's Status Returned for Parliamentary Review

93UM0342A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
20 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vladimir Yermolin under the "Events and Commentary" rubric: "Law on Status of Servicemen Not Passed, Returns for Parliamentary Review"]

[Text] On 22 January, the Supreme Soviet is to review changes made by the RF [Russian Federation] President in the Law on Status of Servicemen, and Legal and Social Guarantees for Citizens Discharged from Military Service and for Their Dependents. In the opinion of the bill's drafters, the changes do not deal with the essence of the document; they tend to be more specific in nature. Also, the changes do nothing to reduce the proposed benefits.

As expected, objections have been raised relative to modifications the Committee on Problems of Defense and Security has introduced into the text of the first version. In particular, the Committee intends to restore the previous shorter title, Law on Status of Servicemen; provide a greater rationale for the serviceman's specific need for legal justification of his status (limitations of his rights; his duties and responsibility as shaped by the peculiarities of military service); restore to a number of articles their previous legal parlance; and accomplish other items.

Is there a detailed discussion of the President's changes in the offing? Much will depend upon the position taken by the Committee on Problems of Defense and Security. Incidentally, this Committee has enough on its mind, with its Law on Military Obligation and Military Service, which, returned to Parliament by the President as early as

December, has yet to be prepared for deliberation. The remarks attaching to that draft are somewhat more weighty than in the Law on Status.

Scheduled for discussion on 21 January—not 20 January as previously reported by our newspaper—is review of the second reading of the draft Law on Pension Provisions for Servicemen.

Tuesday's parliamentary session involved committee and commission work. In addition to the presidential changes made in the Law on Status, the working groups of the Committee on Affairs of Invalids, War and Labor Veterans, and Social Protection for Servicemen and Their Dependents labored over the draft Law on Veterans.

Privatization Vs Servicemen's Interests

93UM0350A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Yuriy Gladkevich: "Large-Scale Privatization Is Beginning: The Interests of the Servicemen Have Not Been Taken Fully Into Account"]

[Text] Large-scale privatization in Russia has finally entered its active phase. The selling of enterprise shares, auctioning by check and the existence of special privatization funds are all making it possible for Russia's citizens to use their vouchers as they see fit. They can build up a portfolio of stocks and manage them on their own, write investment checks to an investment fund or even sell the vouchers for cash....

There is a large group of people whose ability to use checks is objectively limited, however. These are the military personnel. The specific nature of the service and the remoteness of many of them from the "central stations" of the securities market actually prevent them from purposefully studying market conditions and participating actively in the market. The only real way for them to take part in the process of redistribution of state property and its subsequent management is to participate in special investment funds.

Such a fund involving active participation by the Russian Ministry of Defense has been set up and named the Zvezda. It was registered on 16 December of last year. According to Valeriy Shaposhnikov, general director of the fund, however, it is still too early for the fund to begin operating.

"It is perfectly justified," Valeriy Shaposhnikov believes, "for the servicemen, who find themselves on an unequal footing with their fellow citizens, to expect guarantees from the state that their privatization checks will 'perform' effectively. Benefits with respect to taxation, data support and participation by state banking structures in the operations are crucial to our fund, whose main purpose is to provide social protection for servicemen. We hope that the government will accommodate us."

The servicemen have legal grounds for counting on state support: the edicts issued by the President of the Russian Federation On Measures of Social Protection for Servicemen, Former Servicemen and Their Families and On

Steps to Set up a Securities Market in the Process of Privatizing State and Municipal Property. They also have a powerful ally in the person of Russia's State Property Committee.

"I can see no particular reasons to refuse to provide a set of benefits and privileges for a fund set up in the interest of the servicemen" says Dmitriy Vasilyev, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation's State Property Committee. "Naturally, a fund which will operate on an interregional basis (our army is distributed throughout Russia) needs a deposit bank with an extensive network of subdivisions. This could be the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation, the Bank for Industrial Construction or the Central Bank of Russia. We are engaged in talks on the matter, and I believe that we can solve the problem. With respect to tax benefits, we have sent a proposal on the matter to the Committee for Investment Policy of the Supreme Soviet. We have not received a response, but we shall work persistently for passage of decisions on the matter."

Support from such a powerful structure as the Russian Federation's State Committee for Property means a lot, of course. It does not fully guarantee that the interests of the servicemen will be observed in the privatization process, however. Only the nation's government and its parliament can provide such a guarantee. Are they prepared to do so?

Certain facts evoke doubts. I believe, for example, that attempts have been made of late to emasculate the essence of privatization by rejuvenating the idea of turning the enterprises over for ownership (partially—up to 80 percent—or totally) by the labor collectives. The parliament only has to adopt a decision, and the servicemen will be completely excluded from the privatization process, in which case their checks will be good only for papering walls or lighting stoves. Is that what we expect from the reform?

It is apparent that servicemen—and members of other groups of citizens not employed in actual production, incidentally—need to struggle vigorously for their property rights. This is not a matter of some sort of political maneuvering, mass-meetings or anything else unacceptable to the people in shoulder boards. I am talking about active lobbying for the interests of servicemen in the parliament. It includes enough military deputies and people sincerely concerned with the fate of the army, as does the government. "Lobby" is certainly not a dirty word here. We know that there have long been special-interest groups in the parliament: the management corps, labor collectives, private farmers.... The military faction, on which the hopes of hundreds of thousands of people in shoulder boards are pinned, has not yet had its say.

We shall probably not encounter a blank wall of incomprehension in this matter of defending the interests of servicemen in the area of privatization. The parliament and the government are cognizant of the fact that a lot of money out of the state budget and proceeds from the sale of technical military equipment of the armed forces will have to be spent on the social protection of servicemen and individuals released from the military service, on housing and retraining for them. Is it therefore unreasonable, for example, to offer

a small portion of these funds in the form of benefits to the investment checking funds which have already announced that they intend to expend part of these dividends on the retraining of personnel released into the reserve and on housing construction for servicemen and reservists? And is it absolutely essential to sell off all of the technical military equipment presently at military depots? According to Albert Sozhin, an expert with the State Property Committee, a certain amount could be put into legal civilian circulation to generate profits, and the profits could be invested in the implementation of specific social programs.

According to specialists with the Russian Federation's State Committee for Property and the directors of the Zvezda investment checking fund, a system of state support for servicemen in the area of privatization is already emerging in some ways. Such an "intractable" problem as that of making premises available for the investment fund for social protection of servicemen, for example, is actually fairly simple. Russian laws grant the State Property Committee exclusive authority to dispose of state property, including the authority to allocate space for special purposes. Finally, the Russian president's Edict on Measures to Set up a Securities Market contains a provision requiring state structures to assist socially oriented privatization funds. And it must be put into force.

"Or take the military-industrial complex. This is an enormous accumulation of property," Dmitriy Vasilyev says. "I believe that the interests of the servicemen must also be taken into account in the conversion of VPK [military-industrial complex] enterprises. The privatization of civilian branches of industry produced examples of unprecedented benefits for the labor collectives. Why not extend the same benefits now to the military. Why not, as an example, make them the equals of members of the labor collectives in the acquisition of shares in these enterprises? Or why not conduct open registration for privatization funds set up for the benefit of the servicemen for acquiring shares in these enterprises?"

In short, we have some specific proposals for ensuring that the interests of the servicemen are not infringed upon in the privatization. They can be discussed, debated, supplemented and adjusted in the parliamentary debates and at conferences in government circles. There is only one thing we must not do: reject them out of hand and drive the people in shoulder boards away from the table around which what was recently "common national" property is being divided up. The armed forces and each person who has devoted himself to the service have done a great deal to see that this property was preserved and multiplied. To cheat them out of their share today and fail to take their interests into account would not only be unfair but would be fraught with the danger of exacerbating tensions in the military environment.

Topics of Minsk Defense Ministers' Conference

93UM0349A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by Oleg Falichev, Valeriy Kovalev and Oleg Odnokolenko: "Once Again on the Agenda, the Fate of the Commonwealth: Economics Have the Say"]

[Excerpt] A session of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers was held in Minsk yesterday. It was almost cancelled due to inclement weather. A package of documents was submitted for discussion, the main one involving changes in the agreement on strategic forces. The concept "strategic forces" was interpreted fairly broadly in documents previously signed. It covered formations and units of practically all branches of the armed forces. Now, at the suggestion of the Main Command of CIS Joint Armed Forces, it is to include only those military formations and installations armed with or safeguarding strategic nuclear weapons, as well as units supporting their operations. These formations will obviously include the RVSN [Strategic Missile Troops], the naval and air components of the Strategic Nuclear Forces and individual subunits of the Air Defense Forces. Furthermore, each state will compile its own list.

As Lieutenant-General Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the Commonwealth Council of Defense Ministers, stated, the Moscow meeting between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine did a great deal to help bring the positions closer together in this area. There is a purely technical aspect of the issue, however. It has to do with the fact that no Commonwealth state except Russia is in a position to provide the security and the appropriate technical conditions for maintaining the nuclear weapons.

That same day, within the framework of the meeting of military ministers, there was a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Committee, which includes the heads of military departments of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. Assessing the results of the first session of the Council of Defense Ministers, he said, among other things: "We worked fairly productively and closely. We reached mutual understanding on most issues on the agenda." General of the Army Pavel Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, also expressed satisfaction with the results of the first day's work. His answer to a question posed by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was brief and categorical: "I am satisfied for now."

According to preliminary reports four issues are being discussed at the session of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government of the CIS Nations: "On the Establishment of an International Bank," "On Regulation of the Interstate Securities Market," "On the Draft Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States" and "On the Statute on the Economic Consultative Working Commission Under the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth."

Eight issues will be discussed at a separate session of the Council of Heads of State.

Officers Discharged for Criticizing Ministry

PM0102125993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Jan 93 First Edition pp 1-2

[Aleksandr Mozgovoy report: "Military Reform: Victims of Article 'On Unsuitability...'"]

[Text] Cutbacks in the armed forces are a natural and irreversible process. But this is how the natural process is appearing: Officers who would be delighted to serve, who are able and willing to benefit the Army and Navy are often liable to discharge. Why is that?

This was discussed at a recent meeting of the leaders of a number of officers' organizations and movements in the White House on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment under the auspices of the "Army Reform" deputies' group.

I would point out that all the leaders of the military public organizations present at the meeting are now in the reserve or retired. And not through choice. "We were discharged for protecting servicemen's social interests," Colonel Vladimir Kandalovskiy, the "Army Reform" group's press secretary, stressed. For 18 months he was in charge of the coordinating council of officers' assemblies in the Baltic region. The opinion expressed on this subject by Major-General Vladimir Platonov, leader of the "Officers for the Revival of the Fatherland" organization, was more forthright: "Wholesale discharges of activists from the officers' movements are designed to conceal from the people the disorganization within the Army and Navy. The selfish individual interests of the Defense Ministry leadership are also behind all this. I am amazed that the officers' organization leaders are not yet coming under fire."

Perhaps these harsh opinions are based on routine grievances? Needless to say, these grievances do exist. As you know, people do take offense at any actions, words, and deeds that violate their social status and dignity or, ultimately, their philosophical positions. But it would in my view be wrong to treat this merely as an outbreak of personal resentment and ambition.

I am by no means sympathetic to all the declarations and opinions voiced in the program documents presented by all manner of officers' organizations. There are considerable differences between these associations themselves. But the fact that their leaders sat down at the same table and talked about their common pain is highly indicative.

All is not well within our Army. That was also pointed out at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies. The Congress decree on the situation within the armed forces stated: "Reform of the Armed Forces is being conducted too slowly... The Russian Defense Ministry is not showing sufficient persistence in ensuring troops' combat readiness and social protection for servicemen and in strengthening troop discipline." The same Russian Federation Defense Ministry document orders "reform of the Armed Forces to be continued in order to create the army of a democratic state... and close links with organs of state management and public organizations (the stress is mine—author's note) maintained in order to reinforce the prestige of military service and eliminate negative phenomena in the Army."

Now a word about military reform. The leaders of the officers' movements spoke as one man about "dualism" on the part of the Defense Ministry leadership regarding the implementation of this reform. Abroad and from lofty platforms at home prominent Army officials campaign for the radical reorganization of the armed forces, while privately they say in "showdowns" with undesirable officers: There can be no reform because there can never be any reform. I will not venture to judge how reliable these claims are. But there is after all no smoke without fire.

The situation as regards collaboration between the Defense Ministry and public organizations is clearer. There is every indication that it has simply been decided to destroy the public organizations by depriving them of their leaders for starters. Admittedly the leaders are not coming under fire from assault rifles and pistols. They are coming under "fire" from Article 59 "D"—"Professional Unsuitability."

"In accordance with this article," I was told by Lieutenant-Colonel Stanislav Terekhov, chairman of the "Union of Officers" social club, a lawyer by training, who was until late last year a postgraduate student at the Humanitarian Academy, where he was to defend a thesis three months later, "people who have several serious reprimands each or who commit a crime are discharged from the Armed Forces. The leaders of army movements discharged under this article have generally had no reprimands and have not broken the law. On the contrary, they have won thanks, rewards, orders, and medals. Officers who are discharged have to receive a document accounting for their dismissal. These documents are not usually handed out under current practice. Article 59(b)—"Reduction in Strength"—is also widely used against undesirables. Once again this often entails a breach of Order No. 100, which makes provision for a whole series of regulations and procedures to precede this kind of discharge. In other words, the Defense Ministry is in the unenviable position of persistently violating troop discipline."

Here is a recent example dear to the writing fraternity. Under Article 59(d) Aleksandr Zhilin, chief editor of the first independent military newspaper ARMIYA ROSSII, was discharged from the armed forces last December by order of [Russian Defense Minister] Pavel Grachev. He was charged with "participation in a commercial publication." However, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Committee for Social Security for Servicemen, which has now, admittedly, happily been disbanded, was this publication's cofounder. It was not of course for "commerce"—the gain from which, I know, is nothing to speak of—that Zhilin was removed, but for his criticism of the Defense Ministry in the press. It is rumored that there are now plans to reinstate the oppressed editor. Other illegally discharged officers are also trying for that.

I thought that the idea voiced at the meeting by Colonel Oleg Nikonov of the "Assembly" ["Assambleya"] association was interesting: "The Army is being disrupted not by Grachev and the generals around him but by the lack of a military ideology—the doctrines of national security and military building, new organizational principles, and moral norms." I think that, if the Defense Ministry fails to cope with this task, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet not only should help, but has an obligation to help it.

Need for New Weapons Acquisition Policy*PM2901111593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 29 Jan 93 p 2*

[Article by Sergey Ovsienko: "Is Armor Strong?"]

[Text] The collapse of the USSR has left Russia with military equipment which by no means meets modern requirements. That is why the Russian Army, which has only just been born, has turned its eyes toward military-technical policy, highlighting it as a priority avenue.

The qualitative improvement of arms and military equipment on the basis of the latest scientific and technical achievements and advanced technologies, the timely creation of a scientific and technical reserve, and the use of the results of fundamental and research studies when creating new means of armed struggle have become the basic aim and main avenue of military-technical policy.

The good intentions of Russia's military leadership have already come up against serious difficulties, whose solution has been made dependent on expenditure on defense. And, as we know, this expenditure has been substantially reduced. Add to that the inflation process and the transition to market relations, and much becomes clear...

The lack of any harmonious program for the conversion of military production and the reduction of the number of production capacities and scientific research institutes and design bureaus are also seriously affecting the implementation of military-technical policy plans. The substantial increase in the cost of scientific research and experimental design work and of series-produced models of weaponry will to all appearances compel the client (the Russian Federation Defense Ministry) to knock repeatedly on the doors of the topic offices on Staraya Square and the "White House."

The overall concept for the development of arms in the nineties provides for a substantial improvement in the quality and effectiveness of the weapons and military equipment supplied to the troops and a reduction in their range. An effective economic mechanism is being created making it possible to ensure that the Armed Forces' degree of military equipment accords with the military danger and the country's economic potential. Here the expediency of developing new arms is determined according to the cost-effectiveness criterion.

Proceeding from existing realities in the country's economic and sociopolitical life, the Defense Ministry has defined the main avenues for improving military-technical policy. They are the further development of the system of targeted-program planning of orders for the development and supply of arms and military equipment; the transfer of all budget appropriations for defense to the Defense Ministry and the transition to the contract system for developments and orders of arms and military equipment, including on a competition basis; the maximum possible conservation of the production, scientific, and intellectual potentials of enterprises, scientific research institutes, and design bureaus of the defense sectors of industry under conditions of conversion and the reduction of expenditure on defense; the removal from production of all models of arms and military

equipment which are obsolete and do not meet modern requirements; the exclusion from series production of models which have not been completely worked out and have not been adopted.

Right now the reduction of expenditure on defense is being implemented mainly by reducing purchases of arms and military equipment. It gives rise to the need to implement wide-scale conversion of military production, which in turn reduces the mobilization potential of the defense industry at a particular period.

The reduction, in current production, of the volume of arms and military equipment deliveries even when the mobilization capacities which have been created are preserved will lead to an increase in the period in which the production of equipment develops to the volumes necessary to ensure the Armed Forces' requirement at a particular period.

The country's top state organs of administration together with the Defense Ministry must take steps to adapt the existing system for the economic provision of the Armed Forces built on the principle of centralized management to the new conditions without allowing the undermining of the material base of the army and navy's combat might, reinforcing them with the necessary legal and legislative base. For this it is essential to prepare and adopt a package of laws defining the procedure for ensuring the country's defense: the law on the economic provision for defense, the law on the defense order, the law on the country's military budget, and the law on the mobilization preparation of the country's national economy.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS**Starter Storage Battery Maintenance***93UM0280B Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE
in Russian No 2, Feb 90 pp 20-21*

[Article by Colonel A. Muntyan, candidate of technical sciences]

[Text] *How should reliable functioning of motor vehicle storage batteries be ensured and how should their operating parameters be maintained in various operating conditions? How should servicing and maintenance be performed most rationally? Colonel A. Muntyan, candidate of technical sciences, answers these and a number of other questions asked by our readers.*

The service life of storage batteries is determined by their design and depends largely on their proper use as well as timely, quality performance of work in caring for them. A storage battery can be serviced directly inside the vehicle or outside it. In the first instance, during an external inspection be sure of surface cleanliness, reliability of battery attachment, and reliability of attachment of cable ends and caps. In the second instance check cleanliness of vent openings; identify cracks in the monoblock, covers and sealing compound; and check storage battery electrolyte level and degree of battery discharge.


The storage battery is installed and secured in the motor vehicle so as to preclude the possibility of its displacement

along the support platform and spontaneous disconnection of cable ends and to prevent excessive vibration. Experience has shown that a storage battery is placed on rubber mats or gaskets to improve shock absorption.

Cracks may appear in monoblock walls, covers and sealing compound as a result of careless handling of the storage battery, its poor attachment to the motor vehicle, or freezing of electrolyte. An electrolyte leak is possible through the cracks, because of which plates are exposed, become sulphated and deform and battery standing loss increases.

Determine the presence of cracks in monoblock partitions by measuring the electromotive force [emf] of two adjacent cells (see Fig. 1): connect the positive terminal of the voltmeter with the positive terminal of one cell and the negative terminal of the voltmeter with the negative terminal of the cell next to it. With a serviceable monoblock the voltmeter reading corresponds to the sum of the cells' emf, but if it equals the emf of one of them, this indicates the cells are interconnected through the electrolyte, i.e., there is a crack in the monoblock partition. As a rule, such a monoblock is replaced (if the crack is impossible to fill). Such defects in the sealing compound are remedied by its local fusion.

Fig. 1. Connections for measuring:



Key:

- a. Cell voltage
- b. Emf of two adjacent cells
- c. Voltage drop on sealing compound


Electrolyte and dirt that end up on the storage battery surface form a current-carrying bridge between output terminals through which current leaks. It can be detected by using the voltmeter (see Fig. 1): connect one of its terminals with the positive terminal of the storage battery and touch the sealing compound in various places in turn with the other terminal. Deflection of the voltmeter needle from a zero reading indicates a current leak.

To remedy it, it is sufficient to clean the storage battery surface of dust and dirt and wipe with a dry rag. If electrolyte is present, remove it with a rag lightly soaked with a 10-percent solution of soda ash (drinking soda) or ammonium hydroxide, after which wipe the surface dry. Bear in mind that this is done with caps screwed in to avoid fouling the electrolyte. Also be sure that caps are tightly

screwed into the cover openings, projections on them are trimmed off and vent openings cleaned (otherwise gas pressure in the battery may rise).

If gas bubbles are observed being released on the electrolyte surface, this indicates a possible accelerated self-discharge of the storage battery (do not confuse with gas release after charging). The main reason is electrolyte fouling (in this case it is to be replaced). For this first discharge the battery with a current equal to 0.1 of capacitance to a voltage of 1.2 volts on one cell or 7.2 volts on the terminal poles of a 12-volt battery and measure electrolyte density. Then completely drain it and flush all cells several times with distilled water. Fill a flushed battery with fresh electrolyte of the very same density as that which was drained, then charge it. Remember that the voltage of a 12-volt battery at the end of a charge must be at least 16.2 volts, which is checked by a high-rate discharge tester (Fig. 2). The difference in electrolyte densities in cells of the same battery should not exceed 0.01 grams/cm³. Otherwise adjust electrolyte density while continuing the charge, i.e., add distilled water if the density is above normal or add electrolyte with a density up to 1.40 grams/cm³ if it is below normal.

Measuring storage battery voltage



Temperature of electrolyte added to storage batteries should be 15-25°C under moderate climatic conditions and not over 35°C in the tropics. Storage battery operating characteristics deteriorate with a reduction in electrolyte temperature: terminal voltage drops and capacitance and energy release are lowered. In addition, the battery does not fully charge with the engine running. This occurs as a result of increased electrical resistance and viscosity of the electrolyte and a drop in the rate of acid penetration into pores of active material of the plates. To improve battery operation in low temperatures, it is blanketed by a felt mat, especially on the side of the cell covers. But provide for its ventilation, since an operating storage battery gives off a dangerously explosive hydrogen-oxygen mixture.

In high temperatures the electrolyte level in cells drops rapidly due to water evaporation and its density increases,

which can cause a battery overcharge. Therefore, experience shows it is necessary to reduce electrolyte density in a completely charged battery to 1.25 grams/cm³, establish the lower limit of adjusted generator voltage and protect the battery surface from direct sunlight.

Maintaining a normal electrolyte level in cells is a very important condition for ensuring lengthy battery service life. It must be 10-15 mm above the protective shield of the plates; monitor it using a glass tube 5-6 mm in diameter. Bear in mind that electrolyte level drops during battery operation. This leads to sulphating of the plates, as a result of which battery output capacitance is reduced, electrolyte temperature increases, and early gas evolution appears during its charge.

To remove lead sulphate from the plates, perform no more than three control-training cycles according to requirements of the Manual. Add distilled water to the cells with a lowered electrolyte level, but if it is known beforehand that the electrolyte level dropped due to spillage, add to the cells electrolyte of the very same density as that remaining in them.

The working capacity and service life of a storage battery depend largely on the amount of its discharge, which is permitted to be no more than 25 percent in winter and 50 percent in summer. The degree of battery discharge is checked during its servicing and determined according to the discharge of a storage battery having the lowest electrolyte density (see table). In determining it using the high-rate discharge tester, remember that resistances installed in it are used that vary in degree depending on storage battery capacitance.

Battery Condition	U _{bat} , volts	Climatic Areas									
		Far North (not below -40°C)				Northern (not below -40°C)		Central (below -30°C)		Southern (below -20°C)	
		P _w , g/cm ³	t _{fr} , °C	P _s , g/cm ³	t _{fr} , °C	P _{ya} , g/cm ³	t _{fr} , °C	P _{ya} , g/cm ³	t _{fr} , °C	P _{ya} , g/cm ³	t _{fr} , °C
Fully Charged	1.75-1.80	1.30	-66	1.26	-58	1.28	-74	1.26	-58	1.24	-50
25% discharged	1.65-1.70	1.26	-58	1.22	-40	1.24	-50	1.22	-40	1.20	-31
50% discharged	1.50-1.60	1.22	-40	1.18	-22	1.20	-31	1.18	-22	1.16	-18
75% discharged	1.40-1.50	1.18	-22	1.14	-14	1.16	-18	1.14	-14	1.12	-10
Fully discharged	1.30-1.40	1.14	-14	1.10	-8	1.12	-10	1.10	-8	1.08	-7

Notes: U_{bat}—Cell voltage when monitored by high-rate discharge tester;

P_w, P_s, P_{ya}—Electrolyte density in winter, summer, and the year around at a temperature of +25°C respectively (deviation from those values by + or - 0.01 g/cm³ is permissible);

t_{fr}—Electrolyte freezing point.


In measuring voltage (Fig. 1), keep the cell under load for 5 seconds. It should be at least 1.7-1.8 volts with a serviceable and fully charged cell. If the voltage of at least one cell differs from the others by more than 0.1 volts or has dropped to 1.4 volts, the battery is unserviceable and requires repair. A battery which does not support an engine start and is discharged more than the established standards is placed under charge.

Current voltage produced by the generator unit substantially affects storage battery longevity. The voltage must correspond to the value indicated in the vehicle operating instruction. If it is below or above permissible, the battery is discharged or is excessively charged and electrolyte begins to "boil." In this case it is necessary to check operation of the voltage regulator and generator.

RR-350, RR-350A, RR-132, RR-356, 11.37.02 and Ya112V contactless regulators are not subject to maintenance adjustment and must be replaced with a disturbance of normal operation. But parameters of the RR-315, RR-315B, RR-315D, RR-362B, RR-385 and Ya120A regulating relays can be changed using the "Winter-Summer" switch (see Fig. 3).

The RR-132A regulating relay is used in ZIL-131, Ural-375 and GAZ-66 vehicles. It has three regulated voltage ranges: 13.6-0.35 volts (minimum), 14.2-0.15 volts (average) and

Fig. 3. Seasonal regulator adjustment



14.7-0.35 volts (maximum). The range is set (using the little lever located beneath the hexagonal plug screwable with a 30 mm wrench) depending on storage battery condition and temperature conditions.

The switch should be placed in the "Max" position in operating a vehicle in winter in areas with a moderate and cold climate; in the "Av" position in areas with moderate and cold climates (in winter in areas with a hot climate); and in the "Min" position in summer in areas with a hot climate. In screwing in the regulator switch plug, definitely

check to see whether or not the rubber sealing ring is in place. Remember the regulator lever is set in the second position (second regulated voltage range) at the plant.

To check regulated voltage in a vehicle, connect the voltmeter with the 0-30 volt scale (accuracy class not under 0.5). Start the engine and turn on a load (for example, the high beams) between the "+" terminal and regulating relay casing. With a generator rotor rotational speed of 3,500 min⁻¹ and current intensity of 36 amps, measure voltage in all three ranges. If its value goes beyond limits established for each range, check the regulating relay on the control and measuring bench and replace if necessary. Remember that maximum voltage in the vehicle electrical system should not exceed 15.5 and 31.0 volts respectively for 12-volt and 24-volt vehicle electrical systems.

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T-72 Tank: Field Servicing and Maintenance

93UM0280A Moscow *TEKNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 3, Mar 90 pp 10-11

[Article by Colonel M. Starostin, candidate of technical sciences and Colonel L. Kutarev, candidate of technical sciences, under rubric "Study and Maintenance"]


[Text] It is common knowledge that at the end of a day of operation and on the return of tanks to the motor pool, daily routine servicing and maintenance is performed on them each time regardless of their mileage. In organizing it one is guided by a number of general principles in all cases. Under field conditions (exercises, field problems, practice firings) the main such principles are as follows: above all, work is done to restore the tanks' combat effectiveness (replenish ammunition if necessary, fill with fuel, oil and coolants, and remedy malfunctions identified in the course of an inspection); it is advisable to do work whose performance involves a temporary reduction in the equipment's combat effectiveness on no more than 30 percent of the total number of subunit vehicles simultaneously; mobile servicing, maintenance and repair equipment is brought to the tanks.

Here the influence on daily routine servicing and maintenance in the field of factors such as the absence of fixed industrial equipment, the tactical situation (for example, in exercises), time of year and day, weather conditions, technical condition of the tanks, and level of training of the personnel of crews and servicing subunits is taken into account without fail.

It is very important to properly determine the sequence of performing work on the vehicles, rationally distribute mobile servicing, maintenance and repair equipment, precisely assign missions and organize comprehensive monitoring of the completeness and quality of servicing and maintenance. One variant of organizing the work of daily routine servicing and maintenance of tanks in the vicinity of field activities is shown in the diagram.

It usually takes 1.5-3 hours to perform all daily routine servicing and maintenance operations on a T-72 tank. The most labor-intensive and important operation is to load the tank with ammunition for the main gun, coaxial

Diagram of organization of daily routine servicing and maintenance in field activities area



machinegun and anti-aircraft machinegun. It requires the personnel's strict observance of loading rules and safety measures. Rounds are delivered to the tank in a filled and fuzed form. Check their conformity to the gun from markings on boxes, warheads, and on the projectiles. To avoid accidents, do not allow them to strike the armor and do not set warheads vertically on the base disk. See to it that the GUV-27 sleeve does not protrude beyond the face of the base disk and does not sink into it by more than 0.5 mm, and that projectile fuzes are tightly and fully screwed in. In addition, safety caps on HE-fragmentation round fuzes must be tightened and valves set on 0. If defects are discovered, the rounds are sorted out and transported to the depot.

Experience has shown that to shorten the duration of the automatic search for and delivery of the necessary type of rounds it is advisable to load them alternately in the automatic loader's rotating transporter. The subunit commander determines the sequence of stowage by types based on the nature of the upcoming operational training mission.

In stowing a round in the transporter dispenser, send the round fully into the lower tube of the dispenser and the warhead into the upper tube. Then, after making sure that the round and warhead are securely fixed, open the memory unit cover and press the button B [armor-piercing], O [fragmentation] or K [shaped-charge] corresponding to the

type of stowed round. Turn it off only after the dispenser is fully lowered. It is prohibited to press several buttons simultaneously to avoid automatic loader operation failure. If the wrong button was erroneously pressed, however, the stowed round is unloaded. To stop loading, turn the "AZ.UPR" [automatic loader control] switch on the right panel of the turret off and then on.

It is advisable to load machinegun belts using the Rakov machine from the servicing and maintenance shop set.

Begin servicing tank armament after completing ammunition loading. After cleaning the main gun, thoroughly inspect it to make sure there are no cracks, bulges, traces of copper fouling, scratches or rust in the tube bore. The wedge-type breech block should open and close smoothly without jerks, and the trigger mechanism, blocking device and recocking mechanism should operate faultlessly. Check the gun elevating mechanism and turret traverse mechanism by rotating knobs manually. Here the gun must raise and lower smoothly and easily and the turret must rotate without binding.

Experience shows it is necessary to keep a strict watch to see that all tools are stowed in vehicle spare parts, tools and accessories kit boxes after servicing, since operating failures may arise because a forgotten tool gets into the rotating transporter.

One of the monitoring operations of tank daily routine servicing and maintenance is a check of the technical condition of the firefighting equipment system. Serviceability of pyrotechnic cartridge electrical circuits is monitored from the 1B, 2B and 3B lights burning dimly on the P11-5 panel after the battery switch is turned on.

To check system operation from manual backup buttons, first place the PPO [firefighting equipment]-OPVT [tank underwater driving equipment] switch in the OPVT position, then press the PPO buttons on the turret distribution panel in turn. At this point the PO [not further expanded] indicator light should go on on the panel. Then, opening the cover on the face panel of the P11-5 panel, press the ZO [not further expanded] button. The ZO light should go on. Place the switch back in the PPO position only after the PO and ZO lights go out.

Do not fail to check operation of the hydropneumatic cleaning system for protective glass of the observation and aiming devices by turning it on two or three times. In summer the hydraulic tanks of this system must be filled with clean water. At any time of year air cylinder pressure is 120-165 kg(f)/cm². If it is less, additionally charge cylinders to normal from the vehicle air system and make another check of the glass cleaning system operation.

In servicing the power plant, take into account that the T-72 tank engine is multifuel, and so the knob of the three-position stop of the high-pressure fuel pump bar must be set in one of the following positions: D (diesel fuel), B (gasoline) or K (kerosene) in accordance with the fuel it holds.


As a rule the tank is filled with fuel by a closed connection. It must be clean and without mechanical impurities. Water may get into the tanks together with fuel when fueling with

an open connection, which causes corrosion of fuel equipment parts and in winter in addition leads to engine failure as a result of the formation of ice plugs in filters and lines. At the end of filling, tighten fuel tank caps after first being sure of gasket integrity. Unserviceable gaskets are replaced with new ones from the tank spare parts, tools and accessories kit.

If the fuel system has been filled with diesel fuel, measure its quantity in internal tanks using the built-in electric fuel gauge and in external tanks by a measuring rod. But this operation is performed in all tanks only with the rod if the system is filled with gasoline or kerosene.

Measure the engine lubrication system oil level with the stick through the replenishing tank opening. It must correspond to a filling of 65 liters. Its minimum permissible quantity is 20 liters. Make the measurement no earlier than 15 minutes after the vehicle is shut off so the foam settles and an identical level is established in main and replenishing tanks. Always remember it is categorically prohibited to mix different grades of engine oils in filling the tank.

Operations of filling a tank with fuel and oil are rather labor-intensive. Experience shows it is possible to considerably reduce their performance time in the subunit if the fuel truck is rationally used. It is most advisable to fuel two tanks with one fuel truck at the same time with its pump capacity no more than 100 liters per minute with consideration of the intake capacity of the fuel tanks (see diagram).



Key:

1. Through one hose
2. Through two hoses
3. Through three hoses
4. Through four hoses (two per tank)

During daily routine servicing and maintenance check the cooling system coolant level and if necessary add to it (in summer with water with a three-component additive, in winter with antifreeze of a grade corresponding to the area of operation). After filling, set the "Water-Antifreeze"

switch on the driver's monitoring-measuring instrument panel in the appropriate position, check whether or not there are leaks at connections and whether or not the radiator and expansion tank opening gaskets are intact. Remember that antifreeze and water with a three-component additive are very toxic. Therefore after working with them it is necessary to wash hands with soap without fail.

Check the effort on the louver drive crank. If it is large, wash drive joints and louver flaps with diesel fuel.

Check and service the engine air supply system at each daily routine servicing and maintenance. Determine the degree of air cleaner fouling with engine running at a 2,000 rpm setting from the air cleaner indicator light going on. If the air cleaner is more dirty than normal, flush it, using for this the tank spare parts, tools and accessories kit and benches from the mobile servicing and maintenance shop set. After flushing, saturate the upper and middle cartridges with motor oil heated to 100°C and allow it to drain. Saturation with oil heated to 80-60°C is permissible. If oil temperature was 100°C during saturation, the time it takes to drain from the cartridges is approximately 0.5 hours, at 80°C it is 1.5 hours and at 60°C it is 2 hours.

Dust presents great danger for the engine. It can penetrate the engine through loose areas in connections of the air cleaner with the blower manifold and of the blower with the intake manifolds. Therefore it is necessary to check these places very carefully during daily routine servicing and maintenance. If dust is sucked into the engine, as attested by characteristic traces on the joint surface, then it is necessary to tighten clamp screws.

In servicing the tank running gear first inspect road wheels, support rollers and their seals and then check track tension. A track with RMSH [not further expanded, probably rubber-metal joints] in which the sag between the second and third support rollers is 16-18 mm is considered properly tensioned. That adjustment decreases power losses for rewinding tracks and precludes the likelihood of track link cogs on driving sprockets slipping and the track being thrown during movement. For an open-joint track the sag must be within limits of 22-24 mm during operation under conditions of cohesionless soils and on snow-covered roads.

During daily routine servicing and maintenance a large number of other jobs are done in checking and servicing other component parts of the tank—radio, tank intercom system, storage batteries, electrical power users and others. Tank electrical equipment is checked with engine running at power settings of 1,250-1,900 rpm. Onboard electrical supply system voltage must be 26.5-28.5 volts and the magnitude of charging current not over 130 amps. Greater charging current indicates the need to recharge storage batteries. The mobile field repair and charging station (PRZS or SRZ-A) is used for this under field conditions.

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The BTR-80 Armored Transport Vehicle: Preparation for Winter

93UM0276B Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 10, Oct 90 pp 10-11

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Spichakov, Major Yu. Koshel, and Reserve Lieutenant Colonel M. Igonnikov: "The BTR-80 Armored Transport Vehicle: Preparation for Winter"]

[Text] Begin preparation of electrical equipment with an inspection of the state of all of the armored transport vehicle's electrical wiring. Eliminate detected breaks in the insulation or loose contacts at connections and cover the most vulnerable locations with special insulating and sealing compounds. Inspect the fuses while you are inspecting the wiring. If necessary, select and install them, while being guided by the directions of the Plant Operating Instructions and instruction tables. PPO system circuits and charges are protected by wire fuses (PV10, PV30 and TP-150) and automatic circuit breakers are used in the rest. If the circuits are operating normally, the handles of all of the automatic circuit breakers must be in the upper (that is, in the switched on) position.

The switching and auxiliary apparatus does not require special maintenance, other than lubrication of the rods of the terminal switches (of the upper hatches—four, of the side hatches—two, and signaling of the opening of the water-jet butterfly valve and the parking brake). Treat the rods with TsIATIM-201 cold-resistant grease. To do that, having removed the terminal switch from the vehicle and having opened its hatch, press on the rod and lubricate it from the side of the internal housing of the switch, and then, having let it go—from the external side.

You need to pay special attention to the batteries when you are preparing a vehicle for winter. Two 12ST-85R batteries connected in parallel are installed on an armored transport vehicle. They are connected to the onboard circuit through a shielding component. When you prepare a vehicle for winter operation, remove them from the vehicle and service them in accordance with the requirements of the guidance for zinc starter batteries. Install prepared batteries in the vehicle and, while strictly observing the polarity, connect them to the power lines in accordance with the markings on them ("plus" to plus and "minus" to minus). Connect the batteries' negative terminal to the vehicle hull through the VK860B remote electromagnetic switch that is located in the fighting compartment on the third right wheel housing. Verify that the connection has been properly made by pressing the battery switch (BV) on the dashboard. In the process, the BALLON 1 and BALLON 2 test bulbs should light up. If you press the button again, the bulbs should extinguish (which attests to the fact that the batteries have been disconnected from the onboard circuit). During winter with an ambient air temperature lower than 25°C and in cases when breaks in operation of the BTR total more than one 24-hour period, it is advisable to remove the batteries from the vehicle and store them in heated buildings. You can keep the batteries in the vehicle if it is operated on a daily basis and the battery charge is over 75%.

The BTR-80 has two identical generators that operate in parallel. Each of them consists of a G-290V generator with a drive and relay regulator. Use the GENERATOR tumbler switches to turn the generators on or off. You must verify the operation of each generator individually when preparing the electrical equipment for winter. To do that, first turn on the tumbler switches of the RIGHT GENERATOR and LEFT GENERATOR on the instrument panel, start the engine and press the gas pedal until the crankshaft reaches 1,100-1,500 RPM's (based on a tachometer reading). Immediately after you start the engine, the ammeter must indicate charging current and the COOLANT LIQUID TEMPERATURE, FUEL and OIL gauges must operate.

To check the left generator, turn off the RIGHT GENERATOR tumbler switch. In so doing, the COOLANT LIQUID TEMPERATURE, FUEL and OIL gauges must turn themselves off and the volt ammeter reading must be in the 27-28 Volt range. When you turn on the electric motors, heaters and distributor cooling fans and also the headlights and the radio, the volt ammeter should not record discharge current. If charging current is absent in the circuit when the crankshaft is rotating at 1,100-1,500 RPM's and the voltage is below 27 volts and the ammeter is indicating discharge current when load using equipment have been turned on, then either the left generator or the relay regulator is faulty. Check the operability of the right generator the same way (only, in the process, turn on the RIGHT GENERATOR tumbler switch and turn off the LEFT GENERATOR). The OIL gauges must be turned off.

Begin servicing and maintenance of the generators by cleaning their exterior surfaces. Remove oil and dirt with a rag that has been moistened with gasoline and then blow it with compressed air. After that, inspect the reliability of the generator attachment and the tension of the drive belts. While servicing alternating current generators, you must take into account certain specific features that are associated with the presence of a rectifier unit in them. So, you should not disconnect the batteries from the circuit when the engine is running and when load using equipment has been turned off. This will result in a drastic increase of voltage and the component's diodes will malfunction. To avoid that, you need to carefully verify the operability of the batteries charging circuit which passes through a volt ammeter (you will become convinced of the reliable attachment of the battery terminals). Even short-term short circuit of the generator's "+" terminal to the vehicle's hull or improper connection of the batteries' terminals could result in the diodes malfunctioning.

The generator is driven by two belts. Check their tension using the 4905-3923100 device (it is part of group set of the spare parts kit) and adjust them so that each belt is equal to 17-19 mm when 4 kgs of effort is reflected on the camber needle.

If the armored transport vehicle has been in operation for a prolonged period of time or in storage, you must assess the condition and degree of wear of the belts. Remove them from the engine, inspect them (there should not be any breaks, cracks, or separations) and then, having adjusted the generator pulley, determine the degree of wear. If it makes

contact with the pulley insert and the sides of the belt and the pulley do not touch each other, it needs to be replaced.

Having become convinced of the operability of the generators, when necessary connect the "+" power cables to the generators. Do that manually. The cap nut, the ring nut, and the power drive at the attachment point must be immobile. In order to reliably fasten the drive, you need to first of all loosen and remove the cap nut and loosen the fastening nut of the P-shaped clamp. After that, put the exposed end of the "+" wire under the P-shaped clamp until tight in the insulating washer. The clamp should crimp only the bare end of the central wire and must not touch the wire's insulation. Having tightened down the tightening nut of the P-shaped clamp with a force that ensures firm compression of the main wire, install the cap nut and ring nut and secure them with a cotter pin. The screening braid should be fastened between the bushings that are in the nut.

A single wire power source and load using equipment connection system has been used in the vehicle that requires a more attentive attitude to the integrity of the insulation of the wires and painstaking connection of instruments to the hull and to the turret. You must remember that if a wire with voltage flowing through it touches the vehicle's metallic parts, it could result in not only in a malfunction of some electrical equipment elements but could also cause a fire. Weakening the connection between the load using equipment and power sources and the hull disrupts the operation of the electrical equipment and increases the level of the radio interference field. In order to prevent that from happening, you need to reliably protect wire bundles and individual wires from ending up in oil, fuel, and other corrosive materials.

In all cases to avoid a short circuit or fire, you need to move soldered wires and junctions using only acid-free flux, having disconnected the batteries from the onboard circuit. The wire braiding of the wires of all of the connectors and also of the individual leads must be connected with the vehicle hull.

In order to prevent the braiding from breaking loose from the socket during servicing and maintenance, you should not apply excessive force while disconnecting sockets. In the event that nevertheless happens, you should carefully rebraid it while preventing individual wires from coming into contact with the screen. The shielded braiding of wires with the ends under a screw should always be secured with collars that prevent it from slipping or short circuiting the circuit. Replacement of shielded cables with unshielded cables is prohibited.

It is important to control how tight the contact connections are to the F-5 filters, PS-200 connection panels, 4T and 9K junction boxes, generators, relay regulators, and to the blower connector assemblies and the water pump. When you don't have any cotter pins for connector nuts, tighten them by hand and secure them with cotter pins.

Visibility significantly deteriorates during the winter. As a result, you need to carefully inspect and adjust electrical equipment instruments that affect the safety of travel. Among them are the headlights, parking lights, brake lights, tail lights, the dashboard instruments and the horn.

You need to prevent moisture from penetrating inside the optical elements of the headlights which causes the destruction of the reflectors and other parts. To do that, it is advisable to use PVK lubricant, K-17 preservative, or ZZK-3U putty (the latter is preferred). You must adjust the headlights using a E-6 type instrument or a special screen.

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Tank Sealing Technology

93UM0276A Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 2, Feb 91 pp 8-9

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel B. Turchev: "Tank Sealing Technology"]

[Text] Continuing the subject that was raised on the pages of our magazine by USSR Ministry of Defense Main Tank Directorate First Deputy Chief Major-General N. Zhuravlev ("Khraneniye bronetankovogo vooruzheniya i tekhniki" [Tank and Armored Vehicle Storage], 1990, No 9), we are publishing an article prepared based on troop experience.

Experience has shown that the tank sealing technology for storage in open areas that he proposed permits us to reduce the time to carry out these operations, alleviates the process of manufacturing frames and significantly increases their rigidity, attains greater density of application of sealing enamels, and also ensures a significant saving of materials.

The "Kokon" [Cocoon] and "Zakleyka-kokon" [adhesive band-cocoon] methods are utilized in accordance with existing requirements for sealing tanks that are maintained in open areas. They are more labor-intensive and expensive when compared to sealing techniques for vehicles that are maintained in storage facilities. The primary difficulty is in the manufacture of the frame for these coverings when it is necessary to secure each one separately with 6 mm thick wire and to tie them together with thin wire and tape or insulated tape, and then to wrap it in starched gauze from above and coat it with perchlorovinyl enamel. That frame does not totally meet the requirements for its rigidity and does not

always withstand heavy snows and high winds. When you unseal it, difficulties can arise in dismantling the covering which increases the time required to remove vehicles from storage.

You can reduce the labor-intensity of sealing tanks and reduce the time to make them ready for use using this method if you manufacture the frame using ready-made welded mesh made from 4-5 mm thick wire with a 100 X 100 or 150 X 150 squares (depending on the thickness of the wire) which usually serves to reinforce slabs in reinforced concrete structures. Assemble the first frame on an actual tank that has been prepared for sealing. Then make a unique mock-up-template (assembly base) based upon it and make the remaining frames for all of the vehicles on it.

This is the manufacturing technology for the first frame. Cut the mesh to the needed size. To do that, first turn the tank turret to the rear, remove the self-extraction log and place it lengthwise on the vehicle so that it does not extend beyond the vehicle's aft section. Then use a tape measure to measure distance *a* (Figure 1) from one overtrack fender [nadgusenichnaya polka] to the other across the vehicle over the self-extraction log at its lowest part at the rear of the tank and from the highest (across the other end of the log), and also the length of the vehicle along the overtrack fenders from the aft section to the forward inclined armor plate. So, the end result is a trapezium, the size of which will depend on the height of the turret and the length and width of the vehicle.

You obtain a full trapezium for a frame from two parts which you cut from mesh strips (roll) (Figure 2) and weld the two mesh strips lengthwise as shown in Figure 1. Then lay it on a prepared tank (lengthwise across the log) with its apex toward the transmission in such a way that it does not extend beyond the edge of the aft section and cut it in the middle lengthwise from the base to the beginning of the log along line BB², calculating that you will be able to lay the two forward corners overlapping each other as shown in Figure 3.




Рис. 1. Заготовка для сетчатого каркаса «Кокон».





Рис. 2. Выкройка частей каркаса из двух рулонов сетки.

Рис. 3. Укладка передних углов каркаса внахлест.



Having laid the mesh on the vehicle, fit it precisely along the tank hull and weld it along the perimeter with 6 mm thick wire that will serve as the foundation of the frame. In the process, you need to strictly observe fire safety regulations. You need to lay down a sheet of asbestos in places of possible contact with external fuel and oil tanks.

Use a No 10 metal channel or a 70 X 70 angle iron and 10-12 mm thick hardware to manufacture the mock-up-template. First weld the foundation of the mock-up from the metal channel or angle iron. In the process, adhere to the dimensions of the perimeter of the tank hull. Then, install the frame made on the tank onto the foundation, bend the hardware inward along its configuration and weld its ends to the foundation in that position. Furthermore, weld the hardware together at points of intersection. Select the height of the mock-up foundation with the calculation that the welder will be able to work comfortably. Experience has shown that manufacturing frames on mock-ups permits us to reduce labor-intensity and reduces the time of this operation by a factor of 1.5-2.

Install the ready-made frame on the braces which must insure that the gauze hangs 15-20 cm from the foundation and prevents its edge from coming into contact with the ground (the hanging portion is intended to be subsequently glued to the tank hull). Then, apply the enamel to the gauze in accordance with the method indicated in the instructions for storing tanks and armored vehicles. It is advisable to saturate the gauze not in a starch solution but in KhV-114 enamel that has been prepared for spraying onto the frame. Durable adherence of the coating to the wire frame is attained in that way and imparts the required rigidity to the ready-made structure. You need to use rubber gloves to protect your hands while carrying out the work.

In order to reduce de-mothballing time, lay 1.5 mm wire along the perimeter of the tank prior to gluing the coating. Tie one end of it to any protruding portion of the vehicle (a bolt) at the level of the frame foundation and lay the other end across the outside of the gauze coating. Leave enough length on the free end of the wire so that you can form a ring from it which can be conveniently used to remove the wire during de-mothballing. When you pull on the wire, it will burst the foam coating and it will be easy to remove the frame from the vehicle.

The seal will be more reliable if you use KhV-114 enamel instead of KhVK-2A glue to glue the covering to the hull. Furthermore, experience has shown that you can repeatedly use this covering. You just need to put the wire back for de-mothballing and glue a 20-mm wide strip of gauze to the lower portion of the frame and apply 4-5 layers of KhV-114 enamel to the gauze strip during each subsequent use. You need to glue the covering with that same enamel.

Carry out monitoring the water saturation of the silica gel in the process of sealing tanks using this method in accordance with the requirements of the guidance for the storage of tanks and armored vehicles. Carry out an inspection using volumetric sensors and a PKV-2 instrument or by weighing

control bags. You can place the PKV-2 sensor wire under the glued gauze covering at a location that is suitable for access.

You can also make the fit for a control bag placement more simple in contrast to the authorized location. To do that, cut off the upper portion of a plastic bottle with the opening and cover. Make a hole the size of the bottle opening in the gauze covering before applying the KhV-112 decorative enamel in a location that is suitable for placing a control bag and as close as possible to the wire frame. Put on the bottle opening in the covering and tie the bottle to the frame with thin wire so that it doesn't turn when you screw on or unscrew the cap with the control bag attached to it.

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Performance, Specifications of BMP-3

93UM0254A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian
No 5-6, 92 pp 6, c4

[Article by Engineer S. Fedoseyev: "BMP-3"]

[Text] The new infantry fighting vehicle that was displayed for the first time at the Parade in Honor of the 45th Anniversary of the Victory on 9 May 1990 has attracted the attention of Ye. Gubanov (Kemerovo Oblast), V. Gir (Poltava Oblast), and others.

The BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle

Weight	approximately 16 tonnes
Speed on a road	65 kilometers per hour
Afloat	10 kph
Range on a paved road	500 kilometers
Engine	four-cylinder 420-horse power diesel
Weaponry:	
—Coaxial 100 mm smoothbore and 30 mm automatic cannons	
—Three 7.62 mm PKT machineguns	
—Crew	5 men
—Assault force	4 men

First of all, let's recall its predecessors. The BMP-1's (1966) fire power was provided by a "Grom" 73 mm smoothbore gun and by a "Malyutka" PTUR [Antitank guided missile] weapon system, that is, it was obviously "antitank" in nature. The development of tactical and army aviation also required imparting "antiaircraft" properties to the BMP's weaponry. And the BMP-2 which had already begun entering the inventory in the early 1980's had a 30 mm automatic cannon and "Fagot" PTRK's [Antitank Missile Systems]. The armor protection of both vehicles was restricted to protection from ordinary caliber small arms fire and from light shrapnel.

Of course, the designers were striving to develop a vehicle with heightened fire power and improved armor protection. The experience of combat operations in Afghanistan demanded that. And the BMP-3 (Chief Designer—A.

Nikonov) was developed on a newly reworked base at the end of the 1980's. It is actually dramatically different from its predecessors. First of all, the vehicle's configuration has been changed. The traditional forward placement of the engine-transmission compartment has been replaced by a rear placement—based on a "tank" design. As a result, the driver-mechanic's field of view and the habitability of the driving, fighting, and assault compartments have been improved and weight has been more advantageously distributed throughout the length of the vehicle.

The BMP-3's driver-mechanic is located in the driving compartment along the vehicle's axle. The machinegunners are located along the sides of the vehicle near him. The fighting compartment with the installation of weapons in a two-man turret are located behind the driving compartment. The assault compartment where four men are located (the crew and assault force are a total of nine men) is located behind the fighting compartment. They have preserved the capability for the assault force to disembark toward the rear. To do this, the cover of the engine-transmission compartment has been manufactured below the top of the hull so that a distinctive tunnel is formed between them. It is closed with a two-leafed door from the rear and with hatches from above. Two wide folding steps have been attached to the rear of the vehicle to facilitate boarding. There are also two hatches with folding covers in the top of the turret. The driver-mechanic's hatch is on top of the forward section of the hull.

The BMP-3 has combined armor protection: The hull and turret are manufactured from aluminum and steel alloys. Heavy steel armor is used only in the most critical sections. All of this protects the crew and assault force from small-caliber automatic cannon fire and from heavy shrapnel of projectiles and mines.

The "triple" weapons system that sort of combines the traits of the BMP-1's and BMP-2's weaponry is quite unusual for vehicles of this class. A 100 mm smooth bore cannon and a 30 mm automatic cannon have been coaxially installed in the low profile conical turret. They are rigidly tied to each other and permit conducting fire with high angles of elevation. The 100 mm cannon is capable of conducting effective fire on enemy personnel and weaponry, on lightly-defended field fortifications, and against armored targets, including main battle tanks. A guided antitank projectile with laser beam guidance can also be fired from the barrel of the cannon. Firing range is 4,000 meters. Rate of fire is 10 shots per minute. The 30 mm automatic cannon conducts fire at air and lightly-armored and ground-based targets at a range of up to 4,000 meters with an average rate of fire of 200-300 and a maximum rate of fire of up to 560 shots per minute. Range based on altitude is 2,000 meters. Kalashnikov Heavy Machineguns have been coaxially mounted with the cannons.

The gunner-loader controls the weapons system. When necessary, the BMP commander can totally switch control of the weapons to himself. All of this also permits the BMP to be used in combat as a fire support vehicle or as a kind of "light infantry escort tank". Moreover, two PKT 7.62 mm hull machineguns have been installed in the forward section

of the hull, in the bilge of the lead armor plate, fire from which can be conducted by the machinegunners who are seated on both sides of the driver-mechanic. General-purpose or large caliber heavy machineguns and portable antitank and anti-aircraft missile systems can also be transported inside the BMP. Triple-barreled grenade launchers (small mortars) to lay smoke screens are also installed on the forward portion of the turret.

The BMP-3 has a diesel engine with opposed cylinders which permits the reduction of the total height of the engine-transmission compartment. It has a high average output—more than 20 horse power per tonne. This ensures good traction properties, high speed and good vehicle acceleration, that is, the capability to rapidly attain a high rate of speed from a dead stop. And that is a life and death issue for a combat vehicle.

The BMP-3 has a hydromechanical transmission that is much better than the mechanical transmission (installed on the BMP-1 and BMP-2) due to its automatic, infinitely-variable gear changing and traction on the tracks when changing the tractive resistance (that increases average speed and eases handling). To drive the vehicle, the driver-mechanic is "armed" with a steering wheel, a gear shift lever, an accelerator pedal, and an emergency brake pedal.

The drive train consists of six twin rubberized road wheels located asymmetrically along the side of the vehicle and three supporting rollers per side. The road wheels have hydropneumatic independent suspension that permits adjustment of the vehicle clearance height (road clearance). Shock absorbers installed on the first, second, and last road wheels serve to reduce the hull's oscillations. The drive wheel is in the rear position.

The BMP-3 has an amphibious capability which supports the hull's displacement. Two water jets installed in the aft section are the propulsion devices in the water. The direction of movement is provided by adjusting the position of their butterfly-type valves. A wave-deflection shield is raised in front of the hull's lead armor plate that prevents the BMP's nose from plunging into the water. Movement on the water can also be carried out by reversing the tracks, the upper branches of which are covered with hydrodynamic jackets.

The vehicle is equipped with periscopic viewing instruments, and IR surveillance and sighting devices under conditions of poor visibility. IR spotlights that are installed in the lead portion of the turret and in front of the vehicle commander's hatch can be used to illuminate terrain and targets at night. The BMP-3 has a radio transceiver for external communications and an intercom for internal communications.

The BMP-3's total weight is approximately 16 tonnes. It can attain speeds of up to 65 kph on roads and up to 10 kph afloat. At the present time, our vehicle does not have any equals in the world.

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9M333 SAM

93UM0357A Moscow *TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in English No 11-12, 92 p 43

[Advertisement in English: "Low Flying Surface-to-air Missile 9M333"]

[Text] Purpose: Annihilation of the low-flying air-crafts, helicopters, remotely piloted vehicles and winged missiles under conditions of operation through jamming.

It has the homing head (passive, three-channel, gyroscopic) which provides the guidance in the optical and infra-red channels. The missile's head operates from the contact or lazer pickup at the distance upto 4 m from the target.

Missile's self-destruction at the 29th second.

Reliability: The summary probability of the faultless work is 0.98 during the whole service life in storage (Keeping), transportation, firings and order testing.

Technical Characteristics	
Target hitting range, m	800-5000
Average flight speed, m/s	550
Target hitting height, m	10-3500
Target flight speed, km/h up to 1500 on contrary headings (up to 1100 on catching-up headings)	
Time needed for starting the missile (from the moment of pressing the key "Start" up to the beginning of the missile's movement), s	no more than 1
Weight of the head, kg	5
Weight of the blasting agent, kg	2.6
Temperature span (interval) of the missile's combat use, degrees C	+50...-50
Caliber, mm	120
Length of the missile, mm	2223
Wing span, mm	360
Weight of the missile, kg	41
Weight of the missile in container, kg	72
Weight of the packed missile, kg	112
Overall dimensions:	
—container, mm	303x320x2300
—package, mm	400x410x2570

Export of production and services for military purpose is executed by the Russian State Foreign Economic Corporation "Oboronexport" (General Export for Defence).

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Tel.: 94-491; 3-09-12

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Specifications of 120-mm SP Mortar 'Nona-S'

93UM0176A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
24 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Vitaliy Moroz: "The 'Nona-S' From the Assault Troops Has a Sister in the Infantry"]

[Text] Direct fire support of infantry without mortars has become more difficult. They can destroy the enemy with medium-angle fire from behind various natural and man-made cover. A mortar permits the conduct of fire from a deep trench, a ravine, a forest or over the heads of our own troops. This simply designed weapon also has quite a few other qualities: ease of servicing and combat employment, mobility, and high effectiveness of impact of munitions near a target.

A preference has been attached to towed or portable mortars for many years in all armies. Self-propelled mortars only appeared in the United States by the middle 1960's (and a bit later in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], Great Britain, and certain other countries) and are, as a rule, ordinary muzzle-loading mortars mounted on a rotating platform in the assault section of armored transport vehicles.

The "Nona-S" 120-mm self-propelled weapon, with which we are acquainting our readers, significantly wins out, by an order of magnitude, in comparison with foreign self-propelled mortars. We can call it the first domestically-produced self-propelled mortar that has been accepted into the army inventory, but only tentatively. Actually, it is a universal artillery piece that is capable of conducting fire of both 120-mm high-explosive fragmentation mortar rounds (including those of foreign manufacture) and also special high-explosive fragmentation projectiles of that same caliber. The weapon's barrel has a rifled bore. The projectiles are also grooved and, in contrast to the mortar rounds, their trajectory is stabilized through rotation.

Since 1981, the 2S9 ("Nona-S") 120-mm self-propelled weapon has been entering the inventory of artillery subunits of the airborne assault troops. Avenir Gavrilovich Novozhilov (Central Scientific-Research Institute of Precise Machine Building) and Yuriy Nikolayevich Kalachnikov (Perm Machine Tool Plant) guided its development. Colonels Valentin Mikhaylovich Baranov and Aleksey Sergeyevich Taritsyn, associates of a Ministry of Defense scientific research institution, also actively participated in it.

**Tactical-Technical Specifications of 120-mm
Self-Propelled Weapon**

	2S9	2S23
Weight, in tonnes	8.7	14.5
Crew, in men	4	4
Angles of adjustment, in degrees		
—Along the horizontal	+/-35°	+/-35°
—Along the vertical	from -4 to +80	from -4 to +80
Combat load, in units	25	30
Maximum firing range, in kilometers		
—High explosive, fragmentation projectile	8.7	8.7
—High explosive, fragmentation mortar round	7.1	7.1
Maximum rate of fire per minute	10	10
Engine capacity, in horsepower	240	260
Maximum speed, in kilometers per hour		
—on dry land	80	80
—afloat	9	10
Range based on fuel, in kilometers	500	500
Clearance, in millimeters	from 100 to 450	475

The weapon has been mounted on BTR-D armored transport vehicle chassis which, in its turn, has quite a bit in common with the BMD-1 combat assault vehicle. The hull is manufactured from light aluminum armor and reliably protects the crew from bullets. The turret design ensures practically the maximum angles of elevation for the tube of the mortar. Combat vehicle ammunition stowage with honeycomb cells permits loading both mortar rounds and projectiles. The weapon is breech-loading. The self-propelled weapon has been adapted for a parachute drop to the same degree as the BTR-D.

The high-explosive fragmentation projectile developed for this unusual system deserves high marks. It exceeds all similar foreign projectiles in explosive power.

The "Nona-S" rescued our assault troops in Afghanistan on more than one occasion. Its tube, raised almost to its zenith, permitted it to carry out such tasks in the mountains that howitzers and cannons could not handle.

It is not surprising that a sister has appeared for the "Nona-S" and that sister is performing duty in the Ground Forces. It is the 2S23 ("Nona-SVK"), and the BTR-80 served as the basis for it. The 2S9 and 2S23 weapons have identical firing capabilities.

107th Motorized-Rifle Division Arrives in Moscow from Lithuania

93UM0258A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Nov 92 p 4

[Article by Igor Prokopenko: "There Were Brief Assemblies"]

[Text] The 107th Motorized Rifle Division is withdrawing from Lithuania... There are feverish assemblies of people harried by the confusion and haste. The first rail consist arrived at Povarovo Station in the Moscow suburbs on 27 September. Right now, when these lines are being written, 16 rail consists have already been sent here.

"We are loading ammunition, combat vehicles and equipment day and night, regardless of rank or position," Division Deputy Commander Colonel A. Garkush told me. "Our withdrawal reminds me of a hasty retreat..."

In accordance with the Ground Forces commander-in-chief's directive, the division is being placed under the command of the Moscow Military District commander and is being transformed into a brigade (read: disbanded).

Besides, that means that the "excess" equipment and ammunition are being sent to other Russian units. How? "As during war..." the officers coarsely joke. Receipt and turn-in documents are being signed practically unread. Equipment is not being prepared for turn in. Officers are assuming serious material responsibility. From what resources will "materially responsible individuals" in uniform pay the cost of the missing, forgotten, lost or unrecovered assemblies and parts under the conditions of the urgent withdrawal?..

But then again, the equipment is iron. And it is not accustomed to carrying out the servicemen's orders. But the family members, the wives and the children...

"The rail consist that withdrew with our families traveled for four and a half days," said Lieutenant Colonel V. Chernenko. "They sat at rail hubs for days in anticipation of rail cars. There was nowhere to spend the night. They drove to their apartments that they had already turned in (Thank God they were empty). They spent the next day in rail cars but the second part of the rail consist was not there. The children were crying and they ran out of food. There wasn't even any place to get milk..."

The officers of the future brigade have found shelter at a military unit in the Moscow suburb of Solnechnogorsk. In the background of the fact that officers' families at Kaluga, Ryazan, Kostroma, and a number of other cities have been compelled to live in classrooms, offices, and vegetable storerooms (!), we can say that it is difficult to desire anything better. Dormitories with fairly tolerable living conditions have been allocated to them. Places are being sought in neighboring schools and kindergartens through the efforts of the MVO [Moscow Military District] command authorities jointly with the Solnechnogorsk administration.

Lieutenant Colonel Mikhalskiy and his wife and three children have been lucky. They have been allocated a two-room apartment. Indeed, the rooms and small and there is a common kitchen. But, by the way, the Mikhalskiy family generally made themselves comfortable in an office for three years in Vilnius.

In all fairness, we should say that the majority recall the period of life "abroad" with a good feeling. No one remembers the faces of those who yelled "occupiers" in their wake. That was more often done from a crowd. Their Lithuanian

neighbors and acquaintances sent them off cordially and with sadness, helped them to get their things together, commiserated with them, and asked them to write...

Today, in the days of these small new villages for the 107th, they would simply like to drive away alarming thoughts about the future but not everyone is managing to do that. Because as a minimum, its obvious that none of the officers will obtain a separate apartment in the next three years because the apartment building construction plans are only being developed right now. Many will be compelled to occupy posts a grade or even two lower.

The fact that nearly 100 families have remained in Vilnius is worrisome. In accordance with the recent agreement with the Lithuanian Government, they are now being paid 1,500 "vagnoriks" each—two times less than the subsistence level. And for the time being, only plans exist for their infrastructure in Russia. A multitude of plans. And that is a true sign of the fact that an optimal solution will hardly be found in the near future. In any case, alas neither representatives of the division command authority or of the Moscow Military District were able to say anything specific about their fate.

Incidentally, President B. Yeltsin's decision on the cessation of the troop withdrawals from the Baltic states does not affect the 107th. As Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General B. Gromov explained to the officers, the division, half of which has already been withdrawn, must be totally withdrawn.

Helicopter Regiment Moved From Georgia Cooperates With Russian Sovkhoz

93UM0318A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Major Aleksandr Tolmachev: "A New Garrison Has Appeared on the Salskiy Steppes"]

[Text] Colonel Anatoliy Plastkov's helicopter regiment left the airfield it was based at in Georgia late at night.

They divided the remaining fuel among the crews and took off into the air in the radio silence mode. This was totally unexpected both for the guerrillas who had blockaded the military garrison and for the families of the pilots who were left at the "hot spot".

The helicopter crewmen carried out the commander's order: The flight was successfully completed and the aircraft did not end up in the hands of the illegal armed formations. But the families of the regiment's officers and warrant officers and the housing and the infrastructure that are needed for a normal life were left at the deployment location.

Currently, the regiment is based at a temporary airstrip in the Salskiy Steppes. What's there to hide, it is in a bare field. The pilots have five clapboard cottages, the majority of which require major repairs, at their disposal.

It's impossible to say that the helicopter crews have been cast to the whims of fate on their native soil. Literally from the first days, SKVO [North Caucasus Military District] Aviation Directorate officers, under the leadership of Major-General of Aviation Vladimir Ivannikov, have

applied a great deal of effort in order to somehow build housing for the newly arrived crewmen. In a short time, they have set up telephone communications, restored lighting on the airfield, equipped the sentry facility and organized the feeding of personnel. The housing situation was hopeless.

But the people did not despair. Really, they were in Russia, at home and, as we know, there's no place like home. And, indeed, the Cossacks did not leave the aviators to their misfortune. Breeding Sovkhoz Director Nikolay Ivanovich Matyushin was the first to drop by at the regiment. He looked at the aviators' housing—everyday life facilities and he proposed that three dozen families spend the winter at their farm, having allocated three cottages for them to reside in.

How, it would seem, could the leader give away housing to the military when there are already enough people in line for housing at the sovkhoz? But Matyushin is hardly a simpleton. He also told the aviators: he said, we need strong male hands. And there will be quite a few benefits for those servicemen who are being released who desire to remain at the sovkhoz. Let's say, construction materials for the construction of housing will be 50% cheaper for them. Work will be found not only for those personnel who have finished serving in the military but also for their wives.

General Ivannikov has found a common language with the leaders of the sovkhoz. He didn't make extravagant promises but he made them to understand that the servicemen will be frequent "guests" in the kolkhoz's fields. They will render assistance at the first call. And the general has kept his word. At that same breeding sovkhoz, servicemen have already rendered assistance in harvesting sugar beets and corn. And their hands equipped a kindergarten at the farm. Incidentally, the soldiers themselves have remained very satisfied with this kind of labor contact with the local population. They have gotten acquainted and become friends with people and they have earned money and cheap foodstuffs: bread, milk, and meat.

I spent several days at this field garrison and socialized with the servicemen and the Cossacks. And this is what I have understood: the people aren't indifferent to how the servicemen live, the local population doesn't regard them as parasites but sees the soldiers as assistants and their protectors.

When I left the farm, the local administration told me that they will build two kindergartens near the servicemen's housing in the near future. Therefore, more than 30 more families will get roofs over their heads. And the main thing, the sincere concern of the people.

Cadres Training Chief Vysotskiy on Education Reform

93UM0316B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 93 p 3

[Interview with Russian Federation Main Training and Cadre Placement Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Vasilyevich Vysotskiy by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Non-Staff Correspondent Vladimir Silkin, under the rubric: "Timely Interview": "The Military Diploma Will Be Convertible"]

[Text] As we all know, the 7th Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies adopted a decree "On the Situation in the Russian Federation Armed Forces and Military Policy". Specifically, it states the need for the further increase of exactingness and training of Armed Forces cadre, and first of all of officer cadres. How do they plan to carry out reform of military education?

Our non-staff correspondent's conversation with Russian Federation Main Training and Cadre Placement Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Vysotskiy is devoted to this problem.

[Silkin] Yevgeniy Vasilyevich, any reforms, no matter how they are conducted, must be carried out by specific people. In this connection, what kind of officer cadre training system do you see for the Russian Armed Forces?

[Vysotskiy] The creation of the military school is being carried out simultaneously with the formation of the Russian Armed Forces. Here we are differentiating three primary directions of this work. What are they?

First of all—optimization of the network of VUZs [higher educational institutions], compiling a list of them and their capacity in accordance with the new structure and strength of the Armed Forces and with the future need for officer cadres. The total number of VUZs will be reduced through amalgamation and integration and low-capacity and small schools will also be eliminated because training officers in them is economically inadvisable.

Second—bringing the military education system into accord with the multilevel structure of higher education that has been introduced in Russia. And the content of education must be brought into compliance with statewide and international education standards. We will strive to ensure the convertibility of a military VUZ graduate's diploma both in the country and also abroad.

And, finally, third—democratization of the military education system in accordance with the principles and standards of the VUZ law.

In our opinion, all of this will permit us to create a military education system that is capable of not only training the highest class military professional but to also educate a conscious defender of his Homeland, an officer with high moral and universal qualities. And what is very important—to ensure the rapid adaptation of officers upon release into the reserve.

[Silkin] What will be done in 1993 in the context of reorganizing military educational institutions?

[Vysotskiy] First of all, I remind you that the process of reorganizing VUZs had already begun in 1992. Military political educational institutions were reorganized, the transfer of a number of military schools from the Baltic Region and Georgia to the territory of Russia was carried out, and the Ground Forces Air Defense Military Academy was created in Smolensk... Training of officers in specialties was organized in academies and schools, training for which remained at VUZs outside Russia's borders.

In 1993, we will complete the transfer of military schools from the Baltic Region. We need to create the Russian Federation Armed Forces Military Academy of Economics, Finance, and Law based upon the Military Institute and the Military Finance and Economics Department. The presidential edict on that has been signed. The period of education at military aviation schools for pilots and navigators will be increased to five years beginning with the 1993-1994 academic year. The recruitment of cadets into a number of military schools which will subsequently be subject to being disbanded will cease in 1993.

[Silkin] And how are the issues being resolved of officer training in specialties, training in which was conducted at VUZs that have currently turned out to be outside Russia's borders?

[Vysotskiy] I have already practically answered that question. I only want to add that the scientific-pedagogical potential and the educational facilities of our VUZs permit us to organize training of military cadres in any specialties. We will not train officers for the Armed Forces at VUZs of nearby foreign countries.

[Silkin] In that case, what will be the status of a Russian military educational institution graduate's diploma?

[Vysotskiy] At the present time, the Ministry of Defense is examining the issue of bringing the military educational system into accord with the tri-level higher educational system that has been introduced in the Russian Federation. Training of diploma-receiving specialists will be placed at the foundation which is commensurate to the third level of Russian higher education with the issuance of a state-wide diploma. And training of masters of science will be organized for scientific-intensive and research activity at leading VUZs.

[Silkin] Will our servicemen be educated abroad?

[Vysotskiy] Until 1990, the education of Soviet Army and Navy servicemen abroad was carried out according to the international military cooperation plan through the bilateral exchange of military academy students of the former socialist countries and the USSR. Our officers studied at the academies of Poland, Hungary, Cuba, Bulgaria, and other friendly countries. However, as a result of the collapse of the socialist system and the well-known changes that have occurred in those countries and in our country, this form of cooperation has practically ceased to exist at the present time.

Recently, especially beginning since 1992, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense has begun to receive proposals from Western countries (the United States, Germany, Italy, and others) on the expansion of comprehensive military cooperation, including on the line of the exchange of VUZ students and cadets of the Russian Federation and the Western developed states. For understandable reasons, these proposals require serious study and analysis with subsequent practical realization. A team, that is involved not only with developing the conceptual provisions of this cooperation but also with its actual implementation, has been formed in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense

for this purpose. A team of Russian Federation Ministry of Defense generals and officers has just returned from the United States where these issues were studied jointly with the American side.

So, quite serious attention is being devoted to the issues of international military cooperation in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and I hope that we will soon be able to provide the answer to what categories of servicemen will undergo training abroad, for what periods, in which specialties, and at what VUZs.

[Silkin] Yevgeniy Vasilyevich, is the West's experience being taken into account in the training of Russian officer cadres?

[Vysotskiy] First of all, I need to point out that the Russian Military School, including the higher school, has the richest many-year history. Its alumni have repeatedly proven their superiority in professionalism over the representatives of foreign military schools in practice. The constant improvement of the entire training system of our officer cadres and first of all in the direction of the development of their professional qualities and the ability to operate under any conditions of the situation has occurred in the process of the development of military science.

The Western developed countries's experience of training servicemen certainly presents a definite interest for us. The exchange of delegations both along the line of VUZs and also of administrative structures has been regularly carried out for this purpose, especially in recent years. Suffice it to say that in 1990-1991 alone more than 30 VUZ delegations visited 14 countries and we received approximately that same number of delegations in our country. While analyzing the results of the work of our delegations, you can arrive at the conclusion that the experience of the introduction of original training methods, technical support of educational classes, teaching technologies, and other innovations into the educational process at certain foreign countries VUZs presents definite interest for us.

While working on military educational reform, we will certainly utilize individual positive components of the Western countries' VUZs educational process. However, we are not proposing any imitation or copying whatsoever of the entire Russian Army officer cadre training system as it is currently the fashion in our society.

[Silkin] Will foreign servicemen study at Russian military educational institutions and if they will, how will training be paid for?

[Vysotskiy] Foreign servicemen from the states of Africa, Southeast Asia, and the countries of Eastern Europe are already studying at a number of Russian military educational institutions at the present time. They will also study in from now on. Training is being carried out for payment, the specific amounts of which are being determined through the appropriate interstate agreements.

As for the training of servicemen of nearby foreign countries, I will point out: quite a few requests have already arrived and all of them are being reviewed. A legal base has

also been developed. For example, agreements on military-technical cooperation have been signed with a number of CIS states and servicemen from these states will be trained at Russian military educational institutions beginning in 1993.

[Silkin] And the last question, Yevgeniy Vasilyevich. What new things will appear in educational programs?

[Vysotskiy] At the present time, the training of officer cadres at Russian Federation Ministry of Defense VUZs is being carried out according to educational programs that were adopted in 1991. They will be in force until 1995. Therefore, there is no sense in talking about the development of new educational programs today.

Another matter is—adaptation, clarification, and the introduction of new concepts and provisions in them while considering the rapidly changing situation in the country and the views on the future structural development of the Russian Armed Forces. There will of course be some sort of innovations in that regard. What kind? First of all, the content of military disciplines will be made more precise with the adoption of Russia's military doctrine by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. Furthermore, the emphasis will be placed on strengthening humanitarian training, adding the humanitarian element to military education and increasing the culture of military specialists. And, finally, we are planning to increase the military-economic training of officer cadres. I am already not talking about the fact that time will be additionally allotted for elective courses in various disciplines, etc. In a word, educational programs will consist of all aspects of training a highly skilled, comprehensively developed, cultured military man.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Civil-Military Differences over Air Traffic Control

93UM0304A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Dec 92 p 2

[Interview with Maj-Gen Avn Boris Ivanovich Kushneruk, chief of the Directorate of the Interdepartmental Commission of the Unified Air Traffic Control System, by Vitaliy Moroz, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Can the Skies Be Privatized: Military Aviators Are Convinced that They Cannot"]

[Text] In these difficult times of crisis for the country, problems associated with organizing and ensuring order in airspace utilization are also becoming worse. The more frequent aircraft accidents, including with severe consequences, and the strikes by civilian air traffic controllers have attracted the public's attention to the departmental problems.

Does the Unified Air Traffic Control System, which was once praised so highly, have a future? Will the formation of independent states in the former republics of the Soviet Union, the processes of autonomies gaining their sovereignty, the establishing of market relations, and the commercial interests of aviation enterprises and aviation companies destroy the system? What are the prospects of cooperation between military and civilian air traffic control bodies?

Our correspondent talks about this with the chief of the Directorate of the Interdepartmental Commission of the Unified Air Traffic Control System, Major-General of Aviation Boris Kushneruk.

[Moroz] Boris Ivanovich, the question of reorganizing and improving the Unified Air Traffic Control [ATC] System, which has been operating in our country for just under two decades, arose back before the breakup of the USSR. In connection with what?

[Kushneruk] Since its creation in 1973, this system has been quite profitable for the state and society.

To regulate airspace utilization and control aircraft traffic, as we know, the country's airspace was divided into 13 zones that include air traffic control areas. In all, more than 200 centers of the Unified ATC System were set up throughout the country. As a rule, they structurally consist of military and civilian sectors and are housed in the same facilities and use common equipment. In individual areas, based on the distinctive features of the organizations of airspace use, centers were created consisting of one military or one civilian sector.

In addition, hundreds of auxiliary control posts of the Ministry of Defense are used for air traffic control to ensure functioning of the Unified ATC System, which significantly enhances flight safety.

The commander in chief of the Air Force is charged with responsibility for overall organization of utilization of the country's airspace. The Interdepartmental Commission of the Unified ATC System operates under him. This commission exercises supervision of the bodies of the Unified ATC System and has a staff with military and civilian structural subdivisions. Two or three times a year the Interdepartmental Commission examines timely problems of organizing, developing, and improving air traffic control at special meetings, where all airspace users are represented at a high level.

Thanks to the Unified ATC System, which took about 10 years to form and develop, we have managed to raise to a higher level—roughly three times—the regularity, economic efficiency, and safety of air traffic, eliminate the disconnection of air traffic control posts, utilize the airspace more efficiently, and improve the use of equipment.

Still, from my viewpoint, the Unified ATC System in its present form does not eliminate all the problems. It certainly needs to be developed and improved, particularly in the direction of overcoming departmental disconnection and implementing a unified technical policy. It is no secret that the equipment base of ATC bodies lags behind the foreign base. The problem of introducing automated systems into this sphere is very acute. This requires serious financing, considerable amounts of capital investment, and placement of orders both with domestic enterprises and close cooperation with foreign firms. Who should be the general buyer? Who should combine the efforts and be responsible for the state of affairs in this state sector? Someone came up with the idea to find a solution by

creating in 1990 a powerful state non-departmental structure—the USSR State Air Navigation Committee.

[Moroz] Was the USSR State Air Navigation Committee able to do anything?

[Kushneruk] It all came down to elaborating ideas, options, and concepts. But organizational, economic, technical, and legal normative fundamentals of the activities of the new state structure never were fully elaborated. Abolished in connection with the breakup of the USSR, the State Air Navigation Committee, for all practical purposes, did not have time to do anything. Clearing the way before it, they managed to disband the Main Air Traffic Administration under the former Ministry of Civil Aviation—the civilian structure of the Interdepartmental Commission, and this reflected negatively on the condition of the Unified ATC System and impeded its improvement.

[Moroz] What was left after abolishing the USSR State Air Navigation Committee? How do the component parts of the Unified ATC System look today?

[Kushneruk] The Directorate of the Interdepartmental Commission of the Unified ATC System under the Main Staff of the Air Force and the military sectors at the centers of the Unified ATC System were left unchanged. And this today is the only remaining centralized structure in the area of airspace utilization and air traffic control.

New structures were formed in place of the disappearing State Air Navigation Committee: the Interstate Aviation Committee; the Office of Air Traffic Control at the Department of Air Transport of the Russian Federation; the Main Administration of Air Navigation of the Russian Federation, created in February 1992 at the request of the leadership of the Federation of Trade Unions of Air Traffic Controllers. Parallel functioning of several civilian air traffic control structures adversely affects organizing air space utilization and air traffic control, at times turns into open confrontation between them and military structures, and does not help to improve the Unified ATC System and increase the level of air traffic safety.

That civilian part of the Unified ATC System which is directly involved in air traffic control is decentralized today, since it now forms a part of aviation enterprises, companies, and concerns for which earning a profit from its own shipments is more important than the flight safety of other aviation companies and aircraft of all departments.

[Moroz] I heard, Boris Ivanovich, that they are already demanding payment from military aviators for air navigation servicing.

[Kushneruk] Precisely. It is becoming a paradox: the crew of a military transport aircraft on a government assignment was delivering refugees from "hot spots," and at the airport of arrival they demanded a tidy sum for landing support. Where is the crew supposed to get the money? What kind of budget item provides for this money?

I believe that collecting money for landing, air navigation services, and so forth from crews of military transport aircraft performing flights under combat training plans,

supporting the vital activities of the troops, hauling humanitarian cargo and refugees, and in connection with troop withdrawals and emergency situations is impermissible.

[Moroz] The Main Administration of Air Navigation of the Russian Federation, apparently considering itself to be the successor to the USSR State Air Navigation Committee in Russia, judging from specific actions, is striving to lock up all questions of airspace utilization and air traffic control for itself. Should these intentions be supported?

[Kushneruk] In my opinion, the fallaciousness of such a decision would become obvious very soon. I do not think there would be a breakthrough in the area of automation of air traffic control, where we cannot get along without combining the efforts of civilian and military aviators.

As far as the persistent aspiration of the Main Administration of Air Navigation of the Russian Federation to lock up for itself all questions of airspace utilization and air traffic control, it is not likely that it will be able to control military aviation. To do this you need specialists with special skills, who are available only in the military structures of the bodies of the Unified ATC System.

You see, only the military sectors compile consolidated plans, coordinate, and directly control flights of military aviation and aviation of other departments over routes outside of airways and local air lines. They organize and monitor all types of activities associated with other use of airspace (firings, missile launches, demolition work, and so forth). That means that these functions will continue to remain with the military air traffic control bodies, but the Unified ATC System, which has quite a few merits and which is certainly capable of overcoming its present shortcomings, in essence will be no more.

Monopolization of the procedure for air airspace utilization and air traffic control in the hands of the Main Administration of Air Navigation of the Russian Federation, in my view, is fraught with serious consequences. Remember the recent air traffic controller strikes. One of the demands of the Federation of Trade Unions of Air Traffic Controllers was to create a Commission on Airspace Utilization and Air Traffic Control under the government of the Russian Federation and coincided completely with the position of the current composition of the Main Administration of Air Navigation of the Russian Federation. Fulfillment of this demand would result in breaking up the existing military air traffic control structures. It is known that today, particularly in emergency situations, the military sectors of the air traffic control centers become a reserve element which is able to assume additional functions of controlling civil aviation. Incidentally, 125 military specialists have already undergone additional training at the Ulyanovsk Civil Aviation Center under the civil aviation air traffic controller program. I will re-emphasize: we must not allow monopolization of such a critical area as air traffic control in the hands of the Main Administration of Air Navigation of the Russian Federation, which is part of the Ministry of Transportation of the Russian Federation.

[Moroz] How can the Unified ATC System be preserved? How do you see it in the new conditions?

[Kushneruk] In any event, we must not break up the current system. We are obligated to save it by an agreement on this issue between the heads of state of the CIS that was adopted in Tashkent. During the next year we must develop and implement a whole set of legislative and normative-legal acts governing airspace utilization and air traffic control. Today, distressing as it may be to admit, legal infiniteness is intruding into this area, which is a direct threat to flight safety and is already turning into tragedies.

It is extremely important to single out civilian air traffic control bodies from the composition of aviation enterprises (aviation companies) and subordinate them as state bodies directly to the Department of Air Transport of the Ministry of Transportation. It seems to me that we simply will not be able to manage without restoring the vertical air traffic control structures of civil aviation.

In my opinion, the Interdepartmental Commission on Airspace Utilization and Air Traffic Control of the Russian Federation should head the system of both military and civilian specialists who have been working in this field for many years. The working apparatus of this commission would be the corresponding structural subdivisions of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Transportation of the Russian Federation. The chairman of the Interdepartmental Commission is seen as the commander in chief of the Air Force, operationally subordinate on special issues to the chairman of the government of Russia, and not the minister of transportation of the Russian Federation, as the leadership of the Main Administration of Air Navigation of the Russian Federation proposes. The minister of transportation already has enough concerns and duties, and he is not a professional in this specific field.

I think that only such a system that has absorbed the experience of the past and is ready to take on new, more complex tasks will be able to ensure an efficient allocation and utilization of airspace in the interests of all its users and precise and reliable traffic control of all departments' aviation. Under the Unified ATC System, the skies will have one master—the state. Under the aegis of the state and on its behalf, we need to fight for air traffic safety in the country and to raise it to the level of world standards in the foreseeable future.

AWACS-Type Aircraft A-50 'Shmel' Described

93UM0317A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Nikolay Poroskov, under the rubric: "Arsenal": "Shmel' Sees Everything"]

[Text] The primary problem for air defense is the detection of low-flying and small targets. Traditional radar—ground-based radar sites turn out to be ineffective at times if the target exploits the terrain irregularities on its route, for example, if its flies along a mountain gorge. In this case, the site's radiation pattern angles of clearance do not permit the target to be observed.

The idea of raising the radar to an altitude of several kilometers and thereby incomparably expanding its capabilities had already arisen in the mid 1950's. As a result, today the Americans have several versions of the E-3 AWACS Long Range Radar Detection and Control Aircraft. In 1961, the TU-126 (based on the TU-95 Strategic Bomber) Radar Surveillance and Control Aircraft System (AK RLDN) with the "Liana" Electronic System (RTK) that detects airborne targets, beginning from medium altitudes, entered the inventory of our PVO [air defense]. However, soon strike aviation shifted to tactics of penetrating PVO [air defense] systems at low and extremely low altitudes which practically reduced the system's capabilities to zero.

Beginning in 1965, the Instrument Building NII [Scientific Research Institute] in Moscow conducted work on the development of a system that was capable of detecting targets in the background of underlying surfaces (steppe, forest, mountains, or water). The "Shmel" Electronic System, which was subsequently installed on the IL-76MD aircraft, was developed at "Vega-M" NPO [Scientific Production Association] under the leadership of Chief Designer Vladimir Ivanov. Work was conducted at Taganrog Aircraft Scientific-Technical Complex imeni G.M. Bershev (Chief Designer Aleksey Konstantinov). The innovation received the designation A-50 and entered the PVO Troops inventory in 1984.

The "Shmel" Electronic System consists of an onboard three-dimensional radar, an IFF [Identification Friend or Foe] device, a system for processing information and its depiction at the tactical crew's work stations, a digital communications system with ground-based and shipborne facilities and support aircraft. There is also an information recording device.

Information about targets that is obtained by the A-50 is utilized by the tactical crew (combat command and control officers) for control of fighter-interceptors and ground attack aircraft and is also transmitted along digital communications lines through special receiving and transmitting centers (PPTs) to the Armed Forces services automated command and control system command posts (ASU KP). Artificial Earth Satellite (ISZ) Radiorelays are used to transmit data when operating at long ranges from command posts.

The A-50 can serve as a flying fighter control post, radar post, and even command post if the people on the aircraft are allotted the appropriate authority and the A-50 has the capability to transmit information to submarines that surface at the designated time. The onboard computer transmits information to the screens in color in alphanumeric and panoramic form. Control is carried out both using automated communications circuits and using voice, that is, transmitting commands into the air.

During the events in the Persian Gulf, two A-50's patrolled over the Black Sea, while monitoring the air space near our borders. "Shmel" proved itself recently during the "Oborona-92" [Defense-92] exercises.

The United States is devoting a great detail of attention to the development of AWACS system aircraft. According to

Western expert assessments, its introduction is equivalent to a two-fold increase of air defense fighter aircraft. An E-3 modernization program prior to the year 2010 exists and enormous resources are being invested in it. Work is also being conducted in our country—with the consideration that the A-50 has a dual function. It can be used (besides for carrying out military missions) to combat light motorized aircraft that are delivering contraband, to protect fishing zones, and to escort scheduled international flights over Siberia, especially in those locations where there are no groundbased radars. Today the A-50's significance is also caused by the fact that the old air borders have been violated and the new ones are only being formed.

A-50 With the "Shmel" RTK [Electronic System] Tactical-Technical Data

Patrol Duration in the Air Without Refueling at a Range of 1,000 km From the Take-Off Airfield	4 hours
Information Transmission Range to the Armed Forces Services ASU KP [Automated Control System Command Posts] on the Following Radio Circuits:	
—Metric [VHF] and Decimetric [UHF] Bands	up to 350 km
—Shortwave Band	up to 2,000 km
—Satellite Communications	Over 2,000 km
Crew:	
—Flight Crew	5 men
—Tactical Crew	10 men
Aircraft Maximum Take-Off Weight	190,000 Kilograms

Parameters, Operation of 'Periskop' Air Defense Radar

93UM0354A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel Nikolay Poroskov: "'Periskop' on a Mountain Peak"]

[Text] At the beginning of the 1970's, the country's leadership tasked the defense industry with developing a radar that was capable of ensuring guaranteed long range detection of low-flying targets. The need for it was largely dictated by the results of military operations in the Middle East where aircraft in a number of cases had successfully penetrated the PVO [Air Defense] system at low altitudes. The idea of installing a radar on an aircraft was proposed by Moscow Instrument Building NII [Scientific Research Institute] but implementation did not occur at that time because of the high cost. The project to install a radar in the external pod of an aerostat also was not completed with results: there were difficulties with the textiles for the sheath and with the gas filler.

The customer—Ministry of Defense Main Directorate Chief Colonel-General of Aviation Georgiy Baydukov opted for a radar that was raised to a height, to a mountain: there are

extensive mountainous regions along the country's borders and raising an antenna system to a significant height eliminates cut-off angles while significantly increasing the radar's capabilities.

One of the primary requirements—the radar must see targets in the background of the underlying surface and weather formations. At that time, there was only one radar—the P-16—that possessed this quality to some degree. The collective under the leadership of Chief Designer Anatoliy Metelskiy conducted the work on the new complex that received the designation "Periskop". He had previously developed the "Livna" radar complex on the TU-126 radar surveillance and guidance aircraft.

The developers even observed moving automobiles and trains on the screen from Tarki-Tau Mountain (720 meters above sea level) where the experimental model was installed. Information about "Periskop's" capabilities reached PVO Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Pavel Batitskiy and he wished to become personally acquainted with the equipment. The helicopter with the commander-in-chief was detected just after it had taken off from Groznyy. The radar crew also confidently carried out tracking of the MIGs. The satisfied Batitskiy "turned on the levers" at the highest levels and work occurred at an accelerated pace.

The accomplishment of "Periskop's" developers was that they ensured high stability of the transmitter's frequency, good digital processing of the signal and a high degree of suppression of reflections from ground clutter—by a factor of millions. The radar did not have any competitors in target detection range at low altitudes.

Indeed, the high location of the radar along with the obvious advantages also caused problems. It is more difficult to cool equipment and the electrical durability of the insulation is reduced in the rarefied atmosphere. In winter, the radome became covered with a crust of ice and a thick layer of frost which increased the weight of the structure by several times.

The developers found techniques to solve the problems listed above: they used partially liquid cooling of equipment, they increased the insulation, they located crew work stations below the main position, having developed a remote control for the radar and having installed computer control of equipment operation. A "Shalash"-type radar-transparent (fiber-glass) covering withstood the powerful wind loading.

The first "Periskop-B" radars were installed in the Caucasus, along the Chinese and Iranian borders, at Mys Gamov and on the Kola Peninsula. Then, the radars also appeared near Moscow.

Nizhegorodskiy "Gorizont" KB [design bureau] and "Elektromash" Plant jointly modernized the radar. The radar system received the designation "Periskop-BM". The complex is a pulse, two-dimensional, surveillance radar with an effective moving target digital indication device with coherent transmitters and receivers that have a broad dynamic range.

The radar site consists of an antenna on an artillery two-wheeled vehicle that provides mobility; an equipment trailer with a transceiver, computer equipment and a control display; and, a cooling and electrical power supply trailer. The complex has autonomous power diesel-electrical equipment and a substation—with power from the net, 3-4 portable work stations are installed at a distance of 300 meters from the main position.

The radar operates reliably in a jamming situation at a temperature of plus/minus 50°C and with a relative humidity of 98% (at 35°C). It is highly assessed in the troops. In 1980, "Vega-M" NPO [Scientific Production Association] collective developers, under the leadership of Anatoliy Metelskiy became the State Prize Laureate. And today the NPO has new promising developments in its reservists but, alas, no orders.

Tactical-Technical Specifications of the "Periskop-BM"

Radar	
Frequency range	decimetric
Output in a pulse	up to 100 kw
Target detection range with a radar-cross section [RCS] of 2.5 m ² at an altitude of 2,000 meters above sea level:	
—Without jamming	200 km
—With jamming	up to 100 km
Reflection suppression ratio from the Earth's surface	60 decibels
Maximum radar deployment elevation above sea level	3,000 meters
Wind loading withstood by the antenna system	up to 40 meters per second
Power Consumption	up to 100 kw

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Commentary on Japanese Report of Chinese Interest in Carriers

93UM0299A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Dec 92 p 4

[Article by Vasilii Golovnin under the rubric "A Version": "China Wants to Buy Aircraft: If the Japanese Are to Be Believed, Russia Has Promised to Think About It"]

[Text] Tokyo—Following the failure of its attempt to buy the uncompleted aircraft-carrying cruiser Varyag in Ukraine, Japan reports, China has offered to negotiate with Moscow on the purchase of two "floating airfields," these deployed right near the PRC [People's Republic of China], in harbors of the Russian Far East. Sources in the Pacific Fleet have informed the newspaper TOKYO SHIMBUN that this involves the aircraft-carrying cruisers Minsk and Novorossiysk, which have a displacement of 38,000 tons each. According to Western information, each of them can accommodate 13 VTOL aircraft and 16 ASW helicopters.

The Russian government, it is asserted, has promised to consider the possibility of such a deal and made it clear that

everything depends entirely upon the terms offered by Beijing. If the talks proceed harmoniously, the Japanese have learned, the deal could be concluded as early as April of next year, although China is offering the fairly modest amount of 100 million dollars for each of the enormous ships at this time.

In fact, however, the cruisers involved are clearly not equals. According to available information, the dilapidated Minsk is practically laid up in Sovetskaya Gavan and has not been to sea in a long time. According to some sources, there are even voices in the Pacific Fleet calling for the ship to be sold for scrap, since its modernization and repair are practically unfeasible.

At the same, Japan suggests, there is no problem with the operation of the aircraft-carrying cruiser Novorossiysk, based at a harbor in the Primorye region. Incidentally, this very ship has traditionally been viewed in the West as a symbol of the Soviet military threat, and its every move has been reported in Tokyo with as much interest as tours by Michael Jackson or Madonna.

It can be stated in advance that for perfectly understandable reasons the reports published in the newspaper TOKYO SHIMBUN will be refuted by Russian military officials, just as China and Ukraine never fully acknowledged their contacts regarding the Varyag, hopelessly stuck in the Nikolayev shipyards without combat rigging or equipment. There is practically no doubt, however, that China is presently making every effort to acquire at least one of the former Soviet fleet's aircraft-carrying cruisers, since there is simply nowhere else for it to buy these ships. The West and Japan regard with great suspicion China's attempts to improve its naval forces, which could alter the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean.

The PRC currently has 56 destroyers and 94 submarines. Only two surface ships in this outwardly substantial armada are capable of carrying helicopters, however, and only 26 ships are armed with ASW missiles. In other words, the Chinese fleet clearly does not measure up to contemporary demands and could hardly provide effective control of the western Pacific, including the South China Sea with its rich oil deposits. According to the experts, incidentally, Beijing's purchase of SU-27 aircraft, which has an operating range of 1,500 kilometers, from Russia has to do precisely with its efforts to keep its sights constantly on this disputed zone, which China's own aircraft simply could not reach even from its nearest base on the island of Haikan.

Tokyo is extremely disturbed by the build-up of the PRC's naval capability and has even officially called upon it to "exercise restraint" in the purchase of armaments. Japan is frightened by the appearance of the new and poorly predictable force operating on transport routes of vital importance to it. The Southeast Asian nations, which clearly face the specter of a new Chinese military hegemony, are equally concerned. Russia has an extreme need for hard currency, of course. Moscow is also interested in a strategic partnership with a powerful China. However, thought should obviously be given to whether the appearance of an aircraft-carrier flying the red flag of the PRC in immediate proximity to

Russia's waters—added to the presence of American "floating airfields" already operating there—is consistent with its security interests.

Baltic Fleet Counterintelligence Chief Interviewed
PM2201113593 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 93 p 2

[Interview with Rear Admiral A. Drachenko, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security Baltic Fleet Counterintelligence Department, by stringer I. Rudnikov in Kaliningrad; date not stated: "The St. Andrew's Flag—The Only Thing That Has Not Been Swiped?"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has already written about the machinations over the sale of military property in the Baltic Fleet (see issue for 8 October 1992). But, possibly, the tricks of the businessmen in shoulder boards from the "Aviabaltsevis" and "Baltgarant" firms are only the tip of the iceberg. Rear Admiral A. Drachenko, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security Baltic Fleet Counterintelligence Department, answers the questions of our stringer.

[Rudnikov] Anatoliy Pavlovich, you are increasingly accused over the fact that troops withdrawn from the Baltic region will be left without housing. They say that your staff interfere with businessmen.

[Drachenko] It is not the counterintelligence service which is casting a shadow over the fleet's commercial activity, but individual functionaries engaging in "wild" commerce. We are not in the least interested in housing construction. We have to withdraw the operational complement from the Baltic republics. Official organs of these countries demanded as long ago as last year that representatives of foreign special services be immediately withdrawn from their territories.

We are in favor of the use of extrabudgetary funds made from commercial activity. But we cannot agree to the blatant squandering of state property.

In November 1992 the Baltic Fleet bartered diesel fuel in exchange for five minibuses. What does the fleet need more today—minibuses or fuel?

The fleet paid the seller—the trading firm of M. Shvartsman [name as transliterated]—300 tonnes of diesel fuel. Although 100 tonnes would have been more than enough. And Mr. Shvartsman pocketed at least 27 million rubles [R]. Earlier this was called a loss. Now it is called "loss of potential profit."

[Rudnikov] But perhaps this is elementary incompetence?

[Drachenko] Maybe. "Maritime aviators" have for a year now been leasing in its entirety the Skulte Airdrome in Latvia from the fleet. And aircraft of the "Inversiya" airline are serviced using the forces of the fleet's air forces—people and equipment.

No one knows anything about this. "Inversiya" pays the airmen punctually, but the fleet does not get a kopek. Therefore I will not be surprised if after a while we are

obliged to lift the lid on the commercial secret and announce that this was done for our benefit...

[Rudnikov] So commerce is the Baltic Fleet's biggest secret?

[Drachenko] One of the main tasks of military counterintelligence is the defense of state and military secrets. We could defend commercial secrets as well. But for this it is necessary to know what is being protected. We have to delve into the essence of commercial operations where they run counter to the law or damage combat readiness. As was the case with "Baltgarant."

[Rudnikov] There are rumors that the "Baltgarant" affair was contrived, and that with the firm's liquidation the fleet has suffered losses.

[Drachenko] The incidents being investigated come under the article on contraband. What losses the fleet suffered with the liquidation of "Baltgarant" is hard for me to judge. I can say what losses the fleet and the state suffered from "Baltgarant's" activity. Just take its links with the Kaliningrad firm "Ela."

A year ago Ela found out that a Riga aviation enterprise was badly in need of aviation fuel. On terms of mutual deliveries "Ela" acquired from a fleet troops unit (next door to the Riga Aviation Enterprise runway) 500 tonnes of fuel at Russian state prices. Naturally, with the fleet's permission. And straightway it resold the fuel to the Riga aviation enterprise at a mere 14 times (!) the price. The same firm, but this time in Liepaja, acquires from the fleet on the same terms a further 500 tonnes of diesel fuel.

[Rudnikov] The conclusions?

[Drachenko] Simply "loss of potential profit." But that is not all. The fleet helped "Ela," and the firm "helped" us. At the same time it delivers to the fleet almost 1 million rubles' worth of canned meat at R80 per can. This is February 1992, notice. Then, after the increases of prices in May, the canned meat still cost R37. The answer is always the same: these are contract prices. For the same "Ela," the Baltic Fleet organized the unlicensed export of fuel to the Baltic countries, for which it was fined R35 million.

[Rudnikov] How do the Baltic Fleet command authorities and the military prosecutor react to your information?

[Drachenko] In various ways. But criminal proceedings are instituted on most of our information.

[Rudnikov] I tried to find out about the fate of the cases featuring military businessmen Vice Admiral I. Ryabinin and Lieutenant General of Aviation V. Proskurin, which made such a big sensation. The cases were closed "due to absence of a corpus delicti."

[Drachenko] Speaking overall, one of the causes of the growth of crime in the fleet is the relative lack of punishment. In the fleet people already say bluntly: Grab what you can, and if you are unlucky and get caught, at worst you will have to return what you stole.

New Black Sea Fleet Commander E. Baltin Profiled
PM1901125993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Jan 93 First Edition p 7

[A. Mozgovoy report: "Our Information"]

[Text] At their meeting in Moscow the presidents of Russia and Ukraine decided to appoint Vice Admiral Eduard Baltin, chief of the Navy Department of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy, to the post of commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

For understandable reasons, the question of the new fleet commander took a long time to resolve. Twelve names figured on the initial list of candidates. But now the choice has now been made.

Eduard Dmitriyevich Baltin was born in Smolensk in 1936. He joined the Armed Forces in 1954. He is a graduate of naval school, the Naval Academy, and the General Staff Academy. He commanded submarines in the Black Sea and Northern Fleets, was chief of staff and commander of a division of submarines of the Northern Fleet, commanded a strategic formation of submarines of the Pacific Fleet, and then occupied the post of first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet. He is a Hero of the Soviet Union.

Asked to comment on his new appointment, Eduard Baltin said the following to your correspondent:

"I took no direct part at all in the competition for this post. I was the choice of the presidents of Russia and Ukraine. As far as the state of affairs in the Black Sea Fleet is concerned, it is too early to talk about that now. First, I must come to grips with it myself."

As the editorial office was told at the Main Naval Staff, the two presidents' choice was obviously influenced by Baltin's great professional experience and his ability to assess the political situation soberly.

Volunteer Service, Quality of Replacement Personnel
93UM0341A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank Aleksandr Pilipchuk: "Russian 'Pros' Take First Steps"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The Russian Federation Governmental Decree of 30 November 1992 on Measures for Phased Transition to Contract Recruitment for Service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces did not cause a stir in the antisubmarine defense force of which the BPK [Large Antisubmarine Ship] Admiral Tributs is a part. This particular military collective had already experimented with contract service. Many dozens of sailors and petty officers undertook contract service aboard the force's ships in the fall of 1992. Some of the men are already performing sea duty in their new capacities in the Persian Gulf. These men are the subject of this article.

Captain 3rd Rank Yevgeniy Yermochenko, officer in the engineering department (BCh-5) aboard the BPK Admiral Tributs, told a story that would be humorous were it not so sad:

"Several days prior to the ship's departure for sea duty in the Persian Gulf, young replacements arrived at the subunit. One of the new arrivals came up with the question: Will the ship be travelling at night, also?"

Replacements such as that—for sea duty, at that—are not of much use. But who else to bring aboard? The transition to the two-year tour of duty renders impossible the spending of long months on thorough training for a sailor in a training detachment, for this would leave no time for him to serve aboardship. In addition, VMF [Navy] training subunits have no time to become familiar with materiel intended for the ships. In the past, almost half the petty officers and sailors serving in BCh-5 would become specialists first class in their last year of service. Of the men setting out today on a cruise lasting many months, 80 percent are novices. A subunit commander would have a difficult time indeed, if some of the petty officers and sailors would not request tours of contract service of six months to two years duration.

I had a talk with one of the volunteers, Petty Officer 1st Class Vladimir Rashchupkin.

What kind of person is he, this prototype of a professional who emerged from the throes of the "lower echelons" of sailors? Vladimir comes to the Pacific Ocean Fleet from Irkutsk Oblast. Upon completing 10 years of schooling, he enrolled in the Automobile Mechanics Department of the Irkutsk Polytechnical School. After completing one year of study, he decided to enter the service. He performed his tour of active duty in this force, serving aboard the large antisubmarine vessel Marshal Shaposhnikov. When the time came for his discharge into the reserve, he was occupying the position of chief of the gas turbine operation section, as a specialist second class. He would most likely have left the Navy at that point, were in not for the newly-available opportunity of remaining in the Armed Forces without becoming bound hand and foot to a lengthy tour of duty.

Vladimir Rashchupkin specified in his request that he wished to serve two years. Now he is the ranking petty officer of a gas turbine operation team. I asked Vladimir about what prompted him to take this step. The petty officer answered with some hesitation:

"I want to get through a tough time. I cannot ask my mother or married sister for money. I am grown-up now."

I think that there was no need for Vladimir to hesitate before answering my question. This kind of rationale: to earn a living, rise to a certain living standard, leave your problems behind, makes much sense. It is no accident that the RF [Russian Federation] governmental decree cites the need for exerting efforts to enlist citizens, concentrating on areas suffering a surplus of labor reserves, for contract military service. The state is purchasing a professional's skills, and this merchandise is good; if the price is sufficiently high, the deal is favorable for both parties. Vladimir is presently the recipient of pay and allowances not much lower than that of an officer or warrant officer, with cost-free meals and clothing and liberty privileges. In addition, he is paid for sea duty.

Also openly expressing a goal of earning some money for civilian "acquisitions" by performing military service were

Petty Officer 1st Class Ruslan Kud from the Lvov area and Petty Officer 2nd Class Vladimir Valeyev from Tyumen Oblast. Subsequent to serving 30 months in the signal department (BCh-4), they rose to become specialists holding high class status and, committing themselves for 18 months of additional duty on a contract basis, undoubtedly strengthened BCh-4 with their knowledge and experience for the entire duration of their tour. Remaining aboardship were also highly trained specialists in other subunits.

It is patently true that the majority of petty officers and seamen who decided to remain at their shipboard posts in their new capacities did request a six-month tour of duty. A smaller number asked for 18 months. Even fewer specified two years. Do the people look before they leap? They do. In this connection, this is what was said in this regard by Petty Officer 1st Class Vladimir Gnindenko, chief of the radio room and a specialist 1st class:

"I already find fault with some things in my new capacity. First of all, I would like to receive more respect, perhaps mostly in officers' attitudes toward us. We are still sometimes treated as conscripted sailors, even though we are serving on a contract basis. And the uniform is that of a sailor. We eat in the crew mess. We live in crew quarters."

"Which means that six months more, then home for you?"

"Yes, it looks like that. I graduated from a tekhnikum before entering the service. I will find a job in civilian life."

It is possible that everyone does not think the same as the above person with whom I spoke. One must realize that a person's position is one of seaman or petty officer. Also, relations between officers and specialists performing contract service will improve and become smoother. Nevertheless, in the period of institution of contract service, each opinion must be heard. This would include the kind that was voiced by an officer in force headquarters: "The roots of professionalism must be established ashore first." What this officer possessing many years of experience meant by that is clear. The material well-being of servicemen performing contract service can become a stumbling block to young men, especially to those who have families or wish to start one.

I had occasion to come across a case in point aboard the BPK Admiral Tributs. Petty Officer 2nd Class Nikolay Yefimov is steering compartment chief. He completed two years of conscripted service, then decided to remain an additional six months. Why not longer? Nikolay is married and has a three year old daughter.

"I would consider a longer tour, but my family should be close by," he said.

What was I to answer to that? That even officers have no housing? Their wives, no job? Their children, no kindergarten? But it is a shame to lose this kind of specialist, a graduate of the Omsk River Service School. Incidentally, here we have a source of genuine professionalization of sailors and petty officers: our secondary specialized schools that possess a Navy-like structure. All that need be done is to interest a youth in the material advantages of naval service

while he is still in school, and have the Ministry of Defense furnish a stipend to pay for his retraining for a specific shipboard specialty.

But let us not be carried away by our phantasies. The new approach to filling sailor and petty officer slots is taking its first steps. Some of the latter amount to groping our way. There is yet no definite statute dealing with contract service; there are no contracts constituting legal documents in which both parties become bound to taking on clearly defined obligations. Not yet entirely clear are the age limits that will be set for volunteers. But there is one thing that does exist: a continuing influx of requests from seamen and petty officers. There are people from whom to make selections, and not all requests are approved. There is certainty in force headquarters as well as aboardship that the effort will be successful.

Specifications of SA-N-9 'Klinok'

93UM0348A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent
Aleksandr Dolgikh: "'Klinok', Surging Into the Air"]

[Text] Many visitors to the Russian aircraft-space exhibition Mosaeroshow-92 knew that the Klinok (Western designation SA-N-9) multichannel, all weather, autonomous air defense missile-artillery system was still quite recently considered to be classified in our country. However, it attracted universal attention to itself not only because of that. As before, there are no systems comparable to it in the world...

They began talking about the need to develop a weapon of this type for the first time in 1975. Military seamen, who were concerned about the appearance of various types of antiship missiles in many countries, proposed to Moscow's Altair NPO [Scientific Production Association] the development of an air defense artillery-missile system with which they would be able to effectively repel massive attacks of missiles and other aircraft at low and medium altitudes and also to combat enemy ships, including wing-in-ground effect vehicles.

Combat Specifications of the Klinok Shipborne Air Defense Missile System

Maximum Target Detection Range at an altitude of 3,500 meters (during autonomous operations of the complex)	45,000 meters
Reaction Time (depending on the radar mode)	8-24 seconds
Time to Bring the System to Combat Readiness:	
—From a Cold State	3 minutes
—From Alert Mode	15 seconds
Minimum Target Destruction Range	1,500 m
When the 30 mm Artillery Gun is Included	300 m
Maximum Target Destruction Range	12,000 m
Minimum Target Destruction Altitude	10 m
Maximum Target Destruction Altitude	6,000 m

Target Speed	0-700 meters per second
Number of Targets Being Simultaneously Fired Upon in a 60 X 60° Spatial Sector	4
Number of Missiles Being Guided Simultaneously	8
Combat load	24-64 surface-to-air guided missiles
Missile Weight	165 kg
Warhead Weight	15 kg
System Weight (without combat load)	41,500 kg

Stanislav Alekseyevich Fadeyev headed the work. Ten years were spent on research, development, and creation of an experimental model. The complex, which received the for seamen exotic designation Klinok [Blade], was accepted into the Naval inventory in 1986. And today the heavy aircraft carrying cruisers Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov and Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov, Kirov Class nuclear missile cruisers, Udaloy Class BPKs [large antisubmarine warfare ships] and other ships are armed with it.

We need to say that the system has actually turned out to be unique. Its primary distinction and its main advantage is that it is multichannel. That is, it is capable of simultaneously destroying several targets—both with missiles and with the fire of its 30 mm automatic guns. Its own airborne target radar detection systems provide Klinok with total independence from general ship radars and the capability for effective operations in the most complicated situation. Although, of course, information from any other target designation systems can also be utilized.

The Klinok anti-aircraft missile system has high automation of combat operation—from detection of targets to their destruction, short reaction time and a high rate of fire. The system has an adequately deep automated functional control that ensures simplicity of operation. The television-optical target tracking systems that are built into the antenna post increase its jamming resistance under conditions of intensive electronic countermeasures.

The below deck launcher has 3-4 drum-type launch modules. Eight transport-launch canisters with missiles are loaded into each module.

The Klinok air defense missile system uses the same air defense guided missile as the Tor troop air defense system. Missile launch—is vertical and is carried out using a catapult. After leaving the launcher, a gas dynamic system begins to operate that inclines the missile in the direction of the target. The engine starts up at a safe altitude after the air defense guided missile has turned toward the target. The explosion of a high-explosive fragmentation warhead is conducted at the command of a pulse radio fuze in direct proximity to the target. The destruction of maneuvering and level-flying high-speed targets is ensured thanks to the missile's high flight speed. Incidentally, several dozen actual low-flying antiship missiles have been destroyed while the system has been in operation.

The missile is transported and stored in a transport-launch canister that ensures its preservation and continuous combat readiness. The missile does not require any inspections whatsoever during a 10-year storage period.

The Klinok system can be installed on ships with a displacement of 800 tonnes or more. The modular design principle suggests various variations for its placement. It can be operated under various climactic conditions and it can destroy targets in seas up to five balls. The crew of the complex consists of 13 men.

At the present time, Altair NPO is conducting research to further improve the air defense missile system for the Navy.

Black Sea Officers' Assembly Demands Fleet Unity
93UM0346A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 93 p 2

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Vladimir Pasyakin and Vladimir Maryukha: "Black Sea Officers' Assembly Demands Preservation of Fleet Unity"]

[Text] If this is rejected, the Black Sea personnel reserve the right to resolve urgent issues with the means available to the Officers' Assembly.

On 21 January the Black Sea Officers' Assembly sent a demand that a unified Black Sea Fleet be preserved, with its main base at Sevastopol, to the presidents of Ukraine and Russia. There were two factors behind the categorical nature of the resolution adopted by the assembly.

In the first place, after assuming the job of maintaining the Black Sea Fleet Ukraine found itself incapable of meeting its obligations. The drop in the ruble-coupon rate drastically worsened the already poor material situation of the Black Sea sailors, who receive pay and allowances which do not take into account differences in the exchange rate for the currencies. In addition, Ukraine has continued its attempts to take over fleet units and formations, which is fundamentally contrary to the Yalta and Dagomys agreements of 1992.

Today, due to the general deterioration of Ukraine's economic situation, which has entered just about its most critical phase in the Black Sea Fleet, there is very substantial support from the Crimeans. For a second time in the past year and a half the fleet's fate is being solidly linked to political and economic autonomy for the Crimea as an independent republic.

Although the Black Sea sailors do not intend to be drawn into the political clashes for which numerous mass-meetings in Sevastopol and other cities of the Crimea are calling, they have nonetheless demanded the immediate "eviction" of the headquarters of Ukraine's Navy from the fleet's main base.

1986 Nuclear Submarine Accident
934A0660A Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Jan 93 p 4

[Article by Yuriy Dmitriyev, TRUD special correspondent: "From Secret Archives—Tragedy in the Sargasso Sea. What Happened to the K-219 Soviet Nuclear Submarine in October 1986"]

[Text] SUBMARINE. I have had occasion to see this steel whale-shaped monster, stuffed with nuclear warheads, only a few times in my life. And each time I was left with a heavy heart: People have invented for destruction nuclear submarines that are capable of carrying a vigilant missile watch crew into the depths of the ocean that at any moment, on an order from the center, can splash out its lethal load on the earthlings. But I was also very anxious for the callow young lads, in their short, black peacoats, who silently filed aboard the slumbering submarine. Anxious for those who were going out on a long and secret cruise. For weeks and months, without letters and a return address.

Former submarine commanders told me: It was only the best of their subordinates that they permitted, as encouragement, to look into the periscope at the night sky. To look at the stars and, with luck, the moon also. To assure themselves that all of this still existed. Because during the long weeks of submarine life, with the monotonous, measured rhythm, changes of the watch crew, and taps and reveille, a person finds himself as if weightless, and he gets out of the habit of the usual earthly emotions. Even out of the habit of walking. Despite the fact that ship cooks diligently prepare mushroom soups and do not skimp on dill, parsley, and other greens. Despite the fact that in the submarine's dining room there are pictures with Russian forests, rivers, shady ponds....

This time the K-219 nuclear submarine had to surface. This occurred at dawn on 3 October in the Western Atlantic. In the Sargasso Sea. Approximately 1,000 miles from the U.S. coast. It surfaced not of its own will. And not on an order from Moscow and the headquarters of the Northern Fleet, where the nuclear-powered vessel that was on combat duty was based. This rare directive, which is equivalent to unexpected and threatening states of emergency, was personally issued by 37-year-old Commander Igor Britanov. What happened?

The submarine started on its patrol from a remote, highly classified base in the polar region on 4 September 1986. It cruised for a month, adhering strictly to the planned schedule and route of a voyage that was unknown to the world. Duty watches were changed every four hours in all 10 sections. Deputy Political Officer Yuriy Sergiyenko, a happy, cheerful "kap-3"; that is, a captain 3d rank, only two years younger than the commander, was happily telling the crew about the strength that perestroika was gaining in our country, and about our plans.

At that time, more than 100 persons put out to sea: 30 officers, 39 warrant officers, 12 petty officers, and 32 seamen.... There were 15 powerful strategic missiles on board the nuclear-powered submarine that were aimed at targets of the probable enemy. Each one of these monsters knows its target well: where to deliver the lethal nuclear charge. On a signal, it instantly leaves its bunker that is concealed on board, and, raising a myriad of splashes of water, it heads skyward.

I had occasion once to observe this. Of course, it was a training launch. It took place in the icy, leaden Barents Sea, in the beginning of the 1970's. During the unprecedented

Okean universal world sea maneuvers, Marshal Grechko, then minister of defense, was being shown a hellish picture. The former cavalryman and infantryman, who apparently was in an ocean theater for the first time, shuddered at the sight of the fiery waterspout that unexpectedly broke out from under the water. At that time we, a handful of Moscow journalists, were let onto the pilot bridge. We listened to how, after some 10-15 minutes, the solidly built and broad-faced admiral, who was directing the exercise, reported to the minister in a hoarse and cold-afflicted voice: "The missile has reached the target range. The target was destroyed. There were no errors...." I was curious: But where is this test range?

The admiral laid out a map and pointed with his finger to a completely lifeless, remote Arctic region that was several thousand kilometers from here....

Well, this is approximately the kind of Soviet submarine that, bearing the name Yankee-1 according to NATO classification, was located on that fateful cloudy October day in the area of the Bermuda Islands. At dawn at 0500 hours, immediately after the changing of the regular duty watch, there was an explosion. The ship was rocked violently. At first, it began to descend into the abyss quickly, but then the unplanned submergence was stopped. A report was made to the commander: An explosion and afterwards a fire had occurred in one of the missile wells of the fourth section. Toxic components of missile fuel had started to enter the section. Before this, water had poured in....

ACCIDENT. Captain 3d Rank A. Petrachkov, commander of the missile warhead unit, was in the stricken section. There were several seamen together with him, including seamen Nikolay Smaglyuk and Igor Kharchenko. As a result of the depressurization of the missile well, the place was filled with yellowish toxic smoke. People began to gasp and lose their energy quickly. They were literally carried up a sliding vertical ladder. But three seamen, unfortunately, could not be saved. Igor Kochergin, the ship's doctor, tried to ease the convulsions and to revive them. He gave injections. Nothing helped.

The commander immediately sounded the alarm. Having been born into and having grown up in a military environment in the city on the Neva, he entered the sailor's life at an early age. He completed 11 grades of the Nakhimov Naval School, and later a higher school of the Navy and advanced officer courses. He made more than one faraway and prolonged cruise. He received good service efficiency reports, he loved the sea and the ship, and he considered it his second home. Of course, he had heard about and was perfectly aware of previous tragedies on nuclear-powered submarines.

....The fire in the fourth section did not abate. Water was coming in without a stop. In addition, a short circuit occurred, and it activated the emergency shield of the starboard nuclear reactor. Only the port side reactor was operating in a normal mode. It was necessary to surface. Vessels of the Soviet maritime and fishing fleet were already speeding to it. Moscow tried with all of its forces to help the badly damaged submarine. At that very moment, a meeting

was taking place between Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik. The Americans were also well informed about what had happened. Alarming reports on this subject appeared in their newspapers immediately. Our newspapers remained silent. Widespread glasnost had not yet broken out. Only on 7 October did TRUD carry a brief TASS release:

"During 3-6 October of 1986, the crew of our submarine on which an accident occurred, and personnel from Soviet ships that came up to it, fought to prevent it from sinking. Despite the efforts that were undertaken, the submarine could not be saved. On 6 October at 1103 hours, it sank to a great depth. The crew was evacuated to nearby Soviet ships. There were no more crew losses, other than those that were already reported on 4 October 1986. The circumstances that led to the loss of life continue to be looked into, but the immediate reason was the swift penetration of water from the outside. The reactor is shut down. According to the conclusions of specialists, the possibility of a nuclear explosion and radioactive contamination of the environment is ruled out."

So, the reactor was shut down. A new Chernobyl, this time in the ocean, was not threatening humanity. Thank God!... But how did this happen? Who distinguished himself? I called up—in those days on the government telephone—Admiral Panin, who was then the chief of the political directorate of the Navy. He mulled it over, and he did not want to talk about the details, referring to secrecy. In a word, I did not get an interview with the commander of the Navy then or later. I had to take another tack. I learned that the Main Military Procuracy was investigating the case of the K-219 submarine catastrophe. And so, after six years, with the kind permission of Valentin Panichev, its current manager, I am familiarizing myself with the materials of the investigation. There is a large amount of it—questioning of members of the crew, including the commander and his closest assistants, analysis of the ship's charts, documents, navigation journals. But the main thing was the numerous acts of scientific-technical experts and the comments of famous nuclear scientists and shipbuilders.

Serious consideration was also given to this version: But did our submarine not collide with an American submarine? After all, the U.S. military found out about the accident immediately. Before the official acknowledgement by the Soviet side. Indeed, some members of the K-219 crew said that they had heard sharp blows and a crack. In answer to a query of the Procuracy, the management of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff answered:

"...the American submarine Augusta was tracking our submarine a thousand miles to the east of Cape Hatteras, and on 27 October 1986 it returned to its Groton base, in the state of Connecticut. There was damage to its nose antenna faring of the hydroacoustical station and the ballast tank plating in the bottom part of the hull. U.S. Navy Headquarters admitted the fact of a collision of the submarine with an unidentified underwater object; however, there are no data about the date and place...."

Of course, the temptation is great—"to attribute" the catastrophe to some external factor: a collision, or something else of the kind. But there is no direct evidence. On the other

hand, it is known positively about many technical defects and flaws on our nuclear-powered vessels. As well as about the catastrophes. In June of 1961, for example, the centrifugal pumps in the loop of a nuclear reactor went out of commission, and a nuclear plague could have caused indescribable ecological trouble. At that time, members of the Northern Fleet were barely able to tow Commander N. Zateyev's critically damaged ship to the port of Polyarnyy.

I learned during the preparation of this material: It was on this ill-fated K-219 that a similar accident already occurred in the 1970's. And it was exactly in the missile well. There was an explosion and a fire. Then, fortunately, there was no loss of human life. Captain 1st rank in the reserve Ilya Kolton, a veteran submariner of the Northern Fleet, who served in that force and who told us about the incident, generally views the concept of the leadership of the Navy with respect to the construction of nuclear-powered vessels to be extremely negative and incompetent. But this is a question for another article.

SEAMAN SERGEY PREMININ. But for now we will return to the lost submarine. After an almost 20-hour fight for the submarine's vitality, it became clear: The vessel was doomed. By that time, ships approached to rescue the exhausted crew. And then the most horrible thing became clear—because of malfunctioning dampening and compensating lattices, it was not possible to shut down the nuclear reactor remotely, with the help of automation. Human hands were needed. In order to lower the lattices....

First, Lieutenant Nikolay Belikov, the commander of the hold group, and Seaman Sergey Preminin came down to the burning hot section, where the temperature had reached 70-80 degrees. After overcoming toxic and hot gases, they were able to execute a part of the work. With difficulty, they got up to topside, where they were doused with cold water. But one or more lattices still remained. The officer could not go anymore. He was stricken with heat stroke. There was still a warrant officer—the team senior. A certain Sergeyev attached to the crew. They did not send him, and he himself did not go....

Once again, reliable Seaman Preminin went down into the section. Voluntarily. It can be said that he stepped forward to meet his death. When the lattices were lowered, the sailor was able to report over the intercom: The reactor is shut down. But he was unable to pull himself out of the steel armor lock. Because of a difference and a steep fall in pressure, the steel bulkhead door was mortally jammed. The desperate efforts of the sailors to rip off the hatch were not crowned with success....

It is terrifying to write about and explain what happened, but imagine a 20-year old lad clothed in a compact protective suit who tosses about in a fire-spitting room filled with lethal gases; he beats the steel bulkhead, and he hears how from the other side his colleagues are trying to open the door with an adjustable bar. But in vain. The submarine was going down. Only the commander and a handful of seamen were on board. The line, with which the Krasnogvardeysk motor ship tried to tow the K-219, broke. In the two minutes before the complete submergence of the nuclear-powered

vessel into the abyss, the exhausted Commander Igor Bretanov jumped onto a life raft. He was the last to leave the ship. By an order of the Commander in Chief of the Navy. And no sooner. But Seaman Sergey Preminin and three of his combat comrades in arms went down into an almost five-kilometer ocean depth, where they received eternal peace. What kind of person is this legendary Russian seaman? Only this became known about him later. In a terribly long list of those Soviet soldiers who were decorated on 25 June 1987 with orders and medals of the USSR, S. Preminin was mentioned as being decorated with the Order of the Red Star. Posthumously. Was his deed not assessed too modestly? Our correspondent Gennadiy Sazonov went to the homeland of the heroic seaman to the city of Velikiy Ustyug in the Vologda region. His story is in one of the issues of the newspaper.

More On Oct 1986 Nuclear Sub Disaster

934A0671A Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Jan 93 p 4

[Article by Gennadiy Sazonov, TRUD special correspondent, with a follow-up from the editor, under the "Continuing the Subject" rubric: "The Sailor's Heroic Deed"]

[Text] Vologda Oblast—Last Thursday, TRUD published the story "Tragedy in the Sargasso Sea." It described the sinking of the Soviet K-219 nuclear submarine in October 1986. Today's publication tells you the story of the submarine special hold crew sailor Sergey Preminin. He was the person who shut down the reactor and gave his life in order to prevent an ecological catastrophe.

Yes, heroism was taking place at sea, in an uneven battle with an element that does not know any emotions. But the roots of this self-sacrifice, which not so many people are capable of, should be sought on land. They say that a human soul is like a clean sheet of paper and that everything leaves its mark on it—his family, his society, nature—everything that surrounds him, from infancy to his last days.

If this is really true, then Sergey Preminin was lucky. He was lucky in the sense that he was born and raised on the wonderful land of Velikiy Ustyug. What a marvelous place! Wide spaces dotted with low hills, the wide spread of the Northern Dvina and its triumphant spring overflow. Clear pine forests, bright blue lakes. Velikiy Ustyug itself is a living book of Russian history. This city saved Moscow from desecration during the Time of Troubles.

But Velikiy Ustyug has also always been the glory of Russian naval exploration. Its brave and courageous people would leave their native shores for risky voyages across seas and oceans. Semen Dezhnev sailed around Chukotka and proved the existence of a strait between Asia and America. Ten years later, his compatriot Yerofey Khabarov went on a long sea voyage and made a thorough study of the Amur basin. The name of Admiral Nikolay Kuznetsov, famous Navy commander-in-chief during the war years, is also connected with the Velikiy Ustyug area. It is simply impossible to name everybody, however!

The name of a submarine sailor, a simple lad, Sergey Preminin has been added now to this list of great names, as if continuing the tradition of naval glory. We are not

stretching it too far or trying to come up with an allegory. It is hard to overrate the sailor's deed. He gave his life in order to prevent another, second Chernobyl, but this time it was in the Atlantic and not on a continent. Had it occurred, its deadly wing would have spread all over the entire of America!

As we were talking to different people in Velikiy Ustyug, we tried to understand Sergey's personality, his character, his life as a hero. We have not learned anything unusual or supernatural about him, which is also remarkable in a way. The small village of Skornyakovo is located alongside a road near the old textile town of Krasavino, some 20-odd km away from Velikiy Ustyug. On 18 October 1965, Sergey Preminin was born there to an ordinary working family.

The Preminins' name is well known in the area. Grandpa Yefim was the best plowman in the kolkhoz. Later, he also worked for several years at the flax processing plant. People remember him as a hard-working guy. He raised his sons and built a house for each of them: Stay here on your homeland, rejoice in life. He also built a house for Anatoliy, the future father of Sergey. Anatoliy married Valentina, a girl who came to work at the flax plant from the distant Kichmengorodetskiy Rayon. Grandpa Yefim, master of all trades, had many qualities, but his grandson inherited his main one—love and respect for any kind of work. This helped to develop the integrity of his character later.

There was no school in Skornyakovo. A bunch of kids used to walk to Krasavino. There is a road weaving among the pines; Sergey used to run along it. There it forks, just before the hill. Who would think that a few years later he would come to a stop, as if accidentally, at this place. But this time it is for ever! There is a granite monument to the boy by the foot of the hill; it was unveiled on 29 July, 1990, on Navy Day. Incidentally, the considerable sum of money for the monument was collected by the people of Velikiy Ustyug—that was how they expressed their attitude toward the feat of their compatriot. The school is further on, atop a small knoll; the sailor finished eight years of studies there. His first teacher, deputy principal Nadezhda Viktorovna Uvarova, remembers:

"He was a kind, open-hearted, compassionate kid. Simply a village kid, short, sturdily-built, strong, and healthy. He did not stand out among his friends, except maybe for his love for work. His mother Valentina Yegorovna told me what I also knew myself: Sergey would do any village job that was within his strength, and do it without saying too much, without being reminded. He worked in his own home and in the house of his grandma, who lived close by. He would come and help her around the house. She loved her grandson, was happy about him."

Well, the hero was not remarkable in everyday life. But was he, in reality? Let us think about some elementary notions. Does it mean little or a lot if a person loves to work? We think it means a lot. Just like his grandfather, father, and dozens of other people from his village, the boy knew that work was the basis of everything, the essence of life.

In his family, Sergey copied somewhat his elder brother Nikolay who worked at the central heating plant of the

Krasavino flax processing factory. He followed in his tracks and also went to study at the river navigation technical school in Velikiy Ustyug. Incidentally, it was disbanded recently, due to a lack of financing, as if our country did not need sailors and ship mechanics any more. Sergey was still finishing his electric welder/fitter training, and Nikolay had already been drafted to serve in the military. Like many other people from Velikiy Ustyug who had naval training, Nikolay was assigned to the Northern Fleet and then sent to a nuclear submarine. After he finished school, Sergey worked at the Velikiy Ustyug dockyard for less than a year. Like Nikolay, he was also drafted into the Navy. Moreover, they served at one and the same Navy base, but on different submarines.

The brothers did not see each other often. When Sergey was going through his basic training in Severodvinsk, his mother, Valentina Yegorovna, came to see him. That was their last meeting.

Later, Valentina Yegorovna said she had had an incredibly heavy heart on the day when the tragedy struck on the missile-carrying submarine in the Atlantic Ocean. There seemed to be no reason to feel upset. Her son wrote home often. His letters were good and kind. During the two years, he never complained of his service. But this is definitely what a mother's heart is for—to sense personal trouble in spite of the distance or time.

But all became known for certain much later, in a month and a half. The irreparable event came to them in its entire tragic but ordinary appearance. Anatoliy Yefimovich, electric plant worker of the Krasavino sovkhos, was summoned to the village soviet. There he was given a sealed envelope containing the notice and his son's death certificate. The past years have not cooled the pain that is still seen in Anatoliy Yefimovich's sad eyes. He says in a low voice:

"Towards the new year, a senior lieutenant from my son's submarine came here. He brought us his Navy uniform; he said it was his, Sergey's. The uniform was quite new, not worn yet—must have been from storage. Some guys from other submarines came too. The last to come here were two of his mates from his boat; one fellow was from Kostroma, the other from Vologda. They stayed here for two days, told us about Sergey's service..."

When they heard about the tragic death of one of their people, the residents of Velikiy Ustyug responded with sympathy. Sergey Nikolayevich Popov, a war veteran who became disabled in the Sinyavinskiye swamps and a teacher by training, decided to do all he could to preserve the memory of the Krasavino boy. He helped to establish groups named after Sergey Preminin in many schools of Vologda and Murmansk Oblasts.

Popov showed us his extensive correspondence with school kids and articles that he cut out from periodicals. There is enough material there for a whole exhibition. The veteran had been involved with photography for a long time, and this hobby came in very handy. He took over 2,000 pictures that were related in one way or another to the life of the heroic sailor. He himself made a two-type album, which he gave, on behalf of the flax plant workers, to Valentina

Yegorovna as a memory of her son. But we believe that the day will come when real, professionally made books about Sergey will appear here, and not only home-made ones. He fully deserves it.

One of Platonov's characters said once: "There can be no nation without me." It is truly so! Counting on a large scale, each of us is of great self-value, and it is difficult now to imagine the Russian people without Sergey Preminin, an ordinary boy from Krasavino.

He is a hero of Russia, no doubt. But officially, this title has not been bestowed on him yet. We hope that justice will triumph....

* * *

FROM THE EDITOR. The sad odyssey of several of our nuclear ships that ended on the sea bottom or were pulled out with great difficulties makes one think about a number of things. Primarily, it is the safety of sailing, the safety of the people, and the safety of ecology. A few journalists, thoroughly checked by the KGB, wrote a lot of nice things about the pleasure of serving on a submarine, about its swimming pool, sauna, solarium, and gym. They wrote about the strength of its steel compartments and its fear-some missiles. But where was the fact that almost every voyage has had ten or more alarms of "Fire!", a signal hated by all sailors, sounding in those very same strong compartments. For the three nuclear submarines that went down in 1970, 1986, and 1989, it became the beginning of their end. This was strictly banned! Military censorship is always on the alert.

What about the fact that each of our nuclear submarines immediately becomes the object of constant and secret observation by the antisubmarine forces and facilities of the U.S. Navy and of NATO countries; it begins the moment the boat leaves its base in the Kola Bay, for instance, or in some distant Pacific bay. They keep it in their sights, speaking figuratively, through the entire voyage. Nothing about that either. For a long time, they tried to persuade us that Soviet nuclear ships are well hidden from any probable hostile eyes. The facts speak to the contrary: The opponent's space, air, sea, and ground reconnaissance facilities have made the world ocean rather transparent.

The VPK [Military-Industrial complex], much loved by our government, must have also made a few mistakes as it was putting together its strategic submarines in the quiet of strictest secrecy. But all this, again, somehow failed to reach the attention of broad scientific and naval circles. But the voice of those circles, especially of the people from submarines who have experienced some of the "tricks" of their underwater technology, has not been heard by the high government acceptance commissions. But later, one and the same missile well happened to explode twice on the submarine in question.

Who is to blame? The military procuracy closed its files on the K-219 criminal case due to the absence of corpus delicti. This may be correct. It is not for us to judge. But this leaves a bitter feeling in one's heart: The crew was dissolved, and the commander and his mates were discharged from the

Navy as professionally unfit for service and for their posts. In other words, a "scapegoat" was found, as usual. But nobody heard of any VPK or Navy boss being punished for this unprecedented damage.

We showed this story to some submarine sailors and asked just one question: Was it in any way possible to save sailor Sergey Preminin? We were told about a number of variants that would have dealt with the unfortunate and stubborn conning hatch which had locked Sergey Preminin in. A certain degree of confusion was, of course, present among the top commanders of the boat. All the more reason for us to appreciate correspondingly the bravery, fortitude, and heroism of the simple Russian sailor; he deserves the title of a Hero. Even a posthumous one.

Finally, our nuclear submarines are not the only ones lying on the sea bottom. There are also American ones (such as the Thrasher and Scorpio, for instance) as well as boats belonging to other countries. As time passes, they will definitely make their presence felt. The evil radioactive trace will definitely squirm its way up to the sea surface. We have to start thinking now about how we can raise and decontaminate the sunken submarines. No single country has sufficient expertise or, what is more, money. Maybe this work should be done under the aegis of the UN, through some extensive international cooperation?

What are the related opinions of scientists, submarine seamen, shipbuilders, specialists of the Navy Chief Staff?

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Yeltsin Edict on Sale, Use of Military Property
93UM0306A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Dec 92 p 2

[Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 1518 of 30 November 1992 on the "Sale and Use of Surplus Military Property"]

[Text]

OFFICIAL EDICT OF THE PRESIDENT, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SALE AND USE OF SURPLUS MILITARY PROPERTY

To set guidelines for the sale and use of military property taken out of service (property declared surplus, assessed as unusable by the Armed Forces), and to generate additional sources of revenue for the financing of the construction and acquisition of housing and for the resolution of social problems besetting servicemen, including those discharged from military service and these servicemen's dependents, I do hereby declare:

1. To grant the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense the right to sell surplus military property (with the exception of weapons and ammunition) in the domestic and foreign markets, with assignment of subsequent use.

To prohibit the sale of surplus military equipment in any manner not governed by this Edict.

2. That the sale of surplus military property (with the exception of weapons and ammunition) is to be conducted as follows:

Domestic market: Item disposal is to be carried out via cost-accountable enterprises specially set up for this purpose at the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Central Material Resource and Foreign Economic Relations Directorate, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense), with sale to be made as a rule via exchanges and auctions;

foreign markets: Item disposal is to be carried out via the Central Material Resource and Foreign Economic Relations Directorate, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, in accordance with the procedure established by law.

3. The sale of surplus military property to newly created peasants' (farmers') farms and agricultural cooperatives of servicemen consisting of officers, Army and Navy warrant officers, extended-service personnel discharged into the reserve as a result of Armed Forces reduction, and Armed Forces veterans, is to be effected via the specialized state cost-accountable enterprises indicated in Section 2 of this Edict, on the basis of purchase orders processed by local military management agencies, with prices reflecting item wear and tear and current as of the time of sale.

4. Monies realized by the sale of surplus military property are to be deposited into a special fund set up in the Main Directorate of the Military Budget and Finance, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, to be used for the financing of the construction and acquisition of housing and the resolution of other social problems of servicemen, including those discharged from active duty and their dependents, with these monies to be added to budgetary allocations made for this purpose.

To prevent devaluation of temporarily unassigned nonbudgetary monies from this fund and enhance their use, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense is to be permitted to disburse these monies in the form of loans to industrial, agricultural, and other enterprises and organizations (regardless of type of ownership), with consideration of loan assurance, end application, timeliness, repayment details, and solvency.

5. To lift requirements imposed on the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in the following areas:

Payment of taxes on revenues realized by the sale and use of military property and the rendering of services geared to the improvement of socio-economic and housing conditions of servicemen discharged from active duty and their dependents;

the mandatory sale of the 50-percent foreign exchange obtained by the sale of surplus military property, and the associated customs.

6. The Russian Federation State Committee for Management of State Property is to oversee the sale of military property in accordance with the established procedure, working in cooperation with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense to draft necessary procedural recommendations.

7. The Russian Federation Government is to reconcile existing acts of legislation with this present Edict, accomplishing this within a period of two weeks.

8. To rescind Section 11 of Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 290 of 21 March 1992 - Extension of Rights Granted the Murmansk Oblast Administration for the Resolution of Urgent Socio-Economic Problems.

9. This Edict is to take effect in accordance with the manner specified by the Decree on Legal Assurance of Economic Reform, as passed by the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies, RSFSR, on 1 November 1991.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation
BORIS YELTSIN
Moscow, The Kremlin
30 November 1992
No 1518

Chief of Microbiological Institute Interviewed

93UM0301B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Dec 92 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Yevgeniy Pimenov, chief, Microbiology SRI, Russian Ministry of Defense, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA unofficial correspondent Vladimir Mokhov: "Secrets of Military Biologists"; date and place not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] This until quite recently was a highly classified facility having the sole purpose of filling the needs of defense. Today, it is not simply a structural part of the Armed Forces, but also an enterprise involved with national economic problems of the greatest magnitude. What are they? This is the topic our unofficial correspondent discusses with Colonel Yevgeniy Pimenov, chief of NII of Microbiology [Microbiology Scientific Research Institute], Russian Ministry of Defense. In his early forties and a doctor of medical sciences, he holds the awards of Merited Specialist of the Armed Forces and Laureate of the State Prize.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Yevgeniy Vasilyevich, I probably would not be mistaken were I to say that this interview constitutes the first time many readers hear of the existence of the Microbiology Scientific Research Institute within the Russian Armed Forces. Hence the first question: When was the institute established, and what is its purpose?

[Pimenov] It came into being in 1933. The institute was set up as a structure dedicated to protect Army and Navy personnel from bacteriological weapons, epidemics, and infectious diseases. In 1942, the institute was relocated from Perkhushkovo of the Moscow area to the city of Kirov. It went under many names, but it always was directly connected to the military. The Kirov people still refer to it out of habit as the "Red Army Institute."

In what was the institute engaged? In its halls were obtained penicillin, which in 1944 was supplied directly to the front. This is where the first work was done on vaccines of the antiplague, tularemia, and brucellosis types. They were used

successfully in military units, and later, the same as a number of important antibiotics, they were made available for public health use.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What constitutes the institute's efforts at present?

[Pimenov] Briefly stated, we conduct research on protection of troops and the population from infectious diseases of bacterial origin. And, to be sure, we maintain constant readiness to protect military personnel from biological harm, whether that be caused by enemy weapons or natural disaster.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But the Armed Forces have not recorded a single incident of bacteriological danger in the last decade. Is the institute—pardon me for saying so—not functioning uselessly?

[Pimenov] You know that world-famous scientists until recently promised the people a complete and final victory over influenza and other diseases. But infectious diseases continue to exist, still presenting a formidable threat to the population and troops. For this reason, specialists still turn to us, as in the past, for diagnostic equipment, vaccines, and results of research on pathogens of infectious diseases, asking us to provide preclinical assessments of effectiveness of pharmaceuticals.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Well, what about other countries and armies of other states? Do they have access to your discoveries and scientific developments?

[Pimenov] Absolutely. But the matter is not quite that simple. For example, in the days of preparation for the general assault on the Iraqi positions relative to the conduct of operations to free Kuwait, the American High Command recalled that Saddam Hussein had bacteriological weapons, including anthrax. They were patently unable to resolve the problem of assuring the safety of their troops, for supplies of antidotes available to the Coalition Forces were insufficient. The Americans then made a confidential request of our Ministry of Defense for the purchase of a combination vaccine to counter anthrax, a vaccine which I tell you has no equal anywhere in the world. This had the makings of a very profitable contract, but, while the people at the top were making up their minds, time was passing by and the war came to an end. Our country suffered a loss not only financially, but morally as well. One thing became clear: The matter of selling our specialized products is a humanistic, not political, problem. However, the state must maintain its precedence over unique developments, something which in a market environment is of enormous significance.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] I take it that you also are interested in entering into a competitive struggle for marketing your products.

[Pimenov] We find it more important to set up partnership and cooperation with similar institutions of other countries. A realization that this problem has come to the fore has also been experienced by Ministry of Defense specialists who have visited American military medical centers. Tripartite meetings of Russian, American, and English specialists held later resulted in the drafting of concrete proposals for

cooperation between military biologists within the framework of integrated scientific research programs. We are also willing to exchange workers on a regular basis.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Yevgeniy Vasilyevich, the institute is located in a city of a half-million population. What does that say about safety with this kind of proximity?

[Pimenov] The safety and monitoring system that have been put together has performed flawlessly. Just look: In the half-century the institute has stood on Vyatsk ground, there has not occurred a single incident giving cause for alarm. The oblast and municipal SES [medical and epidemiological service] and ecology committee acknowledge the high degree of reliability. And we vaccinate only those workers who work with specific pathogens. The city is also quite impressed by the fact that the laboratory and work area is surrounded by houses occupied by institute workers and their families.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] With your work being what it is, it appears to me that we may assume your institute should experience no problems in acquiring anything it needs, in spite of the country's economic situation. Is that the case?

[Pimenov] Definitely not! It has become much harder to have our requests filled for equipment, instruments, and reagents. The conduct of repair work has become more problematic: materials are in short supply. Most of our funds go to pay the salaries of workers. On top of that, the salaries are much lower than those of specialists working in similar civilian institutions. This is the cause of "brain" drain. This however was not the case in the past: people fought to come here to work.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What can be done about it? Perhaps the same as in the case of defense enterprises and institutes: conversion?

[Pimenov] Our institute was always convertible, as far as that goes. This in the sense that means of defending man from especially dangerous infections are not the sole prerogative of the military. Take the case of penicillin, streptomycin, and vaccine types. We are making a great number of our research results available to the public health service, agriculture, the food industry, and ecology committees. We are also willing to cooperate with other state structures.

I will tell you something else. A commonly-known characteristic of the market holds true: If a product proves unprofitable, its manufacture is curtailed. Presently proving unprofitable are many diagnostic, prophylactic, and therapeutic immunobiological preparations. Nonetheless, the latter are sorely needed by the Russian Army's Military Medical Service. Substantial investment by the state is required to continue the production of items which are unprofitable but acutely needed by the Armed Forces. We are willing to take on this task.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] I would be interested to know how one becomes a military biologist.

[Pimenov] Military VUZ's do not train specialists whom we can entrust with independent work at the outset. That is why

novices undergo a lengthy period of supervision by experienced specialists. Coming to work for us are graduates of the Military Medical Academy, the Military Academy of Chemical Protection, military medical teaching staffs, and medical schools. Quite a few are graduates of the Saratov School of Chemical Protection. Thus, becoming a military biologist is not particularly difficult.

Specifications of UMS (Maskirovka) Station

93UM0303A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel Vitaliy Moroz: "Three Specialties of the UMS"]

[Text] It is hard to imagine troop operations without concealment of their true disposition and intentions, and constant and active aspirations to disorient and outsmart the enemy. Significant in this sense is the recent war in the Middle East. In terms of strategic and operational camouflage, concealment, and deception, the Multinational Forces managed to achieve much. On the tactical level, the Iraqi Army also demonstrated certain skill in camouflage, concealment, and deception. Even the best intelligence assets did not make it possible to disclose, say, all the Iraqi missile battery positions or to preclude strikes against inflatable dummy tanks and the like by expensive weapons.

Naturally, today camouflage, concealment, and deception are seen as more diverse and active than in the past. But traditional, long-known, and tested techniques retain their importance.

The general-purpose maskirovka [camouflage, concealment, and deception] station (UMS), which we are telling the readers about today, is able to significantly facilitate and accelerate certain camouflage, concealment, and deception measures.

In the traveling configuration, it does not attract attention. It is a regular KamAZ-4310 van and trailer. But it is interesting to observe its work at a position, especially how the crew sets up the production of "tanks" or "infantry fighting vehicles."

Making mock-ups of combat equipment is one of the tasks of the UMS. Special equipment and a light plastic polyurethane foam produced by the station make it possible to retain the real dimensions of the mock-ups and the contours of the combat vehicles and to relocate the mock-ups on the terrain without special efforts.

The second specialty of the UMS also involves polyurethane foam. Using spraying equipment, the crew can cover real equipment and field fortifications with this polymer. The specialists call this "texturing." It is obvious that this layer of polyurethane foam significantly reduces, for example, the thermal radiation of a metal object and eliminates other revealing signs. In addition, the polyurethane foam has turned out to be an excellent help in the process of building field shelters—as a reliable and durable insulator.

The third specialty of the UMS is camouflage painting of equipment and structures. The station has painting equipment and a supply of paint for this. Both a single-color

protective painting and a multi-color, camouflage color are possible.

Basic Specifications and Performance Characteristics of the UMS

Station supports:	
—manufacture of equipment mock-ups, units per hour	3-5
—painting of equipment, square meters per hour	up to 500
Crew size:	
—full crew	6
—reduced crew	2
Setting up time, minutes	40
Closing down time, minutes	60
Full-up weight, kg	20,520

The UMS is self-sufficient in accomplishing missions. It has its own generator, cable network, lighting equipment, and two tents.

The general-purpose camouflage, concealment, and deception station, which has no predecessors, was designed at the Plastmash Krasnodar Experimental Design Bureau, of course, with the most active involvement of specialists of the Engineer Troops.

Profit From Sale of Military Assets Noted

934K0048B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 3, Jan 93 p 12

[Unattributed answer to reader's question]

[Text] Our army is gradually being sold off; its property goes to "outsiders," while someone pockets billions of rubles. Are there data on what the military property is currently worth, who is selling it, and where the money received goes?

V. Sobolev, Vologda.

On 30 November 1992 the president of the Russian Federation issued Edict No. 1518 "On Procedure for Realization and Utilization of No Longer Needed Military Property."

The Russian minister of defense assigned the task of control over the realization of the military property to the Central Administration of Material Resources and Foreign Economic Relations. This administration was given the right to issue permits for selling the property (with the exception of armaments and munitions).

According to official data, military property no longer needed because of the cuts in the Armed Forces is valued at approximately 125 billion rubles (as of January 1991). Selling off this property—other than real estate—was supposed to bring in at least 10 billion rubles (also in 1991 prices).

It was decided that the proceeds from the sale of military property will go: 30 percent—to the funds of the commander in chief of each armed service, the commanders of various forces, and the chiefs of main and central administrations of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense; 35

percent—to the funds of military district commanders; and 35 percent—into a centralized fund of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense.

Work, Organization of State Committee on Civil Defense

93UM0320A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Ivan Sergeyev under the rubric "We Are Telling About This for the First Time": "The GKChS Is Not Dozing"]

[Text] In December of last year, the government reviewed the performance of the Russian Federation's State Committee for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Amelioration (GKChS) and passed Decree 988. It essentially involved improving and perfecting the Russian emergency warning and action system. In addition to the fact that the committee is no longer "under the president," as in the past, but is a part of the government, making it considerably easier to resolve many issues, the decree also contains a number of other new things.

Among other things, the staff of the central organization, which numbers 582, presently includes 150 military employees or management personnel from internal affairs agencies. The military personnel are mostly officers from the former USSR Civil Defense Staff and city or rayon civil defense staffs.

It is planned for the committee for emergencies, with a total membership of 27, to include representatives from all the ministries and main departments, as well as nine chiefs of regional centers (more about them later). A collective decision-making body of 15 is being set up to exercise mobile control over the committee's operations, which are to include all deputy GKChS chairmen and the chiefs of central main directorates and establishments subordinate to the committee.

The former All-Union Scientific Research Civil Defense Institute of the USSR is being reorganized as the All-Russia Scientific Research Institute for Civil Defense and Emergencies of the Russian Federation's State Committee for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Amelioration. It is being given the status of leading organization of the Russian Federation for scientific support of projects involving civil defense and the prevention and handling of emergencies in peace time and in time of war.

It is to be hoped that this decree will put an end to that uncertainty which has long surrounded the uncompleted building for housing the new institute and will speed up the move by its staff from "barracks-type" facilities to the new seven-story building. Vyacheslav Benkevich, deputy chairman for science of the GKChS, said that the institute is ready to move tomorrow. Only the completion of the finishing work is holding things up.

Around two years ago an article on civil defense problems published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, "A Structure With No Specialization," suggested that we needed to build a higher, specialized training institute for civil defense—a school or

an academy. The document we are discussing now decrees that the Civil Defense Academy of the Russian Federation's State Committee on Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Amelioration be created out of the 37th Higher Courses for the Training and Advanced Training of Civil Defense Management Personnel of the USSR. The academy will turn out highly trained specialists in the field of civil defense. Tentatively, the training program will last three years and the training will be full-time or by correspondence. The academy will train specialists primarily for the central organization, as well as for subordinate organizations and regional civil defense subunits and staffs. It is the opinion of Yuriy Vorobyev, deputy chairman of the GKChS, that the new training facility will not open before 1994, since all of 1993 will be devoted to compiling the concept, working out the training program and other organizational matters.

I feel that the reader would be interested in learning about that point in the decree pertaining to the establishment of a uniform for workers in the GKChS and subordinate organizations. Rescue workers in many nations have their own distinctive uniforms. People wearing this uniform enjoy privileges for traveling to the scene of an emergency and while working there. In addition, rescue operations may be conducted in areas of inter-ethnic conflicts, as in our case, and in other areas of combat operations. A special, distinguishing uniform is absolutely essential in these situations. The "wardrobe" for the staff of our GKChS, the rescue services and civil defense will now include everyday, field, winter and summer uniforms, as well as a special set of clothing for working at emergency sites. The uniform styles are presently being designed and will be introduced, in the opinion of the specialists, at the end of 1993 at best.

Back in 1949 a protocol of the Geneva Convention established a distinguishing emblem for civil defense: a light-blue, equilateral triangle against an orange background. This insignia has somehow not yet taken hold in our rescue structures. Now, finally, it will be worn on the left sleeve of the new uniform by our rescue workers and civil defense specialists. In addition, they will be issued personal international identification cards as specified in the same protocol.

Regional centers were mentioned. The decree establishes the list of regions of the Russian Federation in which regional centers for civil defense, emergencies and disaster amelioration will function. There are nine such regions in all: the Northwest Region (with its center at St. Petersburg), Central (Moscow), North Caucasus (Rostov-on-Don), Volga (Samara), Ural (Yekaterinburg), Western Siberia (Novosibirsk), Eastern Siberia (Krasnoyarsk), Transbaykal (Chita) and Far East (Khabarovsk). It is planned to set up additional structural subdivisions within the tables of organization of these regional centers and at civil defense headquarters. Their numerical strength is therefore being increased by 694 slots, including 257 military slots.

In conclusion, I would like to point out a detail of importance for our times. The money allocated for steps to avert accidents and preventive work to avoid technologically-generated disasters, as well as for other measures involving civil defense and public safety, will now be distributed not

through local federal authorities but directly through the regional civil defense agencies, which will unquestionably enhance its use for its designated purposes and areas of application.

Program Describes Military Space Forces

LD2001105793

[Editorial report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 2056 GMT on 19 January broadcasts an unscheduled 17-minute program entitled "Military Space Forces."

The program starts with a caption saying: "The Russian Federation's armed forces were set up by the 7 May 1992 decree of the Russian Federation president." The video shows a rotating model globe; a satellite in flight overlaid by a caption "Military Space Forces;" a rocket being launched; radar domes; and a modern building.

Over video shots of interiors of space installations, the announcer begins: "The decree to set up the Russian Armed Forces was issued on 7 May 1992. Their purpose is to defend the ancient but young power of Russia on the earth, in the skies, at sea, and in space. The Military Space Forces took their worthy place among all other branches of the armed forces. The existence of these was previously actively hushed up. However, they have lived and developed in order to be ready to give a merited rebuff to any aggressor." The video then showed a duty officer reporting to a superior officer just arriving.

Over a video of a control room, the announcer says: "The tasks have been fulfilled perfectly, as befits the role of the armed forces, which are in a constant state of readiness for immediate and resolute action. The Persian Gulf crisis and Operation Desert Storm clearly showed the importance and effectiveness of military space forces' actions in a real combat operation."

The program then shows V.L. Ivanov, commander of the Military Space Forces, whom it identifies by caption, speaking inside an operations room. He says: "The lion's share, the main share of our work is for the Defense Ministry. If you look at this year's launch program for maintaining the orbiting group of satellites, two-thirds were in the interests of the defense ministry, while the remaining one-third were for the manned program, for science, and for the national economy."

Over a video of carrier rockets being prepared for launch, the announcer says: "A high-tech organization as complex as the Military Space Forces takes upon itself the main burden for providing various information, not only for the Army but also for many other branches of the economy, including nonmilitary ones. The Military Space Forces also support telecommunications on a national level."

V.L. Ivanov is then shown telling a meeting: "This year we ensured that our orbiting satellites were maintained in their established positions. Launches took place in accordance with programs and plans determined by the chief of general staff. This year, our northern center undertook a major burden by accounting for about 70 percent of all launches.

But the Baykonur space center undertook a very unusual burden because there was a large manned program, and it was difficult to perform this task with our heavy carrier rocket, Pluton. In addition, there are a number of aspects related to the situation we have with Kazakhstan."

Over aerial video shots of the testing grounds, the presenter says: "When rocket equipment first appeared in our country and the strategic forces were formed, they were initially based in the southern testing ground. It was only later that they received the name Baykonur space center. The officers and men of the space units came here long before it was given any names."

The program then shows Major General B.G. Kalinichev, deputy commander of the military space forces, whom it identifies by caption, addressing a meeting, the location of which is not given. He says: "The town is dying." He complains of decay and lack of investment. "Russia provided 1.2 billion rubles [R] for capital construction, and Kazakhstan gave R200 million. What sort of money is that? It needs to be increased a hundred-fold. As to operating costs, in a normal year we spent R40 million in normal money. Nowadays it must be counted in thousands of millions. We received R1 billion from Russia, but Kazakhstan did not give anything. That is the situation."

Rebrov Argues Against Abandoning Baykonur

93UM0351A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Jan 93 p 4

[Article by Mikhail Rebrov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Simple Truths: Ambitions Are Not a Rocket Platform and Will Not Carry Us into Space"]

[Text] Having omitted the course of events, I will begin with the climax. In the once unified "outer space," now divided up like a pie, Russia alone is able to perform wide-scale space exploration. I do not want to offend, belittle, or reproach anyone. Perish the thought! But this is an objective fact. Here is confirmation of that: Russia possesses two-thirds of the once unified space infrastructure. And although the groundless acts of self-seizure under the pretext of nationalization (a typical symptom for our time) enabled someone to acquire for themselves pieces of the once common "space pie," this has not given them a high scientific status.

I am not at all against the emergence of national space agencies or one's own military space units (as is planned in Ukraine). If a republic has the scientific and technical reserves and the means to materially support the functioning of the agencies themselves and the implementation of programs, by all means do so. Let all this be created right next to the Russian Space Agency. Let it even enter into honest scientific and technical rivalry with it. But let us be objective: What can these low-power structures do?

Strictly speaking, torn away from the overall infrastructure, the launch complexes, instrumentation control centers, electronic gear, and information processing computer centers are nothing more than expensive installations that are of no use. The same can be said of space industry enterprises if they are deprived of orders.

There is still no organization in the CIS that is capable of assuming an interstate coordination function in space exploration. Only timid attempts are being made to create something unified. But here, too, we hear a bunch of stipulations. I will not focus attention on them. However, the reality is such that only Russia is able to fill the niche that has formed. References to Europe do not sound convincing. Yes, the ESA (European Space Agency) exists there, which has become a form of cooperation of sovereign states. But its participants at the start rejected ambitious claims against one another, did not ignore the "filthy lucre," and reasonably determined their positions in amounts of share participation.

The former Soviet republics and now independent states sometimes react extremely jealously toward the attributes of independence, guard its (the independence's) effectiveness with all their might, and may perceive even an attempt, say, by figures of culture and art in certain countries to join together as an infringement of sovereignty. One would expect "vertical subordinations" to appear again, and there will have to be Russian Space, Kazakh Space, Ukrainian Space, and so forth (they cannot imagine anything like this in the United States).

One might not be able to explain how the disruption of ties and contacts between the colleagues and cooperating enterprises will turn out for space science and technology. Even a child understands that something divided is not whole. A "subsistence economy" is equally hopeless in the economy and space exploration. Here is confirmation of that. The cost of the Baykonur Space Center is estimated in the billions of rubles (it is difficult to give a precise figure since inflationary processes constantly adjust it, but as of April of last year it was 6-8 billion rubles [R]), and the annual operating costs are in the hundreds of millions. Can Kazakhstan independently ensure normal functioning of such a complex facility?

Without the Space Flight Control Center, without the far-flung network of land and sea telemetry monitoring stations, and without the satellite communications system, Baykonur itself is the same as a vehicle without wheels. I would add that it stopped being a secret long ago that specialists of the military space forces of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation perform all preparation of space and rocket hardware for launches, the launches themselves and also tracking of spacecraft, and orbit corrections. Nothing would come about without their participation.

Fairly recently, the newspaper MEGAPOLIS EKSPRESS had a short report from Baykonur with the following content: "There are plans to create on the base of the space center the commercial association International Space Port, which for a moderate price will offer to all who desire..." It went on to talk about the Proton, Soyuz, Energiya, and Zenit rocket platforms. At first glance, there is something rational in this. But at the same time, a number of questions arise. As we know, the southern space center was created, as they say, from nothing. Russia (like other republics) invested huge amounts of money to build this complex and has a right to demand observance of its interests. Another

thing. In what capacity will its members join the association? Let us say that some are leased land, others equipment, and others specialists. Will the profit be divided in proportion to the investments? As far as the rocket platforms are concerned, I will remind you that they all, with the exception of the Zenit, are made at Russian enterprises.

Apparently, all these problems must be resolved by the leaders of the independent states. And they must hurry, for there are no clear-cut and concrete agreements for the time being, and earlier adopted agreements, unfortunately, still (or already) are not working, and the unique, expensive facility is falling into decay and is even being removed bit by bit.

Let us be realists. No good use will come of Baykonur if Russia refuses to launch its satellites from their due to the situation that has arisen. Today, a questions is actively being spread: "Can the northern space center Plesetsk replace Baykonur?" The question is not as simple as it may seem at first glance. The conquest of space, in addition to everything else, is an energy problem. From this standpoint, the best place to locate a space center is the equator. There a payload receives the maximum additional acceleration when launching rockets with the rotation of the earth. At the Baykonur's latitude, this increase is 316 meters per second. However, what we gain in one place, we lose in another. A spacecraft launched in the latitudinal direction sees only part of the surface of the planet. From the Mir space station, let us say, areas of the country to approximately 52 degrees N are visible. In other words, a large part of Russia and the CIS remains outside the field of view of the orbital complex. This is unacceptable for weather, navigational, natural history, and other satellites. It is desirable to launch these kinds of satellites in a meridional direction, i.e., perpendicular to the equatorial plane. And other laws also reveal themselves here: the closer the space center is to a pole, the better. A satellite inserted into a polar or near-polar orbit sees the entire planet.

So, it turns out that while it loses in something to Baykonur, Plesetsk (75 percent of all launches are made from it) also has its advantages. Of course, in order to become a broad-specialty space port, it needs modernization and construction of new launch structures for heavy platforms. These problems can be solved and need only time and money (approximately R10 billion). Ultimately, the expenses will be justified, and Russia will come out ahead. But do the rest of the CIS countries who are dreaming about becoming a space power?

Use of Funds from Sale of Military Property

93UM0301A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Dec 92 p 2

["Sale of Military Property"—MO RF Press Service headline]

[Text] The Russian Ministry of Defense has issued Order No 231 of 15 December 1992, which assigns responsibility for the sale of military property to the Central Material Resource and Foreign Economic Relations Directorate, MO RF [Russian Federation Ministry of Defense].

The proceeds (nonbudgetary funds) realized from the sale of surplus military equipment will be deposited into a special fund set up in the Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate, Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, for use in financing the construction and acquisition of housing and in resolving other social problems of service personnel, including their dependents, in addition to budgetary allocations made for these purposes.

To derive maximum benefit from the use of monies from the abovementioned fund, the Russian Federation Ministry of

Defense has decided to allocate the proceeds resulting from the sale of military property as follows: 30% for funds of commanders in chief of the VS [Armed Forces] commanders of combat arms, and chiefs of main and central directorates of the MO RF; 30% for funds of district commanders; 35% for the RF [Russian Federation] Ministry of Defense Central Fund. The military property will be sold at free-market prices current as of the time of sale, as determined by such factors as item wear and tear, condition and consumer demand, basically via the exchange and auction system.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Last of Russian 107th Division Leaving Lithuania

93UM0318B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Valeriy Gromak, Vilnius: "All Russian Military Units Have Been Withdrawn From the Lithuanian Capital. Small Garrisons Have Remained in the Suburbs of Visoray and Burbishkesa"]

[Text] Lithuanian and Russian Army representatives recently signed an Act on the Receipt-Transfer of the Northern Garrison.

Lithuanian Minister of National Defense Audrius Butkevicius called the conclusion of the withdrawal of the 107th Division from Vilnius evidence of the fact that Russian troops are being withdrawn according to the approved schedule. Russian Ministry of Defense Representative Major-General Sergey Petrov adheres to that same opinion. He noted that "both sides are carrying out their obligations and there are no difficulties or disagreements whatsoever between them."

Commissions for Takeover of Ex-Russian Bases Formed

934K0035D Tallinn INFO PRESS EESTI RINGVADE
in English No 85, 11-18 Jan 93 p 6

[Text] Leaders of Estonia's northwestern Läänemaa county and its capital Haapsalu, together with representatives of the local Russian military garrison, met on January 13 and ruled to set up bilateral commissions for the takeover of military objects around Haapsalu. Russia still maintains an air force garrison and hydrographic service unit at Haapsalu, and an airfield and housing complex at Ridala. "The garrison leaders expressed readiness to turn the objects over to local authorities as soon as possible," said the mayor of Haapsalu Tiit Beeren. The meeting was also attended by Estonian Defence Ministry, local police and Defence League representatives.

Troop Watch, 15-21 January 1993

934K0036A Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT
in English 8-14, 15-21 Jan 93

[Article compiled by Lya Oll]

[8-14 Jan 93 p 3]

[Text]

—Norway and Denmark will participate in the building of housing for Russian troops withdrawn from the Baltics. This was agreed at a meeting of Russian Defence Ministry officials with representatives of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Denmark and Norway in Moscow on January 5.

—The Russian Navy will retain its Baltic fleet, the Russian defence minister, Pavel Gratchov [Grachev], said during a visit to Kaliningrad; the two main naval bases on the Baltic Sea will be in the Kaliningrad region and St. Petersburg.

—The Russian Defence Ministry has made a statement on the status of Russian troops abroad which says the military will take decisive steps, including the use of arms, to

defend their honour, life and well-being if "illegal acts against Russian troops and their families continue."

—Lithuanian and Russian military officials signed documents on handing over the territory of the Vilnius garrison of the Russian 107th rifle division to Lithuania (December 29).

—Between December 20, 1992, and January 5, 1993, 194 unsanctioned flights in the Lithuanian airspace were registered.

—Lithuanian border troops confiscated an air gun from a demobilised Russian army soldier in a train crossing from Lithuania to Kaliningrad region in Kybartai checkpoint (December 25).

—Between February 1 and December 31, 1992, Latvian authorities registered 392 violations of Latvian airspace by Russian aircraft; nine bombing flights over Zvarde; 38 instances of illegal movement of Russian navy vessels; 169 instances of unsanctioned movement of army truck columns with a total of 1,940 units of transportation; 17 instances of illegal railway echelons with a total of 350 wagons full of equipment.

—The Russian naval vessel *Zond* illegally entered the navy base of Bolderaja near Riga and was confiscated by the Latvian border guards. The navy officials said they had sold the ship to a private Estonian company and were not responsible for what happened (December 11).

—Four armed Russian army soldiers travelling by a train from Moscow were sent back by Latvian border guards at the Lugazi checkpoint (December 16).

—Four Russian army soldiers armed with automatic weapons tried to cross the Latvian border in Lugazi without proper entry permits and were sent back (December 18).

—Twenty-five armed Russian army soldiers arrived in a train from Voronezh, Russia, and were met in the Riga railway station by two Russian colonels who took them to their new postings. The action had not been co-ordinated with the Latvian authorities (December 29).

—Three Russian navy vessels ready to be scrapped were scuttled at the Bolderaja base for unknown reasons. The fuel tanks of the ships were not emptied before the sinking and have caused a serious pollution problem in the Gulf of Riga (December 26).

—Estonian border guards in Valga confiscated two crates of Makarov pistols five Russian troops tried to take across the Estonian border without a permit (December 12).

[15-21 Jan 93 p 3]

[Text]

—Russian border troops have been withdrawn from Lithuania, according to the troops' press centre; fewer than 1,000 border troops still remain in Latvia and Estonia, involved with evacuating equipment (January 11).

—Russian air force planes continued unauthorized flights in Lithuanian airspace: five flights were registered on January 7 and five on January 8.

- Lithuanian border guards in Panevezys discovered 62 Russian army fresh recruits in a Moscow-Kaliningrad train; neither the recruits (destined for the Kaliningrad region) nor the major escorting them had any transit permits to pass through Lithuanian territory (January 7).
- Russian air force planes continued violations of Latvian airspace: one unauthorised flight was registered on January 4 and three on January 10.
- Latvian customs officials confiscated a former Soviet reconnaissance vessel *Zond*, which illegally entered the Latvian territorial waters in mid-December and has been docked in the Russian naval base of Bolderaja in Riga ever since (January 7).
- According to a Latvian Defence Ministry report, 681 Russian army units with a total of 27,000 troops occupy 7,000 square kilometres of Latvian territory; during the second half of 1992, Russian troops have quit 90 army installations; 33 army units have left for Russia; 50 structures have been dismantled and 15 sold illegally to private companies (January 12).
- The Latvian Defence Ministry has protested against the formation of an infantry rifle brigade on the basis of the Russian army 25th division and training centre located in Dobeles and in the vicinity of Riga, which violates agreements reached between Latvia and Russia last February (January 12).
- The Estonian environment department expressed concern over an unguarded storage of hundreds of tonnes of Russian army rocket fuel at Nabala, about five kilometres from the capital Tallinn, which poses a great potential threat to the environment (January 6). The storage facility has not yet been officially handed over to Estonian authorities.
- No concrete agreements were reached at Estonian-Russian border talks in Pskov, where the issues of the state border between the two countries, the withdrawal of Russian border troops from Estonia and social problems of the troops were discussed (January 7).
- The state-owned Estonian Airports company has taken over the formerly Russian-controlled military airfield near Pärnu, western Estonia, and has begun the takeover of the Amari airfield near Tallinn (January 9). The last Russian fighter planes left from the airfields last autumn.
- Only 53 out of the total of 505 buildings controlled by the Russian army have been handed over to the Estonian authorities by the beginning of 1993, according to Estonia's Defence Minister Ilain Rebas (January 11).
- Latvian authorities registered 6 unauthorised flights of Russian air force planes in Latvian airspace on January 12; one flight was registered on January 13; thirty-nine violations were registered on January 15; ten on January 18; eight on January 19.
- The Latvian Defense Ministry sent a note of protest to the Russian Ambassador in Riga over bringing in additional troops to Latvia in violation of agreements between the two countries (January 13).
- The Latvian and Russian officials signed documents providing for the handover of two campuses of the Russian air force base in Saldus, northern Latvia (January 13). The Latvian side estimates the environmental damage in the base will cost more than 24.8 billion Latvian roubles.
- An agreement was reached between Latvian authorities and Russian military leaders on giving Latvian customs officials access to the Russian military port of Bolderaja in Riga (January 15).
- The Latvian Defence Ministry has said it will not base the forthcoming Latvian-Russian troop withdrawal talks on Russian troop figures provided in the Russian Foreign Ministry report (January 18). The report, presented in accordance with the Vienna agreement on conventional weapons in Europe, does not include several Russian military units, naval bases, ammunition depots and other installations on Latvian territory.
- The Russian army began vacating the building of the Baltic military district political administration in the centre of Riga, which will be handed over to Latvian authorities under a protocol signed on January 15.
- No progress was made at the 8th round of Estonian-Russian troop withdrawal talks near Moscow: Estonia insists on pullout by the summer of 1993 while Russia has ruled out withdrawal before the end of 1994 (January 16).
- The Estonian Defence League units took guard over the Russian air force maintenance unit in Haapsalu, western Estonia, under an agreement signed on January 14. All MIG-23 fighter planes based in Haapsalu have left.
- Estonian police detained three Russian air force officers who had 43 pistols hidden in their car (January 12). All three officers serve at the Tartu military airfield in southern Estonia.
- Forty-three Kalashnikov submachineguns, 261 Makarov pistols, one machinegun, 165 flares and thousands of cartridges were robbed from the Russian army unit No. 56 718 in Paldiski, northern Estonia, on the night of January 17. The Russian military prosecutor's office is investigating the robbery, Estonian police have not been allowed to examine the premises.

Troop Watch for Jan 22-28

934K0138B Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT
in English 22-28 Jan 93 p 3

[Article compiled by Lya Oll]

[Text]

- Russian air force planes continued unauthorised flights in Lithuanian airspace: twelve flights were registered on January 10; nineteen on January 11; six on January 13.

Materiel, Weapons Thefts Continue

93UM0346B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Valeriy Gromak: "The Theft of the Russian Army's Weapons, Ammunition and Supplies Is Not Ceasing"]

[Text] Tallin—The new year has brought more cases of attacks on military personnel and on weapons and ammunition dumps of the Russian army in the Baltic countries.

On the night of 15 January, in Liapaja (Latvian Republic), two vehicles, a MAZ truck and a Zhiguli, drove up to the pier of a military harbor at which two Baltic Fleet submarines were anchored from the direction of the city. Around a dozen armed men in the vehicles headed for the pier, where a tank truck containing used oil was parked. Capt-Lt I. Turuntsev and Capt 3rd Rank N. Popov, duty officers, who blocked their way were threatened with the weapons and forced to lie on the asphalt. Seamen and petty officers who came to the officers' aid from a submarine were stopped with rounds fired at the sub's hull. Keeping their weapons on the servicemen, the assailants hooked the tank truck up to the MAZ and disappeared.

On 17 January 43 Kalashnikov semiautomatic rifles, 261 Makarov pistols and ammunition rounds were stolen from a Russian army depot near Paldiski (Estonian Republic). Compare that with the 24 semiautomatic rifles, 139 pistols, 548 grenades and 30,587 rounds of ammunition stolen in all of last year.

Unfortunately, I could go on with these examples.

"There is still a consistent trend of criminal encroachments upon weapons, ammunition and the lives of Russian servicemen in the Baltic countries," says Col Justice Yuriy Voyevoda, chief of the general oversight section of the Baltic Fleet's prosecutor's office. "They are particularly contemptuous and aggressive...."

The aggressiveness of proponents of "talking tough" with Russian servicemen in the Baltic countries is due in great part to maladies of Russia's statecraft. Talks have been underway for such a long time, but the status of Russian servicemen just over the border in the Baltic has not been defined to this very day. There was no reaction from Russia to the decision by the Baltic republics to cut off access of the units to replenishments. The shortage of personnel is producing a situation in which weapons and ammunition are patrolled by reduced guard details. Nor do the local authorities show any interest in this situation. It would seem that, in view of these circumstances, they should take appropriate steps to prevent the spread of weapons throughout the republics. Nor do the local law-enforcement agencies bother to expose thefts of weapons. The reason is simple to the point of banality. There has been no decision among governments at the state level on joint operations by these structures.

The command elements of the Northwest Group of Forces and of the fleet lodge protests after every incident. Judging from the actual state of affairs, however, they are taken as empty statements by authorities of the Baltic nations.

UKRAINE

National Security Council Meeting, Functions Described

Security Council Reviews 1992, 1993 Goals

93UM0282A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Dec 92 p 1

[Article by an unidentified NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent: "A Meeting of Military Leaders"]

[Text] A meeting, at which the results of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel combat and humanitarian training in 1992 under conditions of reform were summed up, occurred at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

The President of Ukraine—Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Leonid Kravchuk, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Ivan Plyushch, members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Commission on Defense and State Security Issues, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov, State Committee on State Border Issues Chairman Colonel-General Valeriy Gubenko, Ukrainian Security Service Chairman Colonel-General Yevgeniy Marchuk, Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Colonel-General Andrey Vasilishin, Ukrainian National Guard Commander Major-General Vladimir Kukharets, and representatives of other state organs participated in the meeting's work.

The Minister of Defense assigned the training tasks for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 1993 and summed up the results of the meeting.

Read a detailed account of the meeting in future issues of NARODNA ARMIYA.

Security Council Rationale, Functions Outlined

93UM0282B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Dec 92 pp 1,3

[Interview with Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on National Security Issues and Doctor of Juridical Sciences V. N. Selivanov by NARODNA ARMIYA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Korobkov, under the rubric: "At the Ukrainian National Security Council": "Prevent a Crisis, Prevent a Catastrophe"]

[Text] Those people who are attentively tracking the political life of the CIS countries, yes and not only them, have had to pay attention to reports that have recently become more frequent about the complicated, vital domestic or foreign policy issues of the various states that are becoming the subject of review at the National Security Councils of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Tajikistan, and Belarus—the geography of those reports is becoming increasingly broad. The growth and prestige of the state institution that has been little known to us until now seems surprising even for our dynamic time.

The National Security Council. What is that organ? What are its functions? What significance can its activities have for the life of the state? We discussed these and other issues with Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on National Security Issues, Doctor of Juridical Sciences Vladimir Nikolayevich Selivanov.

[Korobkov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, can you briefly explain what causes the need to form a National Security Council under the President of Ukraine?

[Selivanov] By the generation of an independent Ukrainian State. Right now we are establishing that as a political reality that has been confirmed by the results of the All-Ukrainian Referendum in December 1991 and by the fact of the recognition of Ukraine by the overwhelming majority of the members of world society, by the formal-juridical and

primarily political acts of Ukraine right now—an independent state. With its own system of national interests. With new problems—for example, the need to structure relations with its neighbors from the former Union while pursuing first of all the goal of satisfying the needs of the politically autonomous people of Ukraine, a people that has expressed its political will for independent state development.

[Korobkov] Why is the conversation on security emerging as a result of that? Security always assumes a threat. Was the leadership of Ukraine, while creating the Council, proceeding from the fact that it and its people are being threatened by someone or something?

[Selivanov] In a certain sense, yes. Although, understand me correctly, I am not saying that someone, say, is ready today to start a war against Ukraine or to announce an economic blockade of it. But the very fact of Ukraine's secession from the previous state organism and the aspiration to structure its life independently, and to act on the international arena as an independent state automatically signifies a certain divergence of state interests. Now, say, Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and Ukraine and Moldova, without mentioning the states that are farther away, they are equal partners with their own national interests. Hence—whether we want it or not—the aspiration of the politicians of the various states, who resolve common issues, to defend and ensure the interests of their own states and to act in their benefit. Even I have always associated a defeat in political interrelations with some sort of losses. The losses may be more weighty or less weighty but they always have a negative impact on social life and disrupt that way of life toward which the citizens of that state are inclined and which the state must guarantee. Hence, the theme of security. In this context, I would like to define security as the absence or minimal risk of defeat.

However, the matter is not only in interstate relations. That is only one source of possible threats. There is also another—internal. Unfortunately, none of us, citizens of the independent Ukrainian State, are insured, say, from a poorly thought-out political act with far-reaching consequences: not from a strike, the motive for which may be understood but which damages the interests of the people of Ukraine; nor from a large-scale accident, natural disaster, or epidemic; nor from abuses by officials at a high level; nor from an incompetent decision of some sort of state organ, the consequences of which may be especially severe. Here we threaten ourselves. Of course, all of these and other factors strain our already complicated lives. This is undermining our aspiration for a stable existence and therefore a threat for us all...

[Korobkov] And the National Security Council must maintain these issues in its field of view?

[Selivanov] I would say it like this: on the one hand, the Council has been assigned the tasks of predicting the possible emergence of threats to our national interests and of preparing proposed variations of preemptive decisions for the President. Second, if the threat evolves from a potential threat into a real one, if any unfavorable events or processes

are present, the Council provides massive, efficient, analytical processing of the situation and sets forth proposals to neutralize or eliminate the threat or, at least, to reduce it to a minimum. In other words, ensures the timeliness and weightiness of the President's decisions on "hot" issues which have already emerged or can emerge.

[Korobkov] What is the National Security Council under the President of Ukraine and what kind of people make it up?

[Selivanov] This is a collegium of the highest officials of the state who are periodically (no less than one a month) assembled by the President to examine the most serious issues of state and social life. Among the council's permanent members, besides the President, are, according to position, the Ukrainian Presidential Advisor for National Security Issues (he is the Council's Secretary), the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Security Service, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Besides them, the ministers of internal affairs, public health, environmental protection and certain other leaders are members of the Council. As you can see, all of the key figures are here.

This is a flexible structure that is capable of changing depending on the tasks being carried out. However, I must stress that we need to include representatives of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet at the level of the chairman or his first deputy among the Council's permanent members under the conditions of today's social, economic and political crisis in Ukraine, having in the process imparted the status of a constitutional organ to the National Security Council. Today, the issues of Ukraine's national security require the development of a coordinated policy at the highest state levels.

[Korobkov] What are the functions of a Presidential Advisor for National Security Issues?

[Selivanov] There are three primary functions. First of all, advocating an initiative to review some issue or other in the Council since the appropriate information is concentrated with the advisor as a state official for national security issues. Second, ensure the preparation of issues for review in the Council with the assistance of the Council staff. Finally, third, ensure cooperation and coordination of the activities of various state and non-state institutions that carry out the President's decisions on national security issues.

[Korobkov] The Security Council functions in the Russian Federation and a National Security Council functions in Ukraine. Is there a fundamental difference in the wording?

[Selivanov] In Ukraine in this case we have used the wording that has been adopted in international political science and in international legal documents where, in contrast to the concept of the nation as an ethnic group that has been established in our country, a nation is understood to be a people who maintain certain cultural-historical values and who are united by their belonging to a specific state. In other words, national security is the security of the country as a whole, of its individual citizens, and of its people no matter what nationality they belong to, its

economy, its culture, institutes of statehood, etc. Here the wording is close in meaning ("national economy", "national interests", "national defense", etc.) are being increasingly encountered in our political lexicon. We are not inserting another meaning into the concept of "national security" under the conditions of Ukraine on whose territory reside representatives several dozen nationalities. The Security Council and the Ministry of Security function in Russia... There are grounds for muddling what state security is, especially for the initiated individual.

[Korobkov] But national security also encompasses the institutions of statehood. In this case, how does the concept of "national security" correspond to the concept of "state security" that is more familiar to us.

[Selivanov] The answer is already set forth in your question. National security is both broader and deeper than state security. The life of the country is not reduced to the activities of just the state alone. The state is a sort of framework of power that provides organization and order to the life of society but that does not absorb it. Many spheres exist in which the state's interference is not only not desirable but also illegal, for example, the sphere of the personal life of any person, the activities of associations of citizens based on interests, the non-state sector of the economy, etc. All of this enters into the object of national security and requires support at the level of recognized national interests.

By the way, all the absurd and tragic things which in our memory are associated with the activities of the state security services are being explained as precisely the excessive development of the state-centralized foundation in social life and the state's attempt to penetrate everywhere—into the economy, into the culture, into local and regional matters... Ideological discipline is also an important state concern that under conditions of a one-party system was in general natural. Any deficiencies in these spheres automatically turned out to be a threat to the state. Hence—both the state security system's range of concerns, excesses, and errors in the recent past.

The topic of those concerns should be what appears to be a threat precisely to the state and to the system of organized leadership of society within the state borders. I hope that it will be so. In any case, the Law "On the Ukrainian Security Service" precisely defines the tasks and spheres of activity of the security organs.

The National Security Council is in contact with these organs, and the Ukrainian Security Service Chairman, as you recall, is a permanent member of the Council, since state security—is an important part of national security. I stress: only part of it and not its essence.

[Korobkov] As I understand it, the Council can accept for its consideration practically any domestic or foreign policy issue if it considers it to be influential on the state of national security. The question is studied and alternative variations for its solution are developed. Doesn't the Council duplicate the work of other state organs who are involved with those same problems? For example, the state of the economy is the direct concern of the Cabinet of

Ministers and the appropriate departments. An external threat is within the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and that same Security Service... Won't it turn out that parallel solutions are being developed on those same issues? That, if you could call it that, "collective" responsibility engenders irresponsibility when too many cooks spoil the broth....

[Selivanov] You're not the first to pose that question to me. I must frankly admit that I don't quite understand it. You're comparing apples and oranges. Judge for yourself: how can a collective organ of several people duplicate the activities of powerful structures like the Cabinet of Ministers or the ministries? To duplicate means to replace someone in something. Whom and in what can the Council replace?

Here it is important to investigate the specific features of the tasks that our structure was formed to resolve. The National Security Council, the Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on National Security Issues, and the Council staff focus the attention of the highest leadership on the gamut of factors that knock society's life off its normal course. In order to effectively make the required decisions and to reduce the risk of possible losses to a minimum. The task here is to locate the knot of tension beforehand, to define its parameters, intensity and prospects for development, consequences, and variations of actions to eliminate tensions in order to arrive at the optimum variations for its solution that may lie at the foundation of the appropriate documents that have been issued by the President during the course of the discussion of the issues in the collegium of state leaders and competent specialists. This is mandatorily resolved with the involvement of associates of the departments concerned, specialists, and competent officials—of everyone who thoroughly knows the problem well and who can make a judgment on it with knowledge of the matter. It is this that is the effective path for efficiently overcoming possible departmental isolation. This is the real path to ensure the comprehensive, systematic analysis of any problem situation. Finally, this is the opportunity to direct the attention of officials to "hot" spots in the sphere of their activities which have general significance but with which they do not always become involved in a timely manner. The Council also carries out these functions, just like it is in the entire world where similar structures have been created. There is simply nothing to replace it. And you know—the results of the work which the Council has already conducted convinces us of that.

[Korobkov] And what are they?

[Selivanov] The National Security Council has already examined several burning issues, including on the state of the crime situation in Ukraine, the state of science and scientific-technological progress, and the epidemiologic situation. As a result, the appropriate Presidential edicts and directives have been adopted that are adequately specific in content (they have been published in the press). Many problems to which they are devoted have not been resolved at the departmental level for a long time—they couldn't be resolved not because of someone's ill-will but because they were essentially interdepartmental and required a comprehensive approach. Experience itself convinces us that this

organ is needed by various state and non-state structures since it provides an effective and, the main thing, coordinated view of various specialists on a complex, difficult problem. Practically everyone who has participated in the preparation of issues for review by the National Security Council supports that system of work.

[Korobkov] What difficulties is the National Security Council and its staff encountering in its activities?

[Selivanov] There are quite a few of them. First of all—there are the difficulties of formation. The Council has existed since 1992. Thus far, we have little of our own experience. Already during the course of our daily activities, we have to develop its forms: determine the priorities in examining issues, the procedures for preparing analytical and forecasting materials, the procedures for review of the issues at the Council, etc. A major problem is the quality and variety of the information being received. There is also a problem in defining a circle of authoritative experts.

The next difficulty is of a higher order. That is the general situation, and the conditions under which we all live and work. Unfortunately, it is such that right now we have to think more not about preventing any threats but about localizing and overcoming actual destructive processes.

And, finally, the problems associated with defining a formal status. It is difficult to work when the legal status of a state organ has not been properly recorded. As we all know, the President of Ukraine's July edicts were the legal foundation for the creation of the Council. These were effective normative acts that were needed to begin work. Now we need to amend the Constitution that is in force which would define the status of the National Security Council as a state organ. And to develop a law on national security already based on constitutional provisions. The U.S. National Security Council Act of 1947—Article 606... A document in which the procedures for the formation and functioning of this state organ in the United States have been described in the greatest detail. Of course, we should not copy it but while creating a law on Ukrainian National Security we should be concerned about its completeness, specificity, preciseness, and that it should be unambiguously worded.

[Korobkov] And the last question, Vladimir Nikolayevich. How is work progressing for you in the position of Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on National Security Issues?

[Selivanov] It is difficult. First of all, I repeat, the lack of native experience in this work is having an impact. We don't have adequate experience at the staff level that carries out the primary load of work problems of the Council's activities or at the level of coordination of the various state organs for now. We still have a lot to comprehend and a lot to learn. Then there is the problem of time. There's never enough of it, although my normal workday is 12-14 hours. All of my colleagues on the Council staff work with that same intensity. Well and, of course, it is important that today, at the initial stage of our work in all state structures, we understand the objective legitimacy of the creation of this Council and coordinate its activities with the single goal—of ensuring Ukraine's national security.

Defense Ministry Commercial Center to Market Excess Arms

93UM0284A Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Russian
10 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by Ukrinform Correspondent Nikolay Zaika: "Military Commerce? There Is Such a Thing"]

[Text] Ten months have passed since the time when the Commercial Center was created under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Lieutenant Colonel Georgiy Kuznetsov, former aircraft navigator and in the recent past head of the working group for the development of the Law of Ukraine "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members", headed it. Just what have been the results of the activities of the military merchants during the time that has past?

"Much," said Georgiy Vasilyevich during a conversation with a Ukrinform correspondent. "During that time, we have earned 1.5 billion rubles, taking into account hard currency income, thanks to the sale of military vehicles and equipment that were released as a result of the reduction of the Armed Forces and also due to other forms of commercial activity. The lion's share of that amount, and precisely 80%, was directed at the solution of the housing problem and rendering other forms of social assistance to servicemen and their family members. By way of illustration, \$2,505,000 has been allocated for the construction and purchase of housing, \$600 was transferred to Valentina Zhipalova who is treating her son, a group I disabled person. Nearly \$5,000 has been sent to Telephone Operator Lyudmila Vygulyarna to pay expenses associated with a complicated operation abroad. And these are not the only examples.

"The Commercial center also assists the social adaptation of servicemen who have been released into the reserve. Resources have been allocated for the creation of joint and small enterprises, joint stock companies, and companies for them to acquire civilian specialties and to provide them with work. So, "Armeyskoye bratstvo" [Military Brotherhood] SP [joint venture] is already successfully functioning in Berdyansk and "Ukraina—Akhtiyar" Stock Company is gaining strength in Sevastopol, and air freight and passenger transportation companies are already productively operating in Mukachev, Mariupol, Krivoy Rog, Odessa, and Uzina of Kiev Oblast. Military pilots who have been released into the reserve compose their primary backbone.

"And all of that is not the limit of the Commercial Center's capabilities. We could operate somewhat more effectively. But there are a number of reasons that prevent that. One of the primary ones, isn't it strange, is the contradiction within the Ministry of Defense itself, more precisely, within its individual directorates who are striving so that only they themselves are involved with commerce. But, first of all, budget organizations are prohibited from doing that. Second, that will result in the dispersal of resources and make it impossible to concentrate them to resolve the main task—the construction of housing. Third, experience has shown that the conditions will be inevitably created for

official abuse and financial violations and more specifically—equipment will be sold for next to nothing and the resources earned will hardly go for the construction of housing. Incidentally, these miscalculations have also resulted in the collapse of the Moscow Commercial Center.

It's too bad that this outcome of events is not serving as a lesson for the Kiev adherents of "free trade" who continue to persistently strive for the closure of our Commercial center. With their secret knowledge, we are continuing to make ourselves comfortable in tiny, semi-basement rooms and we have one typewriter and one telephone for 87 workers. That is how the military merchants live who have already turned over enormous monetary sums for the benefit of our own ministry.

BELARUS

Interview With Defense Minister Kozlovskiy

93UM0221A Vladivostok BOYEVAYA VAKHTA
in Russian 6 Nov 92 p 2

[Interview with Belarusian Minister of Defense Pavel Pavlovich Kozlovskiy by N. Buldyk, under the rubric: "In the Armies of the CIS Countries": "We are a Peaceful State"—Interview With the Belarusian Minister of Defense"]

[Text]

[Buldyk] We know that today Belarus is one of the most "militarized" states: there is one serviceman for every 43 civilians. Will the situation change with the creation of your own army?

[Kozlovskiy] Absolutely. Because the Belarusian Army will number approximately 90,000 men. We propose three branches of the armed forces in its composition—Ground, Air and PVO [Air Defense] troops. I cannot speak in greater detail because we are at the very beginning of the work and not everything is completely clear. But I can assure you that the quantitative and qualitative composition of the army has been determined based on the currently existing economic realities.

As for the "militarization" of Belarus—this is not the fault but the fate of the republic. After the disintegration of the Union, we received in our inheritance not simply a very powerful armed forces formation but an army that was formed and trained to carry out offensive missions. And now we are faced with the very complex problem of reforming this enormous and, in its own way, well-oiled military machine in accordance with the new missions and the existing capabilities in Belarus.

[Buldyk] First of all that is obviously a large reduction?

[Kozlovskiy] Not simply a large but essentially a 40% reduction that is unprecedented in the history of the native armed forces.

Of course, the main difficulty and pain are the officers, the number of whom must be reduced by 20,000-22,000 men. We will attempt to conduct the reduction as delicately as possible. To do this, we are developing a special program, the realization of which is calculated for several years and

envisions not only a gradual reduction of troops but also the provision of housing to former officers (we have 20,000 officers who need housing!), and assistance and professional retraining and job placement assistance. We will notify beforehand all officers who are subject to reduction so that uncertainty does not hang over the officers like the Sword of Damocles and so that they can prepare for the transition both materially and morally. Of course, this will not be an entirely painless process but we will attempt to get by with minimal losses.

Incidentally, I can cite as an example the decree adopted by the Republic of Belarus Supreme Soviet which states that during the period of the reorganization of the army, servicemen who have 15 years of service are being released with a pension in the amount of 40% of their salary. It was difficult to find the resources for such a step under the current economic conditions but we were obliged to do that.

[Buldyk] While conducting the reduction of the officer corps, won't you attempt to simultaneously resolve the issue of the "nationalization" of the army, while releasing primarily non-Belarusians?

[Kozlovskiy] Not, we are not assigning that task. In the republic armed forces, 80% of the officers are non-Belarusians. But there are no interethnic conflicts in the Belarusian Army (as in our republic in general). Not being a member of some ethnic group or other but efficiency, knowledge, and ability—these are the criteria for officer advancement in service. Therefore, even today we are assigning people of various ethnic groups to high posts. Of course, if they themselves don't express a desire to leave Belarus. Then that's another matter. But we have not and I believe we never will drive people out of the republic based on their ethnic group.

By the way, it is from that position that we resolved the issue of the military oath. Only young soldiers have taken the new oath and those who took it previously (including myself) have not repeated the oath. Why artificially incite the situation? Yes and in general I would not begin to employ the definition "national" with regard to the army. There is a more precise word—state army.

[Buldyk] Can you set forth the Belarusian military doctrine?

[Kozlovskiy] It's not worthwhile to get ahead of events. The military doctrine is always the state laws of the republic. However, they have still not been completely elaborated and the documentation has not been accomplished. Therefore, I will point out the main thing. The Belarusian Armed Forces will fulfill one mission—defensive. If the need arises, soldiers and officers will defend Belarusian soil. But the Belarusian Army itself will never seek enemies and will never begin to look with suspicion and hatred at its neighbors—Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia or Poland. Our country will be non-nuclear and neutral. It is this that lies at the foundation of the military doctrine and is its essence. The republic's defensive concept will be necessarily coordinated with the security concepts of the other states of the Commonwealth and Europe.

[Buldyk] But is an army generally needed at all in that case, moreover one that is impressive? Maybe that is inadvisable albeit from the economic point of view?

[Kozlovskiy] Yes the army is an expensive pleasure. Any army and for any country. But unfortunately today it is impossible to get by without it. We certainly hope for a calm life but nevertheless the people must have the guarantee of the defense of their interests, territory, and independence.

But only defense. Belarus is a peaceful state and no one should fear it.

OUR INFORMATION: Pavel Pavlovich Kozlovskiy was born in 1942 in the village of Volkoven in Pruzhanskiy Rayon of Brest Oblast to a peasant family with many children. In 1945, he lost his father, who died at the front.

He graduated from Tashkent Combined Arms Command School, the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, and from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy. He served in the Central Asian, Transcaucasus, and North Caucasus military districts in various command-staff posts.

In 1989, he was assigned commander of a combined arms army that was deployed on the territory of Belarus and, in 1991, chief of staff and Belarusian Military District first deputy commander. He has been Republic of Belarus Minister of Defense since 22 April 1992.

Counterintelligence Chief Interviewed

WS1901134093 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian
18 Dec 92 pp 1,2

[Interview with Colonel Valeryy Viktoravich Kez, chief of the Military Counterintelligence Administration, deputy chief of the Belarusian Committee for State Security, by ZVYAZDA correspondent Alyaxandr Koktysh under the "Specially for ZVYAZDA" rubric: "Betrayal of One's Motherland Is a Pressing Issue If the State Has Its Military Counterintelligence"; date and place not given—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Colonel Valeryy Viktoravich Kez, chief of the Military Counterintelligence Administration, deputy chief of the Belarusian Committee for State Security, gives our newspaper his first interview.

[Koktysh] Valeryy Viktoravich, my personal knowledge about your service is limited to some feature films where military counterintelligence looks just like the czarist Okhrana.

[Kez] You are absolutely right. People know too little about us. Both our system, which saw an enemy in an average individual, and peculiarities of our work, were the reason for this. Up until recently, we were a part of the Third Central Directorate of the USSR Committee for State Security and obeyed Moscow's orders. All our work was reported to Moscow. In January 1992, by the Supreme Council's decree, we became a part of the Belarusian Committee for State Security. I have been chief of this Military Counterintelligence Administration for quite a short period of time but I have managed to learn an important thing: there were no Belarusians among the former chiefs of special

departments within the Belarusian military district. I do not support the idea of military intelligence officers being only of Belarusian nationality, but our service needs some national changes. Always and everywhere, the main task of the counterintelligence service was to reveal and to prevent subversive activities of a foreign intelligence service towards the national state.

In connection with the fact that strategic missile forces are still on Belarusian territory, our task is to prevent a second Chernobyl.

We also help the Belarusian commanders to keep both the fighting efficiency of the troops at the appropriate level and maintain their readiness for any military action.

[Koktysh] You cannot fulfill the last task without the proper storage of arms and ammunition.

[Kez] Right you are. We realize that numerous military conflicts in different regions of the former USSR would have been impossible had it not been for ammunition stolen from the troops, and a complete and absolute lack of control.

Lately, Belarus has been attracting thieves of military property. In 1991, for example, we did not have thefts of machine guns, hand grenades, bombs, and shells. In 1992, 14 machine guns have disappeared from military depots. Actually, our intelligence officers together with the law protecting organs have found all of them. Last year, nine submachine guns were stolen while this year, 12 submachine guns have been stolen and nine of them have been found; last year, four pistols were stolen in comparison to three this year, only two of them have been found; this year, 91 hand grenades have been stolen, 65 of them have been found; bombs and shells became the objects of theft only recently. I must add that the stolen bomb was soon found by our officers. Everything that has any value can be currently stolen. Here are some latest examples of military ammunition thefts. We have prevented the theft of 15 night vision devices and landing force garments from the depot in one of the units of Borisov garrison. The stolen articles had a value of about 1.5 million rubles [R].

Our inspection has revealed R8 million missing in one of the Vitebsk garrison units. But can you imagine that a commander of one of the battalions from the same Vitebsk garrison was a coparticipant in a deal which involved the delivery of 3.5 tonnes of copper to Lithuania? Criminal proceedings were instituted against him. As you can see, our Army has not escaped copper "fever". As we know, the Baltic states lack gasoline. Chiefs of a depot of one of the units of the Orsha garrison made a deal with "Kanversiya", "Granula", and some other private companies to sell 500 tonnes of gasoline A1-93 to the Belarusian Engineering Building Organization [BIKAZ]. BIKAZ administration sold the gasoline on the basis of ... an old license No. 62-1184 dated 11 September 1992 and signed by Surmach, chairman of the State Committee for Oil Products.

Despite this fact, BIKAZ company tried to export this gasoline to Riga. Well, the company was fined for the sum of R8,000 (!!!) while the value of the confiscated petroleum was R15 million.

Prices on ammunition are going up. This is a new example of ammunition thefts. An active serviceman, a private, was arrested on 4 December 1992. Together with two civilians he tried to sell 8 zinc boxes with 5.45 mm cartridges. Some additional information for you: 1 such box contains 1,080 cartridges.

[Koktysh] A well known saying that rottenness begins first in high places suits the Army well. I am sure that if the leaders are unscrupulous, the rank and file start selling boxes with cartridges. [Kez] Perhaps, you are right. In general, when some units are disbanded there are too many dodgers who want to catch fish in troubled waters. To tell you the truth, those dodgers are often high-ranking officers.

As a result of the disbandment of one of the units of strategic missile forces [RVSN] near the station of Kolosovo, Minsk Oblast, the commander and the chief of accounts and operational department decided to sell an aluminum container for a strategic ballistic missile outside of Belarus.

The "Piryt" cooperative from Minsk bought 500 tonnes of high quality strategic aluminum from a specific strategic arsenal and sold it to Czechoslovakia for \$105,000. The metal was transported abroad as "a welded pipe from aluminum alloy."

This is not all. Our wretched military businessmen wanted to sell huge amounts of duralumin for a bribery of a foreign car. So, "Piryt" had to return R2.5 million to the state after the financial inspection had been made.

It goes without saying, I have many such facts. But I am sorry to mention that responses of the appropriate organs to our discoveries are not always timely and productive.

[Koktysh] But who are the judges? I do remember how I was unable to learn the results of a financial inspection of some official embezzlements in Bobruysk Tank Army from Major General Anatol Glyukav, chief of the Military Prosecutor Office.

[Kez] Well, we have already instilled order in the Bobruysk Tank Army. What is more, we have also inspected the Borisov Tank Army in connection with the use of personnel in mercenary purposes and waste of building materials for building summer houses and garages for the Army commandment. The Army Commander Isaychankav and Headquarters Chief Ramasenka were discharged from their posts, and criminal proceeding were instituted against Colonel Ivanitski, deputy chief commander for rear services. So you see that our judges work. In cooperation with us. Although, and I agree with you in this respect, much depends on the high ranking persons. In our case, on the defense minister and his deputies. I know that Pavel Paylavich Kazlovski is a highly ethical person.

[Koktysh] Do your files on Pavel Kozlovski confirm your personal opinion?

[Kez] We collect full information only in cases when we have facts that some persons are working for a foreign intelligence service. Or, for instance, that someone is capable of stealing weapons or is guilty of some other unlawful action. For example, we got some information

about a Caucasian serviceman who had once been guarding a depot with ammunition in his unit stationed near Shchuchin. Later, he returned to his unit to buy some ammunition. He said frankly that his household told him not to come back without a pistol or a submachine gun.

[Koktysh] Are not you anxious about the ammunition coming from the southern republics and being put in action in Belarus?

[Kez] Of course, we are. We have good professional links with our colleagues from all the former Soviet republics. Crimes have no borders. We possess information about criminal elements even outside of Belarus especially with regard to state crimes, such as thefts of ammunition. I think that the issue with ammunition from other regions of the CIS is under our control. Just before your arrival, I received a telegram that a non-Belarusian PPSH submachine gun was picked up. The response was fast: a criminal investigation into the matter was initiated.

[Koktysh] Currently, we are scared with a civil war, with officers demanding better living conditions....

[Kez] I can tell you with complete responsibility that rumors about officers' uprisings are ungrounded. At any rate, we should urgently solve issues concerning the social status of officers and servicemen. An officer must be sure that if he retires, he can go to his Motherland, for instance, to Kursk, Russia, and get his pension there.

[Koktysh] Earlier, the most important words in servicemen's references were: "One is devoted to the ideas of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government". Do you still adhere to this?

[Kez] Since 1991, special Army departments for political damage have been liquidated. This, however, does not mean that we must open all our secrets and hang on the Western partner's words.

[Koktysh] Are you of the opinion that the Western intelligence services can function more easily on our territory?

[Kez] Certainly. Foreigners can go anywhere at any time. All the military equipment which had been stationed on the territory of the Belarusian military district (with exception of the units of strategic missile forces [RVSN]), is known to the West. Including the battalion equipment. We cannot discuss different issues without being too sociable. The Treaty on Conventional Weapons in Europe which we signed did not expect us to reveal all the secrets.

We possess information that 50 percent of the 20 foreign inspections that have visited us were staffed with foreign intelligence officers. As for us, we have not yet managed to organize a single inspection abroad.

In spite of all our attempts to become frank and open, our national interests will demand that we maintain state secrets. We must work out a procedure to protect our state secrets.

[Koktysh] Is the issue of betrayal of one's Motherland pressing today?

[Kez] Betrayal of one's Motherland is a pressing issue if the state has its military counterintelligence.

Military Counterintelligence Official Interviewed
WS1901133893 Minsk VO SLAVU RODINY in Russian
22 Dec 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel Stanislav Nikiforovich Knyazev, deputy chief of the Military Counterintelligence Administration at the Belarusian Committee for State Security, by VO SLAVU RODINY correspondent Major L. Zakharenko: "Stanislav Knyazev: '...History Is Always With Us.' Our Correspondent Is Speaking With Colonel Stanislav Nikiforovich Knyazev, deputy chief of the Military Counterintelligence Administration at the Belarusian Committee for State Security"; date and place not given]

[Text]

[Zakharenko] Stanislav Nikiforovich, we are speaking on the eve of the day which used to be a professional holiday for military intelligence officers. In this connection, will you celebrate your holiday this year considering all the political changes that have taken place within the last year and all the shocking information that appeared in our press about the Committee for State Security?

[Knyazev] My organization cannot disappear. We have a lengthy history, traditions, and our own methods of work. We will abandon all the appalling habits and maintain everything that is essential.

As for the holiday.... History is always with us. We will use this day for friendly unofficial parties. We will have heart-to-heart talks, will analyze our history for the sake of analysis, and search new forms for our activities, considering the political situation in the Republic and rapidly changing atmosphere in the Army. And just to ease off for a day.

[Zakharenko] I realize that despite the Army openness, you have a great deal of work to do....

[Knyazev] Right you are. Any openness usually attracts greater curiosity. But since state secrets exist, we will have to eliminate all the possible means of information leaks.

[Zakharenko] Does this mean that military counterintelligence deals with Army crimes, although this function is alien to you?

[Knyazev] Yes, we must do this kind of work too. We follow the instructions. We, intelligence professionals, must put a stop to embezzlements in the Army. We have calculated that within this year, our officers have returned 150 million rubles to the state's budget.

[Zakharenko] Stanislav Nikiforovich, if we do not go into details, has your unit undergone any changes after your Military Counterintelligence Administration was organized, or is it just a change of a sign?

[Knyazev] A mountain of changes... First, we no longer belong to Moscow and have become a part of the Belarusian Committee for State Security. This better serves our operative work. Second, our tasks have changed because Belarus has become a sovereign state.

[Zakharenko] So, your problems are similar to those of our Army....

[Knyazev] Of course. Housing, personnel, and social protection issues are our sore points. But I am overanxious about personnel issues. Many officers from other regions are willing to work within our organization. Now and then, we meet their wishes. But usually such issues are difficult to solve. That is why I am concerned with the future of military counterintelligence.

[Zakharenko] Why the personnel?

[Knyazev] It is simple. We will not live forever. We will have to retire some time. But who will replace us? Before, our personnel received highly qualified training of a very high standard. We now run the danger of missing professionals. We have no experience in training intelligence personnel, we cannot rely only on born intelligence officers. Only one solution remains: to appoint unschooled officers. But our organization is not a place for dilettantes.

[Zakharenko] Stanislav Nikiforovich, it is a known fact that your organization had been relieved of such a function as secret political surveillance of people. But information of such a kind gets into your files. Do you use it to pressure people?

[Knyazev] No, never. But if this information had been used by any of our officers, they would have been punished severely. As for the information... if it is not related to any state secret or possibility of information leak, we just do not use it.

[Zakharenko] According to your words, there are some classical methods of counterintelligence work. Do you resort only to the old methods of work?

[Knyazev] To the extent that it is used in the international counterintelligence practice. Those are the ABC's. But military counterintelligence is currently undergoing serious changes. We are looking both for new forms of work in conformity with the political situation and new forms of cooperation with the other law enforcement organs. The results are promising.

[Zakharenko] But one cannot read about it anywhere. Fighters of the invisible front as your officers were called in the past....

[Knyazev] This is natural. It is not the kind of work to shout about at every corner. The invisible front still exists. It will remain until the state's sovereignty needs our protection.

[Zakharenko] It is unjust when the fruits of your labor are used by someone else.

[Knyazev] We are not offended. We serve the Motherland. But we feel neglected when our information is used for disrespectful purposes. Let us say when to appoint or dismiss an officer.

[Zakharenko] Stanislav Nikiforovich, do you cooperate with similar services of other states? If yes, with whom and in what spheres?

[Knyazev] Sure, we cooperate with counterintelligence services of the CIS countries. But it is naive to think that national military counterintelligence can function successfully on its own. Such contacts are of use to all sides. The time has not yet arrived when a state can operate alone in this field. We depend on each other. But we assume that the processes that are taking place in our society are irreversible. This is the lode star of all our activities.

Kazlovski, Polish Defense Minister Issue Joint Statement

WS1501133593 Minsk VO SLAVU RODINY in Belarusian
23 Dec 92 p 1

[Text of the joint statement made by Colonel General Pavel Kazlovski, minister of defense of the Republic of Belarus, and Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, minister of national defense of the Republic of Poland; issued on 15 December 1992 in Warsaw]

[Text] The Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus and the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Poland,

- In line with the principles of the treaty on cooperation and friendship between the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Poland which was signed on 23 June, 1992, in Warsaw,
- Trying to strengthen the European mechanism for security, stability, and cooperation, in accordance with the principles of the documents adopted at the All-European Conference on security and cooperation in Europe, as well as with the international agreements in the sphere of disarmament and security,
- Wishing to keep and develop friendly neighbor relations between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus and the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland and between the Armed Forces of the two countries,

Have agreed:

- To hold consultations in the sphere of defense issues of mutual interest; to develop bilateral contacts in the military domain between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus and the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland and between the Armed Forces of the two countries, paying special attention to the issues of mutual security including the measures for establishing confidence along the border area.
- To develop a bilateral agreement specifying the framework, principles, and forms of mutual consultations in the following fields:
 - To develop and strengthen the European security system, specifying the tasks and place of the Armed Forces of Belarus and the Armed Forces of Poland in this system;
 - To establish bilateral military contacts;
 - To train military personnel;
 - To cooperate in the spheres of culture and sports.

The ministers agreed to hold regular meetings at the level of the administration of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus and the administration of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland and the General Headquarters of the Polish Army.

The minister of national defense of the Republic of Poland accepted with gratitude the invitation of the minister of defense of the Republic of Belarus to pay a visit to the Republic of Belarus at any convenient time.

[Signed] Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus
Colonel General P. Kazlovski
Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Poland
Dr. Ja. Onyszkiewicz
Warsaw 15 December 1992

BALTIC STATES

Estonia: 1st Large Military Exercise

934A0670A Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Galina Golub: "Young People Have an Excellent Appetite: An Army Is Being Created in Estonia Which Is Prepared To Rebuff an Attack by 'Adjacent State U'"]

[Text] Tallinn—A totalitarian regime has come to power in "adjacent state U." The "U" air force has bombed Estonian border guard posts. Many of them have been knocked out. The Government of Estonia has declared mobilization. The fully combat-capable defense forces have been moved to the border because it is expected that the "U" troops intend to cross it...

According to a report of the Baltic News Service agency, this is approximately how the scenario for the first large-scale exercise of the Estonian defense forces looked. About 1,000 personnel and 30 armored vehicles took part in the exercise. Let us not specify who won. After all, there is such a thing as military secrets in peacetime, too. However, here is the overall summary: "The regular units of the defense force of Estonia are prepared to accomplish the tasks assigned to them."

At almost the same time, right there, in southern Estonia, heavy transportation IL's took off from the military airfield at Tartu and set the course for Russia. About 50 officers and sergeants saw them off on the runway. This is all that remains of an Air Force division which, incidentally, General Dzhokhar Dudayev commanded before he returned to Chechnya. Later, he stressed repeatedly that he took lessons in democracy in Tartu, where he had an excellent relationship with the city authorities.

The Russian (former Soviet) Army frequently could not boast such mutual understanding in other cities and settlements. However, the notion of "occupiers" sounded clearly for the first time when it became safe to say this—in 1989, on the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. This opened the floodgates to the long-restrained, hidden hostility toward the people in the gray uniforms of soldiers.

Nonetheless, it did not come to an open confrontation. Estonia became independent without fighting, without a single drop of blood, of which it was quite deservedly proud.

The first shots rang out last summer. A detachment of Kaitseliit, the continuers of the cause of the postwar "forest brethren," announced that it was beginning an armed struggle—until "the last soldier of the army of occupation leaves the territory of the Republic of Estonia." Roadside ambushes and firefights began, as well as the capture of already vacant barracks and bases which were ready to be turned over to the local authorities.

As is always the case when bullets whiz and fists fly, both sides accused each other: one side—of disrupting the (recently established) order, and the other—of undisguised provocations. However, people were wounded, and nobody's being right justified the blood that was spilled. Fortunately, the government of the republic took a sober view of the situation: Some were roundly condemned, and others were punished. The main point was that the shooting stopped.

However, the military issue remained, and still remains, the main one at all stages of Russian-Estonian negotiations. As Estonia sees it, the latest deadline for the complete withdrawal of troops is the middle of this year. Russia gives other, realistic deadlines. After all, you cannot evacuate people to a green-field location. Who specifically will do the carrying and the loading? Hardly any soldiers remain here; therefore the mothballing and evacuation, in their entirety, devolve on the officer corps.

However, as the Ministry of Defense of Estonia believes, this is a personal matter for the Russian Army. They are concerned with creating their own army, a new Estonian army. What will it be like? Fortunately for the taxpayers, most likely it will not have modern jets and submarines, though an item concerning them was quite earnestly discussed in the former Supreme Soviet.

The main creed of the new army is not to attack anyone. Hence the name—the Defense Forces of Estonia. For the purposes of defense, three mechanized infantry battalions and a signal company should suffice, and they are already available, and even clothed and outfitted with nonrepayable assistance from Scandinavian neighbors, as well as Germans and Frenchmen. The situation with weapons is more complicated: It is expensive to purchase them from either the West or the East. However, Estonia does not intend to manufacture its own weapons. Repairing them is another matter.

Minister of Defense of Estonia Hain Rebas (an Estonian from Sweden, PhD. from the University of Goteborg, professor of the Kristman Albrecht University in Kiel) is an utter civilian. All his military experience consists of serving in the Swedish Army in his youth and being a reserve officer later. As the minister communicated in one of the interviews, "we will not raise our weapons against the Russian people."

The new minister (he has been in office for less than three months) took over a difficult jurisdiction. Recently he was

unable to answer to the State Assembly as to what, specifically, reports to him, how many military assets of the former USSR have been removed, and how many remain. In the opinion of the minister, 25 employees of the ministry are simply not in a position to handle this volume of work. It is time to establish a special service, or an intelligence service.

Besides, for now there is no unity in the defense forces. The detachments of the already mentioned Kaitseliit and the so-called defense initiative center, which report to the Main Staff, have repeatedly expressed their lack of confidence in the leadership of the defense forces. This is why a certification of all officers is expected to be administered. A dozen "real" lieutenants who are finishing their studies at a Finnish cadet school will be the yardstick. Not all of the current "showpiece colonels," on whom the ranks have been conferred by various echelons, will pass through the sieve of such certification. This is the opinion of the Ministry itself.

One more problem for the new army is purely economic. It has already been planned where the 124 million kroons that have been promised by the State Assembly to the Ministry of Defense this year will go. They will be used to pay employees wages of 1,250 kroons, on the average (this is virtually twice as high as the average for the republic). Soldiers will not be shortchanged either. It is planned to allocate 18 kroons per day, or 540 per month, for meals per person. In addition, there will be a monthly allowance (between 60 and 90 kroons). Once again, for comparison: Out of the average wage for a nonmilitary person (648 kroons), one-half will be claimed by rent and so on; how much remains for food is his personal problem. Retirees have, all told, just over 8 kroons a day for everything, including rent.

Under such circumstances there is hope that the prestige of the Estonian Army will go up sharply. It will be easier for young citizens to abandon the life of freedom for the duration of their military service (only citizens of the Republic of Estonia are entitled to serve in the Army). As it were, there is no dearth of problems with the draft. Besides, the reservists have not yet fully grasped their patriotic duty. For example, only 40 percent of the drafted reservists showed up for the last exercise.

The conscientiousness of Estonian women is far better. On the initiative of the Union of Women and the Ministry of Defense they undertook to knit warm socks, mittens, and mufflers for soldiers. About 1,000 sets have already been finished. However, the stock of wool purchased by the Ministry of Defense has not run out yet, and the effort is continuing. The first sets have already been festively handed out to recruits.

On this occasion one cannot help recalling a slogan from years past: The people and the Army are one, it said. In the times of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviet Army, it was no more than a hollow slogan. What about in the new Estonia?

Latvia: Report Notes Numbers of Russian Troops in Country

934K0137A Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER in English
15-21 Jan 93 p 8

[Text] The Russian military in Latvia received a comprehensive report card this week. The Latvian Defense Ministry released a survey reflecting numerical strength of the Russian military stationed on the Latvian territory, their equipment and instances of misdoings.

According to the report, presently 681 army units occupying 70,000 hectares and including 27,000 thousand people are located in Latvia. The troops consist of 11,000 officers and 16,000 rank-and-file soldiers.

The report says that Russia's intelligence services are freely operating in Latvia. Statistics confirm existence of more than 20 such formations in Latvia. Additional reports also say that military equipment that is being withdrawn from the Latvian territory is mainly going to regions of Kalinin-grad, Moscow and St. Petersburg, according to the Bureau for Monitoring of the Russian troops pullout.

During the second half of last year, Russian military have left 90 installations, and 33 army units have returned to Russia. Besides this, 50 units have been disbanded on the spot and 15 units unlawfully sold out to commercial structures.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Armenian Edict on Social Protection for Servicemen

93US0200C Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA
in Russian 16 Oct 92 p 1

[Republic of Armenia Presidential Edict: "On Supplemental Measures for Social Protection of Persons Participating in the Defense of the Republic of Armenia"]

[Text] Supplementary to the Republic of Armenia Presidential Edict of 21 June 1992, "On Supplemental Measures for Social Protection of Persons Participating in Combat Actions in Defense of the Republic of Armenia Who as a Result Have Become Invalids, Military Servicemen and Fighters, as Well as Families of Deceased Servicemen," I hereby decree:

1. To establish that the effect of the above-mentioned Edict shall extend to persons who participated in combat actions in the period from 1988 until the time the said Edict went into effect, as well as after it went into effect.

2. The effect of the above-mentioned Edict shall also extend to:

a) military specialists or specialists serving on special assignment in the areas of combat action who were killed or disabled;

b) specialists who were killed or disabled during testing of military weapons;

c) military servicemen and fighters, as well as specialists assigned to areas of combat action, who are missing in action during the period of combat activity, and who in accordance with the procedure established by legislation have been declared dead.

3. If the number of persons from a single family killed in defense of the Republic of Armenia comprises more than one person, the one-time payment established by point one of the above-mentioned Edict shall be paid out separately for each person killed.

4. Financial means allocated from the state budget to persons who have suffered a loss prior to publication of the above-mentioned Edict and their families shall be taken into consideration in the specified payable sums.

5. Specialists, as well as fighters assigned or directed by the military commissariat or by the Republic of Armenia Ministry of Defense to areas of combat action or to the republic's border regions shall retain their jobs and average monthly salaries.

6. The Republic of Armenia Government shall:

a) within a month's time review and resolve the question of creating a military hospital within the system of the Republic of Armenia Ministry of Defense;

b) allocate a sanatorium complex to the military hospital for the purpose of realization of the therapeutic and restorative process in treating persons who have participated in combat action;

c) within two week's time, adopt the statutes to ensure the implementation of the present Edict.

[Signed] Republic of Armenia President L. Ter-Petrosyan
10 October 1992, Yerevan

Armenian Edict on Fall Draft

93US0199C Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
22 Oct 92 p 2

[Edict by Republic of Armenia President L. Ter-Petrosyan: "On Implementing the Fall Military Draft of 1992," place and date not given]

[Text] In accordance with Article 16 of the Republic of Armenia law, "On the Military Obligation," I hereby decree:

1. That in November-December 1992 there shall be a Fall draft into the army of those persons of the male gender who have turned 18 years of age by 1 September of this year, as well as those citizens whose terms of previously obtained deferment have elapsed.

2. That the Republic of Armenia Government, based on the Republic of Armenia law, "On the Military Obligation," shall establish the procedure for organizing and implementing the Fall military draft of 1992.

Armenian Edict on Callup of Reserve Officers

93US0199B Yerevan *GOLOS ARMENII* in Russian

22 Oct 92 p 2

[Edict by Republic of Armenia President L. Ter-Petrosyan:
"On the Military Callup of Reserve Officers of the Republic
of Armenia Armed Forces," place and date not given]

[Text] In accordance with Articles 47 and 51 of the Republic of
Armenia law, "On the Military Obligation," I hereby decree:

1. In October-December 1992 to perform a callup to the
army of reserve officers of the first group in the Republic of
Armenia, establishing a two-year term of duty.
2. The Republic of Armenia Government shall within a
week's time adopt the appropriate decree ensuring the
implementation of the present edict.

ARMS TRADE

Firm's Export of Military Experts Examined

934K0048A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 3, Jan 93 p 4

[Interview with an unidentified retired general by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent V. Savichev, place and date not given: "An Army for Export"]

[Text] *An ordinary "dorm" in the outskirts of Moscow; a seedy room with a nonfunctioning telephone and two retired generals—not much to look at if one thinks of an image of a firm officially engaged in foreign employment for military servicemen. At first glance, it is hard to believe that this is the point of origin for a quiet domestic military "brain drain." Our correspondent interviewed one of these retired generals.*

[Savichev] There are more than enough military servicemen who are out of business today. It is my understanding that you are not wanting for clients.

[General] I want to make it clear from the start: We deal only with civilians. All our clients are military servicemen transferred to the reserves. It is true, though—there are many who wish to work abroad. We would not take just anyone as a client, however. We will not be able to help an officer who just graduated from a military school last year. Our foreign partners insist on very strict terms. They need specialists with many years of practical work experience.

[Savichev] What kind of specialists are in greatest demand?

[General] As a rule, specialists in the most sophisticated types of equipment and armaments.

[Savichev] How do the state security organs feel about this? Many people who worked at defense enterprises are refused exit visas.

[General] Our specialists are experts in equipment that in the past was exported to some or other country. Today this type of equipment is no secret. Our clients go through all the exit-related procedures in accordance with existing law.

[Savichev] Do your operations include neighboring foreign countries?

[General] You will not find our clients in any of the "hot spots." We do not want anybody to profit from bloodshed.

[Savichev] In what countries is there the greatest demand for our military specialists?

[General] In the past, about 80 percent of all military equipment exports from the USSR went to the Near East. Therefore, the greatest demand for specialists is there.

[Savichev] Are our military specialists well regarded? What salaries do they fetch?

[General] Our specialists' standard of living is not comparable, of course, to that of the American military, but they live as well as local specialists. As to our experts' skills, they are, of course, higher by an order of magnitude.

[Savichev] How do you find your clients?

[General] Last year, in March, we put just one advertisement in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. This was enough.

[Savichev] Do you have any relations with the Ministry of Defense?

[General] Officially—no. I myself was transferred to the reserves last year, after serving for 25 years in the General Staff, 10th Department (whose job is military specialists' foreign assignments—Ed.). There are smart people working there, who see us first and foremost as helpers rather than competitors.

[Savichev] Who is the founder of your company?

[General] One of the founders is a military-insurance company. We take a certain percentage-based commission for our services, which includes both purely technical assistance to our client in processing the necessary papers, and consulting. We have established contacts with military attaché offices of the embassies both in our country and abroad.

From the editors.

The Army does need help today. Thousands of homeless, unemployed, without any rights, specialists in the business of war, are making an effort to find a future for themselves on their own. Some knock on the doors of foreign embassies, offering their services to some or other countries. There is probably nothing bad in having at least someone who will help them organizationally in this endeavor. But where is a guarantee that, while honestly earning their daily bread and shelter in faraway foreign countries, our compatriots (or the equipment they service) will not fire at their former combat comrades who, for instance, will be bringing order to some or other hot spot on the planet as part of a UN force? Where is a guarantee that companies that specialize in supplying military specialists to neighboring foreign countries are not operating under the cover of various cofounders? Despite all the noble motives, the operation of firms such as this is first and foremost a profitable business, which, along with illegal trade in equipment and arms, is confidently growing with the sanction of certain structures in the highest military echelon of power.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

IZVESTIYA Criticizes Use of Russian Mercenaries Abroad

PM2001094993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
16 Jan 93 p 8

["Editorial Viewpoint" article: "Mercenaries Must Be Outlawed"]

[Text] The incomprehensible willingness with which Russian citizens are participating in armed conflicts on the territory of neighboring sovereign states has assumed dangerous proportions. Russian volunteers are fighting on the side of Abkhazia, the Don and Kuban Cossacks are "monitoring the situation" in the Dniester Region, Siberians are "establishing order" in Serbia... The bolshevik concept of internationalist duty as the right to export one's own idea of

the fair organization of the world to other countries by means of bayonets is being revived not only in theory but, as we can see, also in practice.

Let us be blunt: The participation of Russian mercenaries in combat actions beyond Russia's borders is perceived as armed aggression. Aggression encouraged—how else is it to be understood?—by the Russian Government and parliament since they have not found the means to resolutely prevent it by using the law or at least by issuing an official condemnation. Unfortunately, the Russian authorities have still not expressed their attitude either to the Cossack campaigns in the Dniester Region or to the combat operations by mountain peoples in Abkhazia as though these were just army song and dance ensembles performing on the political stage in those places rather than tough, highly paid armed formations of volunteers.

"This is a fairly well tried system," St. Petersburg City Soviet Deputy Yuriy Belyayev, one of the Russian recruiting agents, said candidly without even trying to conceal his identity. "The fact is that we too will have to fight in the very near future. We are training detachments. The people and organization already exist. Everything is being done at a professional level... Russian [natsionalnyy] business is already grouping around us, the Russian national movement, and is contributing small but adequate sums of money."

Aleksandr Nevzorov, another recruiting agent who uses the state television channel as a recruiting station, is summoning volunteers to go to Abkhazia to "harvest the mandarins." And he advises them: You do not need any "instruments"—there are plenty in the zone of the bumper "harvest."

If such public statements do not elicit a response from the Russian authorities, this gives our neighbors grounds to suspect Moscow of harboring secret imperial ambitions. In order to end this dangerous ambiguity it is necessary to establish clear legal limits for those Russian citizens who, either for money or from conviction, are fighting in nearby and distant foreign parts. The civilized world defined its attitude toward mercenaries long ago and outlawed them.

"We also lean toward that view," Ivan Shalatonov, chief of the Russian President's State and Law Administration Department of Law Enforcement Organs and Questions of Security and Defense, told IZVESTIYA. "A draft document is now being prepared which will strictly regulate this practice or, more precisely, prevent it entirely. Most likely this will take the form of an edict from the president."

We had better be quick about it. Until the state's policy toward mercenaries is formulated and proclaimed with precise legal clarity the incursion of Russian volunteers into various sovereign countries will be perceived as encouraging aggression.

Purpose of Joint US-Polish Military Exercises Questioned

93UM0343A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 20 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Oskin: "Polish-American Maneuvers—Against Whom?"]

[Text] Information seeped into the Warsaw press that a plan has been developed for joint maneuvers between armed forces of the United States and the Republic of Poland. The exercises will take place this July in the airspace over the Baltic. The military aspect of this event is entirely apparent. The armed forces of the two countries use different aircraft, different systems of armament and communications. The Americans use F-16 aircraft, and the Poles—the MiG-29 and MiG-23.

In other words, the armed forces of one of the former Warsaw Pact countries and one of the NATO bloc countries have decided to undertake efforts to integrate their military systems. True, nothing is said here about whom the general staffs of these maneuvers have chosen as their "provisional enemy."

On the day prior, Poland's President Lech Walesa stated to Bill Clinton in a phone conversation that it was necessary to maintain a U.S. military presence in Europe.

It must be said that there have existed two points of view in Poland over the course of many decades concerning Polish foreign policy: one is pro-Western in nature, the other—an Eastern, Slavic point of view. During the years of the Communist regime, the pro-Western point of view existed as if in the underground, while the Eastern, pro-Soviet point of view prevailed. But today the situation has changed. The Eastern orientation, which democratic and reasonable forces now continue to share, seems to have gone into the shadows, and the pro-Western point of view has surfaced.

Several years ago, still a long time prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Waldemar Svirgon, secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, tried to convince me: "Reasonable Poles are afraid that, once again, there will be no place for Poland between a unified Germany and the Soviet Union." Perhaps such a point of view dictates to the Polish leadership a policy of strengthening military cooperation with the United States? I do not know.

There exists another point of view as well. Two very wise priests—one from Gdansk, and the other from Wroclaw—told me a significant time later that they saw Poland's future in the strengthening of its economic and cultural ties and its defensive alliance with Russia.

In recent years both sides—Poland and Russia—have done a great deal to move towards one another. Unfortunately, however, there exist certain influential forces in Warsaw which continue to intimidate residents with threats emanating from Ukraine, Russia, in short—from the now defunct USSR. They are calling for increased defense, membership in NATO, etc. And it is apparent that one of the integral parts of this propagandistic campaign is the planned military exercises between the armed forces of the United States and Poland.

I have nothing against the development of friendly relations between the armed forces of two sovereign states, of course. Moreover, I believe that cooperation between defense establishments facilitates the reinforcement of trust between countries, without a doubt. But evidently the military aims of the coming maneuvers have given way to a significant degree to their political aims.

Reasonable observers are asking themselves the question: Is it possible there exists such an extreme necessity for the armed forces of Poland and the United States to conduct large-scale military exercises over the Baltic? It would be interesting to see how the Polish leadership would react to the conduct of similar Russian-German exercises near the Polish border.

I would not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Polish Ministry of National Defense, but all the same I would venture to recommend to General Jerzy Gotowald, commander of the Polish Air Force, that joint Polish-Chinese maneuvers be planned. And these too over the Baltic. In addition, I could name another 20 countries or so which have air forces whose structures differ from that of the Republic of Poland Air Force. Perhaps it would make sense to conduct joint exercises with them as well! And also over the Baltic! But once again the problem arises: Who would the esteemed military leaders select in these instances as their "likely enemy"?

Some thought should be given to this. But most probably not by the military leaders—rather by political ones. And better still—by sensible political ones.

SECURITY SERVICES

Activities Of Latvian Home, Border Guards Detailed

93UNO421A Riga TEVIJAS SARGS in Latvian
No 5, Oct 92 p 3

[Volunteer national Guard and border guard chronicle]

[Text]

Volunteer national guard chronicle

09/14. Around 10 p.m. somebody attacked a volunteer national guard on Slokas Street and stole his bag with documents.

09/16. Near Daugavpils thermoelectric power Plant, S., a Polotsk resident, and Z., an Ogre resident, were detained with 50 kg and 100 kg of potatoes respectively. The detained confessed that they had dug the potatoes in a garden belonging to somebody else in Demene Pagasts.

09/19. In Daugavpils, a theft of 40 kg of bronze bearings from the "Lokomotiv" enterprise was prevented. The teenagers who were trying to steal the bearings ran away.

09/19. In Ventspils, a large-scale operation was carried out with the participation of police, volunteer national guards, and border guards. During this operation, near high school No 6, while trying to detain suspicious persons, national guard C. fired 4 times in the air from AK and one of the frontier guards fired 6 AK shots (at that time not directly up in the air but a little lower). At the bus station located

nearby, a young girl was wounded in the thigh. The wound was the size of a fist. The girl was rushed to the hospital, and both guns were taken for expert evaluation.

09/23. At the Rucava checkpoint, 7 foreigners from southern countries, suspected of being spies, were arrested by Kuldiga police and border guards of the Liepaja battalion. A gas gun was found.

From 10 p.m. 09/25 till 7 a.m. 09/26, an operation took place with participation of 270 volunteer national guards and police. Two cases of the use of weapons. There were no victims.

09/26. Two WWII mortar charges were found in Ligatne Pagasts. Information was sent to the Civil Defense headquarters.

09/30. at 1:25 a.m., men from the defense company of the Republican National guard staff extinguished a fire in a newspaper kiosk on Kalnciema Street at the trolley bus stop "Daugavgriva".

10/01. at 11:25 p.m., two VAZ cars, driving off the Suspension bridge, passed the Volunteer National guard headquarters and fired shots. The police were notified.

10/07. At night, volunteer national guards from the 53rd battalion detained poachers. A killed deer was confiscated as was a combat carbine with cartridges.

10/10. At 10:05 a.m. there was a call from a person on duty at the Customs Department: "I need help; somebody is breaking into the office of the Customs Department director". At 10:07 a.m., this information was given to the Special Task Unit ("SUV"). They went to the scene. At 10:37 a.m. a message was received that everything is OK in the Customs Department. At 10:38 there was a call from the Customs Department that the person on duty mistook construction workers for burglars.

1/13. Suspicious persons (who could be thieves) were noticed in drying-room of the "Rucava" share company. Volunteer guards from the 53rd Bauska battalion took care of the security of the drying-room. When it became dark, two persons drove to the drying-room and started to put electric motors which were partially disassembled earlier, in their truck. Both subjects caught red-handed were put on the ground by two guards. One guard remained with them and the other went to call the police. During the absence of the second guard, one of the infringers attacked the guard despite two warning shots; as a result, a fight began and one infringer was mortally wounded. The second infringer was arrested. Bauska Rayon Prosecutor's office is conducting the investigation.

10/16 around 10 p.m., in Riga in the area of "Teika", a volunteer guard from the 12th battalion killed a traffic violator who was trying to run away. The case is being handed over to the Prosecutor's office.

Border guard chronicle.

On September 9, border guards from the Liepaja battalion detained three trespassers who were trying to escape in a car

but drove into a ditch. A hand grenade was confiscated. Three thousand packs of cigarettes were found in the car.

On September 16, at the Ludza checkpoint in Zilupe, four CIS soldiers with unwrapped AKSU submachine guns were encountered in the Moscow - Riga train. They said that they had accompanied cargo to Russia and now were going to Riga to return to their unit in Estonia. Our border guards wanted to confiscate the weapons because the submachine guns at least needed to be in cases, but the CIS soldiers threatened to shoot.

On September 18, at 9:20 p.m., there was a message from the water police that an explosion was expected in an hour in the Riga commercial port. After emergency measures it was found that there would be no explosion.

On September 19, at 2:50 a.m. a local resident N., who was trying to steal weapons, was detained at the Kolka cordon. While detaining, the guards shot in the air.

On September 20, border guards took over from CIS the Perkone and Pope cordons.

On September 26, at 2:35 p.m., a group of Iraqi citizens tried to fly to Stockholm on the flight Riga - Stockholm. The trespassers were detained and two were arrested. Already at 4:15, the same Iraqis were trying to reach their target by bribing someone at the port. The ship to Sweden left without them. Europe could breathe freely but the failures threatened in broken Russian to get even.

At Zilupe station, Ludza border guards, while checking the Moscow - Riga train, found passenger V. to have a passport issued to the name of a Chinese Van Huan Ven. The finding was sent to the Foreign Ministry.

On October 2, at 6:56 p.m., a message was received from Copenhagen that terrorist Kangers Kasams was on a flight to Riga. There was nobody registered under this name at the border checkpoint of Riga airport.

On October 2, two Iraqi citizens were detained at the border checkpoint of Riga airport. The Iraqis were trying to fly to Stockholm with false passports.

On October 3, mushroom picker K. tried to go to Lithuania by a car, bypassing customs. After the soldier shot in the air, the trespasser stopped his car.

On October 14, unknown persons tried to steal a "Latvija" minivan and Zil-131 from the Selija battalion headquarters. One of them was caught and handed over to the police.

On October 14, seventeen Iraqi and four Iranian citizens were put off the train Moscow - Riga in Zilupe. All of them were Kurds. They said that they were refugees and wanted to go to Switzerland or Bulgaria. They did not have proper documents and therefore were sent back to Russia.

On October 16, at the border checkpoint Aizgarsha, a truck was detained which was illegally transporting 31 electric ranges from Russia.

Kazakhstan Edict on Internal Troops

935D0197A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 29 Oct 92 p 1

[Republic of Kazakhstan Presidential Edict signed by Republic of Kazakhstan President N. Nazarbayev, Alma-Ata, 28 October 1992: "Republic of Kazakhstan Presidential Edict on the Republic of Kazakhstan Internal Troops"]

[Text] While considering the need to further consolidate public safety and law and order and to improve the command and control system for the Republic of Kazakhstan Internal Troops,

I decree that:

1. The Republic of Kazakhstan Internal Troops are subordinate to the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of Internal Affairs.

2. To establish that the Republic of Kazakhstan Internal Troops Commander is at the same time the Republic of Kazakhstan Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and provides direct command and control of the internal troops.

To task the Republic of Kazakhstan Minister of Internal Affairs with overall leadership of the internal troops and responsibility for the official combat missions they carry out.

3. The Republic of Kazakhstan Cabinet of Minister will prepare draft laws on the introduction of changes and additions to the Republic of Kazakhstan Law "On the Republic of Kazakhstan Internal Affairs Organs" and "On the Republic of Kazakhstan Internal Troops" and submit them for review at the next Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet session.

[Signed] N. Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan
Alma-Ata, 28 October 1992

MVD Unit Attacked in Ingush Republic

93UM0245A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by Natalya Pachegina under the "North Caucasus" rubric: "Russian Investigators Attacked in Malgobek, Second Disarmament Operation Nets Little"]

[Text] The North Ossetia Armed Forces Press Center has informed NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that, on the evening of 6 December, armed persons attacked members of a Russian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] operational investigation brigade as they were returning to Nazran (Ingushetia) from Malgobek. According to Press Center employee Fatima Khabalova, the Russian investigators were on their way to Malgobek to "become familiar with the operational situation in the area," which has been the scene of some difficulties associated with a local leader's demand that the Russian troops be withdrawn from the Malgobek area of Ingushetia. The vehicle carrying the investigators was stopped as it was leaving the rayon center. Presentation of documents and the ensuing discussion had no effect on the fighters, who attempted to take the MVD workers hostage. The investigators were fired upon as they attempted to depart. In the return fire, two attackers were

killed and one—fatally wounded—died in a hospital to which the Russian investigators took him. The strength and allegiance of the Ingush fighting group have not been established. Ruslan Aushev, head of the Ingush Republic temporary administration, had this to say about the situation: "Russian investigators were attacked by a group of bandits operating on the territory of Ingushetia."

On the same day—6 December—forces assigned to the temporary administration of the SOSSR [North Ossetia] and IR [Ingush Republic] performed a second operation to disarm illegal armed units located on the soil of both republics. Confiscated in the village of Olginskiy (North Ossetia), Muzhichi and Dattykh (Ingushetia) were one BTR [armored personnel carrier], two BMPs [infantry combat vehicles], three grenades, eight hunting shotguns, a Berdan rifle, and ammunition of various calibers. No complaints have been received from the populace regarding the actions of the MVD members or Russian servicemen involved in the operation.

At night on 7 December, a Russian Interior Troops post was fired upon by unidentified persons in the settlement of Chmi in the Soviet area of Vladikavkaz. Neither side suffered any casualties, according to the SO [North Ossetian] Armed Forces.

On Monday, the temporary administration issued an announcement to the population of North Ossetia and Ingushetia on the subject of refugees and hostages located on the soil of both republics.

In a statement issued by Nazran, which NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA contacted for information, the attack on the Russian investigators in Malgobek was communicated as follows: "Servicemen mounted on a BTR opened fire on a private motor vehicle carrying Ingush persons. Two of the latter were killed outright, one died later."

Scope of Government, Commercial Corruption

93UM0321A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 93 pp 1,2

[Interview with Major-General Anatoliy Vasilyevich Trofimov, chief of the Directorate for Combatting Smuggling and Corruption under Russia's Ministry of Security, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Sergey Kalinayev under the rubric "Interviewee of the Day": "Corruption Is a Monster—If It Is Not Defeated, It Will Defeat Us"]

[Text]

His Calling Card

Anatoliy Vasilyevich Trofimov was born in 1940. He graduated from the Higher KGB School imeni F. Dzerzhinskiy. He served as investigator for the special department of the Turkestan Military District and senior investigator on especially important cases in the Central Asian Military District. He then served in the KGB Directorate for Moscow and Moscow Oblast, rising from senior investigator to deputy directorate chief. Since January 1992 he has headed the Directorate for Combatting Smuggling and Corruption of Russia's Ministry of Security. He is a major general.

He is married and has two sons, one of them a senior lieutenant in the Russian army.

[Kalinayev] Anatoliy Vasilyevich, in our difficult, torturous, so to speak, transitional period, the spontaneously changing situation itself is opening up brilliant opportunities for unscrupulous officials. In addition to the fact that they are "siphoning off" enormous amounts of funds belonging to the people and the state into their own pockets, there is another real and no less frightening prospect that the growing corruption could lead to a breakdown of control and reliability of the state system. I refer primarily to the combining of main jobs with jobs in the commercial structures by representatives of central authority and management. How do you view these problems?

[Trofimov] In answer to the first part of your question, I would say that the circumstances of the transitional period are indeed creating new preconditions for the rapid spread of corruption. The current outbreak and growth of crimes of avarice and abuse of position are due in great part to the uncertainty and instability of the situation: the economic crisis, the breakdown of the monetary and financial system and the weakness of state institutions designed to ensure legality and the interests of the individual. Legal nihilism is taking root in the public mind, and an attitude of "self-protection" and "survival," of acquiring the means of survival by any available means, including unlawful methods, is emerging.

How does one classify, let us say, the combining of positions in a commercial structure with state positions in which a direct influence can be exerted upon the success of entrepreneurial undertakings?

Or take, for example, hiring for a very high-pay job with large bonuses the wife or some other relative of a state official upon whom the prosperity of the commercial structure directly depends. A certain person we know, a top administrative worker, performing services which were not a part of his direct, official duties, accepted offers to become a member of the board and the oversight council and a share-holder or to go abroad to attend a symposium or a seminar and to deliver lectures, where a line of credit in hard currency would be opened for him. There are records of offers being made to him to become a member of a joint-stock company whose founders include a French bank. The form of the gratuity has changed since the president of Russia issued the Edict on Combatting Corruption Within the State Service System. As payment for services involved in getting space made available, the French company gave his wife a job, a joint enterprise hired his daughter, and another joint enterprise hired his brother-in-law as a member of a foreign firm's mission in England for a two-year term.

And what about the body of deputies? It does more than just pass laws conducive or detrimental to entrepreneurial undertakings, after all. At the lower level, through the so-called local self-government agencies at the level of the rayon and settlement, it has a direct influence upon economic activities. And we have deputies cochairing various charitable foundations and societies, joint enterprises and

cooperatives. We have memoirs of newly appeared political figures published in large editions for incredible royalties.

The scope of the corruption is also indicated by the following fact. Experts estimate that as many as 40 percent of the entrepreneurs and two thirds of the commercial structures are involved in corrupt activities today. Banks, management agencies for state property, law-enforcement agencies, tax services, customs control agencies, foreign economic structures and trade organizations and enterprises have been particularly susceptible.

The causes of this development of the situation lie in the former state control not just of the economy but of the nation's entire public life: the distributive system for regulating socioeconomic affairs; the significant body of state employees, the size of which was inconsistent with real need, and the concentration of distributive and decision-making functions; the existence of a "nomenklatura" to whom the proclaimed principle of equality of all before the law did not apply; perverted concepts of social justice and stereotypical "official-bureaucratic" thinking.

Now, about the second point. How could we speak of reliability and controllability of the state system, when, as one of the speakers at the 7th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia said, laws, edicts and instructions from agencies of authority and management get only 15- to 20-percent observance at the lower levels. There is practically no system for monitoring their observance and no system of sanctions for violating them. There is no question that we need a fundamental reform of the entire institution of state service, precisely defined laws and regulations on the conduct of officials, and a financial foundation for enhancing the prestige of and appreciation for the position of state employee.

Not until the official values and protects his position within the rigid guidelines of his rights and duties, reliably monitored by the community, by his immediate superiors and by financial oversight and law-enforcement agencies, will the system have control and reliability.

Another, also fairly long and difficult route toward this is to develop market structures and gradually reduce the system. This must be done intelligently, however, in no way forcing the process or permitting it simply to proceed on its own, as happened during the years of the restructuring. And it absolutely must have a precisely defined legal basis. This is exactly why we need a law. And not just one law but at least two—a Law on Combatting Corruption and a Law on State Service—which would specify for officials what they may and may not do. We absolutely must also make appropriate changes in criminal and criminal-procedural legislation, coordinating them with these laws.

[Kalinayev] The amount of social and economic crime is growing today, as we know. Members of our "national" criminal set are mastering new stratagems, successfully taking advantage of foreign know-how and, naturally, exploiting those in authority. Take bogus bankruptcy, for example, the concealment of income from taxation, swindling on the stock exchange and so forth. Are these things within your jurisdiction?

[Trofimov] In my opinion, we absolutely must deal with this, the same as internal affairs agencies and the prosecutor's office. For one thing, the illegal activities are affecting areas and assuming such a scale that they threaten state security. In addition they are becoming increasingly international. I am therefore absolutely opposed to a monopoly on combatting them by any single law-enforcement department. Positive results can be achieved only through joint efforts by all of our structures and with close coordination and well-organized interaction. Particularly, since crime today—I would make the comparison—is not a scarce commodity which has to be fought over.

Interacting with internal affairs agencies, the prosecutor's office, customs and the state tax service, our agencies are contributing to the campaign against economic crime. During the first phase of Operation Sweep, for example, we filed 120 criminal charges and intercepted the removal of more than 665,000 tons of petroleum and petroleum products, 9,400 tons of nonferrous and rare-earth metals, and more than 43,000 cubic meters of timber and lumber worth more than 6.6 billion rubles. The value of the goods and materials saved for the nation is now approaching 20 billion rubles.

I can cite other examples as well.

We are continuing to investigate a group of corrupt personnel and thieves uncovered in the Yuvelirprom MPO [Production and Marketing Association] and other individuals linked to them, whose activities have cost the state many millions.

The investigation has revealed a system whereby officials at the KamAZ marketing center take bribes through workers planted at the center and criminal elements. Corrupt ties have been established between them and law-enforcement agents. We have uncovered significant financial and economic abuses, the concealment of income from taxation and other violations of the laws on the enterprise and on entrepreneurial activities.

We have exposed a criminal group which defrauded a certain economic structure out of almost 10 million rubles worth of property. That same group fraudulently obtained special-purpose, short-term loans totally almost 60 million rubles through its corrupt ties with a commercial bank.

A worker with the Mosfilm movie concern was caught red-handed accepting a bribe in the amount of 10,000 U.S. dollars.

Unfortunately, the establishment of new, private entrepreneurial economic structures has also allowed corruption to penetrate into the armed forces. Files on certain officials at garrisons in Riga and Tallin have been turned over to the Baltic Fleet. They sold written-off submarines abroad, causing the fleet a loss amounting to 716,200 U.S. dollars. Criminal charges have also been filed there in connection with a shortage of 338 tons of diesel fuel at a fleet rear-service depot, which was issued upon presentation of bogus checks for military units which have already been disbanded. The loss amounted to around 104,000 U.S. dollars.

I could cite dozens of such examples, unfortunately.

[Kalinayev] The corruption takes many forms and is all-embracing, but, in my opinion, it has clasped its tentacles particularly firmly around all of the privatization processes....

[Trofimov] We are very troubled by the enormous money supply which has been placed into circulation and is practically uncontrolled, a significant portion of which is out of the country. It is frequently concentrated in the hands of specific physical and legal persons, including many criminal elements. With their corrupt ties they are able to acquire extensive property in Russia in the course of the privatization, absolutely unhindered, which could enable them in the future to gain control over entire economic sectors or individual regions of the nation. The Ministry of Security has information on plans being hatched up for this purpose by certain foreign firms, including some involved in the drug trade who intend to "launder" dirty money in this way.

We now have information indicating that Western firms "had prepared" for the privatization of state property in the former USSR, planning to buy up a significant portion of the production facilities through planted individuals or organizations. They believe that there will be a rigid quota on the sale of enterprises to foreign firms, even for hard currency, and in order to buy them through planted organizations (and the best way is through public organizations), they will need Soviet money in the form of clearing accounts in Soviet banks. Some firms and banks are already offering to exchange very large sums (billions and more) at rates below the exchange rate. The Soviet money is not transferred but placed into accounts in banks of the CIS states, and the hard currency is deposited with banks abroad. For a bribe and at the Western firm's instructions the bank director will then transfer the Soviet money to the account of a privatized entity.

[Kalinayev] The readers undoubtedly want to know about the exposure of high-ranking officials. What means and methods do you use in this area of your work?

[Trofimov] The means and methods we use are established and stipulated in the Law on Operational Investigative Work and the Law on Federal State Security Agencies. These laws have been published. They are not classified, and the reader can learn about these things from the original sources, so to speak.

With respect to high officials, the readers' desire to learn some bit of sensational news is understandable. I have nothing to add to what V.P. Barannikov said at the congress of people's deputies, however. He named some fairly high-ranking officials in his statement.

I would like to mention one acute problem in connection with this question, though. For many years we have proclaimed the principle of equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of official position or social status. At the same time we ourselves violate that principle, making written and unwritten exceptions to the law. In years past the so-called "nomenklatura" was above the law. Today this

is a sizeable new group of citizens: people's deputies, judges, workers with the prosecutor's office. There are many examples of these people resorting to criminality for their own interests, however, including acts of corruption. I believe we need to change this situation, to move from a proclaimed principle of equality to real equality of all before the law.

[Kalinayev] In an article entitled "Bribes: A Game Which Almost Everyone Plays," Kerry Goldberg states that corruption in Russia "is beyond all imagination." I personally do not doubt that this is true. The newspaper also states that the campaign against it "receives no special support from lawmakers and businessmen, for whom the corruption is advantageous, even though they publicly condemn it." What is this: "Intrigues of the West," as we used to call it? Or is there a grain of truth in it?

[Trofimov] There is a grain of truth—a fairly large one—in it, of course. I have already mentioned the gaps in the law. Frankly, one has the impression that we are in no special hurry to fill them in.

On the other hand, this might be a certain negative reaction by a significant portion of the society to various kinds of prohibitive measures and to the expanded rights and authority of law-enforcement agencies. Certain of the mass media have made a considerable effort in this direction, and continue to do so.

In the situation of political instability and spiritual and economic crisis there are various forces not interested in organizing a real, full-scale campaign against corruption. This is true of the emerging field of business as well. We know that in the situation of a developing market there is a struggle for a place in it. World experience indicates that this struggle is frequently conducted with the most harsh, sometimes cruel, methods.

Some businessmen are now clearly attempting to establish a monopoly in this or that area. There is very stiff competition. Unacceptable methods are frequently used, including assistance from the criminal world. This represents a growth of that economic and other criminality about which you spoke. Furthermore, corruption is employed not just to derive illegal gains but also as a "safety umbrella" to cover the crimes.

[Kalinayev] We know of some instances of corruption and bribery of law-enforcement workers. The criminal structures are sometimes given unauthorized counsel for bribes. There have been cases in which classified information has been provided. What do you think is the cause of this betrayal of the service?

[Trofimov] Yes, such things have occurred. I have already mentioned some of them. I should say, however, that they are not widespread. As far as the law-enforcement agents are concerned, we should not forget that they are members of our society. Furthermore, they are members of that state system whose problems we are discussing. All of the processes occurring in it also affect them.

At the same time, those things which are intolerable in the society as a whole are particularly unacceptable in special agencies expected to combat these ugly deeds. All of the cases of betrayal we expose are therefore assessed from a standpoint of principle, and conclusions are drawn for the future.

Incidentally, since the subject has been brought up, I want to underscore the fact that this is yet another reason—perhaps the most important—why I am personally against a monopoly on combatting crime and corruption by any single agency. The monopolist will inevitably become the target and to some degree, the victim, of crime.

[Kalinayev] Do you not think, Anatoliy Vasilyevich, that even the most well-conceived and focused but singular efforts will not be enough to overcome the evil consuming the society, that we must have an integrated system for combatting corruption and bribery and a normal legal basis? The edict issued by the President of Russia, "On Combatting Corruption in State Service," is one of the first steps in this direction. What do you see in the future for this work?

[Trofimov] A lot has already been said on this subject. In view of the importance of the problem, however, I would stress the fact that we must develop a state program for combatting organized crime—and for combatting corruption, an inseparable element of it. The program must include coordinated political, economic, legal, organizational, social, indoctrinational and special operational measures.

With respect to legal support for this work, the prime task is that of working out and passing a set of laws governing the economic (primarily foreign economic) and finance and banking activities and focusing on reforming state service and combatting organized crime and corruption.

All of these issues are reflected in the special decree issued at the 7th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. It also discusses the need for certain fundamental steps to reorganize this work and switch it onto practical rails, to move from words to action.

We are all tired of talk about the need for a determined campaign against corruption and of proclamations and decisions on the matter. It is time to roll up our sleeves and become serious, to stop sweeping under the rug the objective and subjective circumstances hampering the work in this area.

KGB Alpha Unit Reportedly Training Anti-Coup Force

93P40098A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
16 Jan 93 pp 1,4

[Report by Sami 'Ammarah]

[Text] Moscow—Informed sources in Moscow have disclosed that the Kremlin agency responsible for the preparation of special forces is training them in the suburbs of Moscow to counter new coup attempts against the Russian leadership. The sources told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that these forces are being trained by a number of senior leaders of the Alpha team, which form the KGB's special forces and are composed primarily of troops which have returned from Afghanistan and KGB officers seconded from the service. Among other things, it was said that "Representatives of organized crime have found their place in the sun of these units."

The sources said that the formation of such forces corroborates the fact that President Boris Yeltsin no longer trusts the interior, defense, and security forces. Mikhail Poltoranin, the head of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] information agency and the effective number-two man in the Kremlin today criticized the ministers of the interior and security who have remained silent about the coup attempt which took place shortly before the people's deputies' congress in December, according to Kremlin sources. He said that the president had reported this attempt at the time and that the parliament should report the attempt and its decision to remove them [the ministers]. Poltoranin disclosed that Gennadiy Burbulis, the former first counselor to President Yeltsin who resigned his post under opposition pressure, is still in his position at the side of the president, where he is forming an international "strategy" center for political scientists and preparing to announce the foundation of the president's party.

Informed sources indicate that Mikhail Poltoranin warned a group critical of the Russian leadership in his meeting with Russian television workers the day before yesterday of the consequences of backsliding. He said that "You may work within the framework of your job but I will not permit you to practice politics," similar to what former President Mikhail Gorbachev said to President Yeltsin upon his "ouster" from the Communist Party leadership in Moscow and the politburo of the party, when he warned "I will not permit you to return to politics!"


The signs indicate that the next few weeks in Moscow will witness a comprehensive information campaign in support of the president and the referendum which will be implemented on 11 April. It has been decided that Mikhail Poltoranin will be responsible for this campaign by virtue of his new position as head of the CIS information agency.

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